Democracy For Nepal

The peace process seems to have remained at a stalemate even after the sending of a joint letter to the United Nations on August 9, 2006 by the government and the Maoists, requesting the monitoring of the ceasefire, seeking assistance for the "management of arms and armed personnel of both sides," and for observing the constituent assembly election.

The letter does not, however, elaborate on the modalities of these issues, particularly the procedures and appropriate timing of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) or the process of reforming the Nepal Army (NA). These contentious issues have again been sidestepped. We know that the peace process could once again be in jeopardy as it was when the issues of arms management and the timing of DDR arose after the government sent a letter to the UN seeking assistance for decommissioning the PLA, without informing or prior consultation with the Maoists.

Theoretically and practically, "arms management" is an integral part of DDR, which must be conducted in good faith and with a cooperative approach as part of any peaceful resolution to the conflict, rather than used as a way to provoke another party to the conflict.

Although arms management as part of a broader DDR strategy is essential for a peace agreement, a peace process dominated by arms management alone destabilizes the efforts to end the 10-year-old-conflict. Although all peace agreements or settlements incorporate DDR in one form or another, there are additional political and outside factors that can contribute to or obstruct its success.

Disarmament expert, Joana Spear, outlines in a book entitled, Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, five main factors that determine the success of DDR. They include the feasibility of the agreement and its aims; the implementation environment; the capability and resources of international implementers; the attitude of warring parties; and effective verification. Several of these are not yet present for a successful DDR process in Nepal.

First, as previously mentioned, issues of DDR have been used as tools by the parties to the conflict to provoke the other, indicating a reserved attitude towards taking genuine and significant steps towards DDR.

Second, many members of the international community have tried to force decisions regarding disarmament. The United States, the European Union, Japan and India have all insisted upon disarmament of the PLA prior to the Maoists joining an interim government. The strategy for DDR and the peace agreement must be "owned" by Nepalis, rather than, as is so often the case, developed by outside actors.

There are examples from Afghanistan with its new, but western, constitution to Mozambique where disputes erupted during DDR because the UN Angola Verification Mission (1993-1995) used the term "disengagement." While it is wise to consider the advice of friends, ultimately the strategy for DDR must be "homegrown." Forcing decisions and setting timelines and criteria is not the responsibility of the international community, but rather of the Nepalis themselves. Such strong-arming only weakens the peace process and efforts for political transition, thereby strengthening autocratic forces in Nepal.

Third, there have not been sufficient confidence-building measures taken to instill trust between the two parties to begin DDR. Although the parties can hold dialogues and begin to strategize, immediate implementation of DDR, particularly the disarmament of the PLA, is not feasible. Considering the still very questionable loyalty of the NA, the rash and rather unilateral statements of some political leaders, and that steps to ensure political space for the Maoists are still heavily debated, disarmament of one side would create an imbalance of power and a sense of insecurity among former combatants, which would surely disrupt the wider peace process.

The process for DDR should be clearly laid out in terms of timing, stages, sequencing, etc… in order to make guarantees to both parties. Trust must be built slowly between the two, through statements, with concessions, and by following through on previous understandings and agreements.

Fourth, DDR and reforms to the security sector must be conducted concurrently with development programs, otherwise reintegration is not feasible. If the future of ex-combatants (both PLA and NA) is uncertain either could revert back to violence, extortion, or other crimes. Development strategies (economic, educational, health care, and political) play an important role in halting the emergence of new armed-groups and discouraging vigilantism, both of which if unaddressed could create insecurity that will quickly destabilize the state and the peace agreement.

During the peace process in El Salvador (1991-1995) not having a shared strategy regarding land ownership caused a significant setback. In Uganda, those who were injured and disabled from fighting in the civil war later disrupted the political transition due to their sacrifices being ignored. Job opportunities, acknowledgement of past service, and land are just some of the issues that can create stumbling blocks to effective DDR if development is not included in the operational strategies of the agreement and in the national strategy.

Fifth, the two parties have not fully developed the aims, or end goals, for reforming the security sector and completing DDR. Until they develop objectives, there cannot be a comprehensive strategy developed. These objectives must be developed in consultation with civil society, political entities, and the public-at-large. If the objectives do not meet the needs of the Nepali people, no amount of reform will result in a sustainable peace. This leads to the final point; there will not be a conducive environment for effective DDR if the peace process is not made more transparent. Thus far, the proceedings have been relatively concealed from the public. The process, to be accepted by the people, should be more transparent, and the agreement, including points on DDR and security sector reform, should address the needs and concerns of the people.

The current "private" method of the peace process provides opportunities for both the sides to take non-binding positions, and an agreement will be less likely to address some of the security and justice needs of the victims of the conflict.

End goals, development, needs of the public, transparency, security for free and fair participation in the constituent assembly election, confidence-building measures, the role and responsibilities of national and international verifiers, and simultaneous DDR and security sector reforms should be discussed and laid out in detail.

As preparations for the monitoring and management of arms continue, the concerns raised in this article must be considered and dealt with in an environment of cooperation. If these issues remain unaddressed, or decided upon without public input, full implementation of DDR and reforming the NA and other state security structures will not be feasible.

(The writer, human rights defender and conflict resolution practitioner, holds a Masters Degree in Peace and Justice Studies from the University of San Diego, USA)

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Democracy For Nepal

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Thursday, August 17, 2006

Contents 2006

Shobhakar Budhathoki: Imperatives Of Effective DDR