ICG: Nepal's Election And Beyond

Nepal’s ELECTION and BEYOND
Asia Report N°149 – 2 April 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS i
I. INTRODUCTION 1
II. The Run-up 2
A. How the Elections Were Put Back on Track 2
B. Parties and Alliances 3
1. Manifestos and party positioning 3
2. Candidates 4
3. Alliances 4
C. Beyond The Parties 5
D. A Conducive Environment? 6
E. Possible Spoilers 7
III. The ELEctions 8
A. The Electoral System 8
B. The Role of the Election Commission 10
C. The Preparations 10
1. Technical preparations 10
2. Security arrangements 11
3. Voter awareness 12
D. Possible Electoral Malpractice 13
E. Election Observation 14
IV. The AFTERMATH 16
A. Repolling 16
B. The Count 16
C. The Results 17
D. Reactions: Acceptance, Appeal or Rejection 18
V. A Challenging Transition 19
A. A Roadmap for the Interregnum? 19
B. The Constituent Assembly’s First Sitting 20
C. Possible Destabilising Factors 21
VI. Constituent Assembly and Beyond 22
A. The Nature of the Constituent Assembly 22
B. The Big Issues 23
C. Public Participation 24
VII. Conclusion 25
APPENDICES
Map of Nepal 26
Glossary of Acronyms 27
About the International Crisis Group 29
International Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Asia 30
International Crisis Group Board of Trustees 32


Asia Report N°149 2 April 2008
Nepal’S ELECTION AND BEYOND

Executive Summary and recommendations

Nepal’s peace process faces a crucial test this month. Elections for a Constituent Assembly (CA) are likely to go ahead on 10 April 2008 as scheduled but political unrest and violence could mar – or even derail – preparations, and the aftermath could bring turbulence. Elections in a delicate post-conflict situation are never straightforward and Nepal has many possible flashpoints, not least that the two armies that fought the war remain intact, politically uncompromising and combat-ready. Once results are in, all political players must be prepared for a difficult period in which they will need to compromise to make the CA an effective body, extend the number of parties with a role in government and urgently tackle crucial issues left aside during the campaign, including security sector reform. The international community has an important election observation function and should listen to Nepal’s political and civil society groups in assessing the credibility of the process.

Successful elections for a CA charged with writing a new constitution and serving as an interim legislature would be a major step forward. It would be a psychological and concrete achievement for the political leadership after two failed attempts that would vindicate the sometimes controversial concessions made to recalcitrant groups, which made the peace process possible. It would also be welcomed by the international community. India wants a successful conclusion to the roadmap it was closely involved in designing, while credible elections would open the way to a significant scaling back of the UN role. Although underlying issues remain, holding the polls would signal the short-term success of the recent deals with protesting groups.

There are many positive signs. All parties moved quickly into campaign mode, nominating candidates and launching programs to attract voters. A vibrant media reporting news and offering critical scrutiny is narrowing the deficit in public awareness of the electoral system and party positions. Given the momentum, it would be hard for any major party to back out of the elections, although some, including the Maoists, are still wary of the process.

Nevertheless, major challenges remain. The campaign has been dogged by violence and intimidation. While the Maoists appear to have been responsible for most assaults on rival candidates, they have had eight of their party workers killed – a fact which the mainstream media has chosen to downplay. Public security has been dismal throughout the ceasefire, and armed groups in the lowlands have carried out killings, bombings and abductions and threatened further violence. The considerable technical challenges of holding an election have been exacerbated by a complex, nearly opaque parallel electoral system that involves three separate means of selecting members of the CA. The widely respected Election Commission, charged with managing all aspects of the exercise, has no experience of logistics. In previous elections, those, along with back-up security, were managed by the army, which the peace agreement has now largely confined to barracks.

The post-poll period will likely be difficult and dangerous. Under the best of circumstances, it will probably take three weeks to determine final results. Significant repolling is expected to be required in areas where there was violence or disruption on election day – adding weeks more to the schedule. There will certainly be appeals from losing parties, and public frustration at the delay in learning results may add to a tense atmosphere. Parties will trade allegations of fraud and violence. The behaviour of powerful losers will shape the immediate aftermath. Some, in particular the Maoists, may even be tempted to reject the entire election: the best possible results for them will not reflect their actual power on the ground (exercised through continuing parallel structures). Royalists cannot hope to gain enough seats to block the move towards a republic.

If the major political forces accept the results and move forward without severe confrontation and acrimony, the transition will be manageable. However, each step will present obstacles that demand maturity and cooperation from party leaders. The formation of a new unity government – which will need to include members beyond the current seven-party coalition – will prompt much haggling. The convening of the CA, whose first sitting must take place within three weeks of final poll results and which is set to discard the monarchy, will be even more problematic. Transitional arrangements are only vaguely covered by the Interim Constitution; how they work out in practice will depend on political compromise. Yet, the CA will have to deal with tough issues, including the drafting of the constitution and addressing security sector reform, federalism, the role of the monarchy, secularism and inclusiveness.

While attention has focused on the elections, there has been no progress on the fundamentals of the peace process. Many critical agreements have not been implemented, inter-party consensus and mutual trust are fragile, and the military ceasefire, which has held since April 2006, has yet to be transformed into structures for a sustainable peace. Public aspirations for peace and socio-economic reform remain high but are matched by scepticism towards political leaders. This is the best chance for politicians to redeem themselves.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Nepal:
1. Improve security so as to ensure an environment conducive to free and fair elections on 10 April 2008 by:
(a) providing solid guidance and political support to the Nepal Police and Armed Police Force, and training and deploying temporary police, ensuring they are non-partisan and carry out their duties with neutrality;
(b) improving security arrangements for candidates and party campaign workers; and
(c) basing all security plans on local community support and respect for human rights.
2. Build on the agreements with protesting groups by:
(a) implementing fully the agreements with the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF) and the Federal Republican National Front;
(b) pushing for negotiations with armed militant groups on an election ceasefire, while strengthening security in sensitive areas; and
(c) encouraging moderate Madhesi leaders to use their influence to urge armed groups to drop plans to disrupt the polls.
3. Guard against giving openings for Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Nepal Army (NA) militants to assert more influence over proceedings; clarify the code of conduct for both armies in the election period; and move urgently to begin discussions on security sector reform so the PLA has an incentive to remain in cantonments.
4. Move beyond solely seven-party cooperation to involve all parties contesting the elections in discussions on security and the creation of a free and fair electoral environment.
5. Keep working on other critical elements of the peace process and in particular:
(a) implement the 23-point agreement and other accords; and
(b) abide by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and ceasefire code of conduct.

To the Election Commission of Nepal:
6. Enforce the election code of conduct strictly and impartially, maintaining pressure on all parties to cease intimidation and other malpractice, such as the widespread misuse of state resources for campaigning.
7. Continue with voter education and other publicity efforts and in particular prepare the public for potentially slow announcements of results by increased publicity explaining the count procedure and realistic timeframes.
8. Make plans for dealing rapidly with politically sensitive post-election appeals and repolling.

To National Election Observers:
9. Carry out observation and reporting impartially and professionally, dismissing any observers who are linked to political parties and avoiding inflammatory assessments before and after the elections.

To the Media:
10. Adhere to the standards set out in the election Code of Conduct and exercise responsibility in the accurate and impartial reporting of election-related violence.

To the Political Parties:
11. Commit unambiguously to free and fair elections by:
(a) promising to accept the results of a credible poll, whatever they may be;
(b) abiding by the election code of conduct, including ceasing all violence and intimidation;
(c) exercising restraint and responsibility in mobilising student and youth cadres for legitimate election campaigning, not as private security forces; and
(d) educating voters about the electoral system.
12. Prepare for the difficult post-election period by building cross-party consensus on managing the transition, including:
(a) forging a minimum agreement on dealing with post-election recriminations and maintaining consensus on moving forward;
(b) using formal procedures to resolve any complaints regarding the election process or results;
(c) agreeing on the broad framework for negotiations to form a new government; and
(d) clarifying and publicising the procedure by which pre-election agreements, including the implementation of a federal democratic republic at the CA’s first sitting, will be implemented.
13. Build common ground on procedural issues such as the formation of CA committees and the division of business between the CA as a constitution-drafting body and as a legislature.
14. Make clear commitments for public participation in the constitutional process.

To the International Community, in particular India, China, U.S., EU and UN:
15. Election observers should:
(a) publicise international electoral standards and the principal benchmarks by which they will assess the polls, as well as explain the consequences of failure to meet those standards and benchmarks;
(b) coordinate their deployment to maximise coverage across the country and make the most of relatively small numbers; and
(c) coordinate on main statements to avoid public confusion and achieve as much unity as possible on the overall assessment.
16. Condemn all election-related violence, pressure all parties to abide by the code of conduct and encourage the Election Commission and security forces to use their powers in a non-partisan manner.
17. Prepare for the post-election period by:
(a) reminding all parties they must accept the outcome;
(b) supporting the Election Commission, politically and practically, on any necessary repolling;
(c) urging and supporting the formation of a power-sharing unity government; and
(d) listening to judgments by Nepali political and civil society groups in assessing the credibility of the electoral process.
18. Offer technical and financial assistance for establishing mechanisms to ensure meaningful public participation in the constitutional process and work to coordinate proposed training and orientation programs for CA members.
Kathmandu/Brussels, 2 April 2008

Asia Report N°149 2 April 2008
Nepal’S ELECTION AND BEYOND

I. INTRODUCTION

The December 2007 deal that brought the Maoists back into government and the February 2008 agreement to end a second Madhesi movement in the Tarai plains put Nepal’s Constituent Assembly (CA) elections back on track. The seven-party governing coalition remains at loggerheads on many issues, but all its components insist they want the elections to go ahead as scheduled on 10 April 2008.

The country has considerable experience of elections. Following the first general elections in 1959, the Panchayat period of palace rule offered little chance for meaningful polls, and a 1980 referendum on the Panchayat system was widely seen as rigged. But 1991 multiparty elections managed a smooth transition to democratic rule. The general elections of that year as well as 1994 and 1999 were regarded as broadly free and fair (despite local malpractices by most parties), were well managed considering the logistical challenges, and had high turnouts. This is, however, the first time Nepalis will elect a constitution-drafting body, though calls for such an assembly go back to the early 1950s.

Most parties are treating the campaign in the same manner as past general elections. This is encouraging insofar as it suggests a return to normality but indicates they are underplaying the significantly different role a CA will play – even though it will also function as a legislature. The sense of comfort is likewise fragile. The momentum to hold the polls appears unstoppable, but last-minute hurdles could still delay or derail the process, especially if major players become more worried about the likely results.

II. The Run-up

A. How the Elections Were Put Back on Track

By December 2007 the peace process was at an impasse. The Maoists walked out of the interim government on 18 September when new demands were not met by the other parties. Negotiations on a deal to bring them back into government and set another date for the twice-delayed elections were stalled until a flurry of talks achieved success on 23 December.
The 23-point agreement between the six governing parties and the Maoists addressed the main issues, committing to making Nepal a federal democratic republic as soon as the CA convenes and to implementing still incomplete aspects of the peace process. A third amendment to the Interim Constitution (IC) on 28 December reflected the new commitments, most notably the implementation of the republic at the CA’s first sitting, an increase in the number of CA seats to be elected by proportional representation (PR) and clarification that the king no longer has any powers, and the prime minister will officiate as head of state until the republic is implemented. The Maoists rejoined the government on 30 December, with their previous five ministerial positions and two additional state ministers. The 10 April election date was announced on 11 January 2008.

The road forward was not smooth. The Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF), which had spearheaded the Madhesi movement of January-February 2007, was joined in December 2007 by Rajendra Mahato’s Sadbhavana Party (which had split from the Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi), NSP(A), which remained in the government) and a new party, the Tarai Madhesi Democratic Party (TMDP), established by former Nepali Congress (NC) minister Mahant Thakur. These three parties formed a loose alliance, the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), which launched a new wave of protests from 19 January 2008 and an indefinite Tarai bandh (shutdown) from 13 February, demanding greater representation in the CA polls and a single Madhesi federal state. Some of the protests were provocative, even violent (one armed police officer was killed); a harsh state response led to the deaths of six protestors. Although the shutdown hit the country hard, producing shortages and price-hikes in Kathmandu, it was not sufficient to disrupt the nomination of candidates for the elections. With both sides under pressure to negotiate, India stepped in to take a surprisingly public mediation role, hosting some critical talks in its embassy.

After frantic last-minute haggling during which MJF leader Upendra Yadav threatened to pull out, the government and the UDMF signed an eight-point agreement on 28 February. The deal was enough to call off the protests, and there were both victory rallies and widespread relief in Tarai towns. However, its content was vague, and it was not clear that either side had made serious concessions other than to allow election preparations to go ahead. Thanks to a deadline extension by the Election Commission, the Madhesi parties filed nominations, as did former royalist Prime Minister Surya Bahadur Thapa’s Rashtriya Janashakti Party (RJP), which had threatened a boycott if the Tarai issue was not resolved.

Madhesis were not the only determined protestors. A coalition of hill and Tarai ethnic groups had formed a Federal Republican National Front (FRNF), which also called strikes and threatened to disrupt the elections. Three days after the Madhes deal, the government concluded a five-point agreement with the FRNF, which brought an end to its protests, by promising a federal republic that would emphasise the rights of ethnic groups and guarantee their proportional representation in all branches of the state.

Elections once more appeared possible, but the agreements that cleared the way were reached under great external pressure, and their durability has been in question from the start. Some of the seven parties themselves were quick to repudiate the eight-point agreement, while the Nepal Army (NA) insisted it would not accept group Madhesi recruitment. Other elements may or may not materialise. A sceptical observer commented: “You have a government that can’t provide electricity or collect rubbish promising the details of a federal system that’s yet to be agreed upon”. There has been almost no progress on the fundamentals of the peace process, including implementation of the 23-point agreement. Seven-party consensus is fragile and relations often antagonistic.

B. Parties and Alliances

1. Manifestos and party positioning

The parties moved rapidly into election mode. The Maoists were the first to start mass training to prepare their activists for the campaign, but others quickly followed, building on their interrupted preparations for the postponed November 2007 polls. The Maoists were also the first of the major parties to publish their manifesto, on 7 March, quickly followed by the Communist Party (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML) on 9 March and the NC on 13 March.

The major parties’ manifestos follow similar patterns. Each starts with a lengthy analysis of recent history, and each claims the party is best placed to fulfil the mandate of the April 2006 people’s movement. Each stresses the significance of the constitution-writing process – the NC, for example, stating that it is the chance to create a new sense of “we, the people of Nepal” – but large parts of the NC and UML manifestos read more like a standard plan for government. No party devotes much attention to explaining the electoral system, setting out plans for the functioning of the CA or ensuring public participation in the process. However, the Maoists offer more detail than the others in most areas relevant to the CA, notably a proposed map of ethnic-based autonomous states. Key features of the manifestos include:

Nepali Congress. The NC stresses the party’s longstanding commitment to liberal multiparty democracy and reminds voters that in 1950 it was the first to call for an elected assembly to frame a constitution. It urges a broadly Westminster/Indian government structure, with an upper and lower house, a prime minister-led government and a ceremonial president.

CPN(UML). The UML sees the CA’s main objectives as democracy, lasting peace and progressive policies and stresses its own history of struggle and determination to bring change. Although it talks of the need for consensus in the CA, it appeals for votes to ensure it leads the next government, which it says will be formed according to the proportion of seats won by each party and will “play an important role in the constitution-making process”. It calls for a directly-elected prime minister to head the executive and a ceremonial president.

CPN(Maoist). The Maoists are most emphatic in reminding voters that “the election of a constituent assembly is not the same as the usual five-yearly parliamentary elections”. They devote eleven pages to an analysis of Nepal’s historic problems (feudalism and imperialism), the democratic movement as a fusion of their people’s war and the people’s movement, the regressive conspiracies of the feudal monarchy and the weaknesses of the parliamentary parties in comparison to the clarity and conviction of the Maoist revolutionaries. The CPN(M) personalises its appeal by highlighting the claim of its leader, Prachanda, to the executive presidency of a new, republican Nepal. It argues that as the only party to put forward the new agenda of a republic and state restructuring, it is the only one that can be trusted to implement that agenda. In many policy areas, the Maoists offer compromise, such as embracing public-private partnership, and they make the kind of promises associated with a parliamentary election, such as eradicating illiteracy and ensuring clean drinking water for all within five years.

Smaller leftist parties. Janamorcha Nepal has proposed a balance of power between an executive president and a prime minister, the former to be directly elected and the latter to be chosen by the upper and lower houses of parliament. It also calls for halting commercialisation of the education sector. The Nepal Workers and Peasants’ Party (NWPP) has called for a powerful president, with no prime minister and proposes to convert the existing geographically delimited zones into provinces with legislatures, rather than divisive forms of federalism. CPN(ML), another small communist party, has proposed a directly elected prime minister, a ceremonial president appointed by the parliament and seven federal states. The CPN (United) has one unique proposition: equally powerful parliaments at the central and provincial level.

Madhesi parties. The TMDP still calls for a single, autonomous Madhesi province across the entire Tarai. A prime minister would hold executive power and a ban is proposed on no-confidence motions for one year to ensure “political stability”. The MJF wants a president as chief executive, continues to demand Madhesi group recruitment into the army and proposes a trilingual official language policy (local mother tongues, Nepali and Hindi), with English as the national language. The Sadbhavana Party led by Rajendra Mahato calls for a prime minister-led government with a ceremonial president, elected provincial and central legislatures and autonomous provinces ruled by chief ministers. Madhesi leader Ramraja Prasad Singh’s Navajanabadi Morcha has proposed a rotating presidency shared between incumbents from the hill, mountain and Tarai regions.

Royalist parties. Only the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (Nepal), the RPP(N), headed by the king’s former home minister, Kamal Thapa, is campaigning on an explicitly monarchist platform, demanding that the future of the monarchy be decided by a referendum and calling for its continuation as a constitutional entity. The Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) and the Rashtriya Janashakti Party (RJP) are more ambivalent towards the palace; both have publicly stated, though not in their manifestos, that they will accept the CA vote as legitimate authority for determining the monarchy’s future. The RJP explicitly calls for the constitution drafted by the CA to be “directly ratified by the people”; the RPP says “people” should decide the future of the monarchy with “their direct participation”. It does, however, embrace the concept of federalism and calls for an ethnically based upper house. The RPP’s manifesto is silent on the monarchy and calls for state restructuring to guarantee “inclusive multiparty democracy”, with federal states run by chief ministers.

2. Candidates

Candidate selection was a major challenge for the parties. The distribution of party tickets is always a contested affair; because of the parallel electoral system and the new quotas for various communities, it became even harder, especially for the larger parliamentary parties, whose leaders had to juggle the expectations of their many established workers and incumbent parliamentarians with the need to offer the electorate new faces.

The NC has a high proportion of older candidates, many the same ones active in every election since 1991. Of its first-past-the-post (FPTP) candidates, the youngest is 31, most (175) are between 41 and 59 and 44 are 60 or above; the UML is only slightly different. In contrast, the CPN(M) has a young profile, with an average age for its FPTP candidates of 39. The Maoists also present by far the most diverse selection of FPTP candidates, with eleven Dalits, 73 janajatis and 63 Madhesis. The UML and the NC field the bare minimum of women candidates, only 26 each for 240 FPTP seats. Many of these have been selected for seats which they have little chance of winning. In sixteen districts and 67 constituencies, there is not a single woman candidate. The Maoists have nominated 42 women, as well as several serving members of their People’s Liberation Army (PLA), in contravention of the peace agreement.

The Madhesi parties have opted largely for middle- and higher-caste candidates. The MJF, for example, has 25 Yadavs and almost no women. The TMDP has four women out of 94 FPTP candidates, the Sadbhavana Party four out of 87 and the MJF three out of 103.

3. Alliances

Despite the multitude of parties, there is still a broadly discernible left-right split. The leftist parties are the Maoists, UML, the Janamorcha, NWPP and CPN(ML), as well as a handful of smaller groups. Those towards the right are the NC (although it describes itself as socialist), the royalists and the various Madhesi parties, which are all more or less anti-leftist. However, there are other ways of categorising the parties: in many ways UML and NC similarities as centrist parliamentary parties outweigh their differences.

The major parties have been expected to agree on a seat-sharing deal under which their top leaders would be elected without serious opposition, but they are reluctant to discuss this publicly and have sent mixed signals about it. An arrangement would concern the FPTP portion of the elections, in which candidates can in effect withdraw to allow their opponents a clear run (it is too late for them to cancel their candidacies formally, so any deal must be well publicised to voters). Even if party leaders overcome their mutual antagonism to reach such an accommodation, however, it may be difficult to ensure that local activists and candidates respect it.

On the left, Janamorcha has withdrawn some candidates in the interest of unity (for example, pulling out of Madhav Nepal’s Kathmandu constituency), but the larger parties are still at loggerheads. The Maoists have pushed hard for a left alliance and called for a grand alliance of progressive and nationalist forces. Sceptics suggest this stems from concern they would not do well on their own. The Maoists themselves argue that there have been longstanding agreements to unite around a common minimum program, and a broad alliance is particularly appropriate for CA elections, which should be different from the usual scramble for parliamentary power. They have reacted to the UML’s reluctance to forge such an alliance by accusing it of betrayal under outside pressure. Domestic and international forces have indeed leaned on the UML to dissuade it from joining with the Maoists, but the party’s reluctance also stems from confidence it can do well on its own. It has generally left it to local party leaders to decide on cooperation but has not closed the door altogether on a nationwide deal. Holding out the prospect of an alliance may be the UML’s attempt to keep Maoist attacks on its activists in check: the rash of violence after it had initially refused a deal suggested a deliberate Maoist response.

Madhesi parties united to form the UDMF but have been divided over their election plans. Although they are not intensively contesting each other in some constituencies, they could not agree on a functional alliance. The Sadbhavana Party and TMDP did eventually manage a deal, but the more prominent MJF has not joined them. Their divisions may cost them dearly. Analysts suspect they will not win more than 50 seats among them, which would mean that most Madhesi delegates will belong to the major parties. On the royalist front, the RJP and RPP have avoided fielding candidates against each other but face competition with Kamal Thapa’s RPP(N).

C. Beyond The Parties

The public. The general public want elections but doubt politicians’ sincerity or ability to make them happen, though the recent momentum has assuaged some doubts. If intimidation – already a problem in some areas – at least does not increase, turnout could be high. The incumbent parties should all be worried that the interim government’s dismal record on basic services will count against them: little has been done to ensure security, deliver basic services and utilities or cushion significant price rises for food and petroleum products. However, dissatisfaction on these matters is unlikely to generate major street protests or stimulate an election boycott.

The media. The increasingly sophisticated media has already played a major role by both disseminating basic election information and scrutinising parties and candidates critically. The press has analysed party lists, exposed malpractices such as dummy candidates and offered a vehicle for policies to be communicated and debated. The significance of private FM radio and television stations has grown hugely (they hardly existed in 1999, at the time of the last elections). In addition to carrying donor-funded, election-related programs, they have developed their own high-quality discussion and interview shows. State radio and television have also shown greater professionalism. However, there are questions about their impartiality, since the Maoists run the information and communications ministry. Equally, there are questions about the political inclinations of the private media, most of which have been quick to castigate Maoist misbehaviour but softer on other parties, especially the NC.

Overall, the media has had trouble adjusting its outlook and coverage to the delicate transitional situation. Much election reporting has been along traditional party lines and has downplayed or ignored the additional sensitivities of the conflict context. The media is subject to a code of conduct in the electoral period (in force since 9 March 2008), the observance of which is being monitored by the Nepal Press Council. This government-appointed watchdog has yet to show signs of being a stern referee, despite much inflammatory and inaccurate reporting.

Civil society. Its leaders resent accusations that civil society has become divided and partisan, no longer commanding its earlier respect or influence. “Remember we dragged the parties to where they are today”, one said. “If we hadn’t, there would never have been a people’s movement or peace process”. Civil society’s active role has helped move the peace process forward, but criticisms of partisanship and personal rivalry are not unfounded. Many human rights organisations and election observers (see below) have party leanings. Some prominent activists are campaigning for parties or even standing for election, for example, Daman Nath Dhungana, who has returned to the NC. Nevertheless, influential civil society voices are maintaining some pressure on the parties to abide by electoral norms and deliver the results the peace process promised. Many who lack party leanings are disillusioned at the speed with which the parties have returned to business as usual, with only the Maoists willing to nominate some outside individuals.

D. A Conducive Environment?

Despite the positive mood generated by the momentum towards elections, there are clear signs that not only the campaign but also its aftermath will be fraught with tension. For all the rhetoric of uniting to build a new Nepal, most parties are preparing for aggressive competition. On 1 April, leaders of the three main parties signed a ten-point pact promising to cease misconduct and establishing monitoring and coordination mechanisms to build a free and fair environment. However, past evidence suggests that signatures on paper do not readily translate into improved behaviour.

There have been at least nine election-related murders: one victim a National People’s Front candidate in Banke, all the others Maoist activists. On 29 March, two people died when a Biratnagar mosque was bombed, an act for which the shadowy Nepal Defence Army claimed responsibility. There have also been dozens of assaults on party workers engaged in campaign activities. RPP Chair Pashupati Shamsher Rana commented: “This will not be an election, it’s a battle”. Maoist leaders have described the elections as the next stage in their “war” for revolutionary transformation. Domestic and international human rights bodies and observers have warned of misconduct and condemned the killings and other acts of violence and intimidation.

The Maoists have been accused of the most systematic misconduct, in particular a series of attacks on royalist party workers and apparently concerted efforts to disrupt their campaigns. In pre-poll observation, the respected but UML-linked human rights organisation INSEC reported Maoists were responsible for 97 per cent of violations of the code of conduct. As well as beatings and harassment, there have been a few abductions. The aggressive language of party leaders may well encourage cadres to this course. All major parties plan to mobilise their youth wings to support door-to-door canvassing and be present at polling booths; they will likely also serve, as in the past, as muscle to protect candidates or threaten voters. In the words of the RPP chair, “the state isn’t able to provide adequate security, so each party will try to make their own private arrangements”.

Candidates, their party colleagues and election officials may face the most direct threats, but intimidation of the general public could be as damaging. Many Tarai districts have no-go areas for some candidates, and the threat of armed action remains explicit. The continued absence of local government officials suggests a far from normal atmosphere, which may be off-putting to election and security officials. International experts warn that policing plans do little to restore public confidence.

Voter participation in past general elections has consistently been over 60 per cent (66 per cent in the most recent). If turnout for the CA polls is significantly lower – whether through fear or disinterest – it could undermine the legitimacy of the exercise. Low turnout in particular areas, or partial boycotts, could spark renewed regional tensions. The main threat to wide participation is intimidation. In the face of direct threats from Madhesi militant groups and indirect warnings from the Maoists (and sometimes other parties), many voters may decide to stay at home. Poor turnout could have specific electoral ramifications: for example, harming the traditional NC vote, since older voters with family and property to worry about may be more influenced by threats. On the other hand, low youth participation – possible since many young men work abroad or away from their home constituencies, and several thousand young adults are missing from the electoral roll – could harm the Maoists.

E. Possible Spoilers

Armed militant groups. Several Tarai-based groups threaten to disrupt the elections and have already carried out violence, but they are more politically isolated than before: people are tired of bloodshed and keen for elections. They also face a more serious security crackdown, with both deployment of additional armed police (APF) in sensitive districts and tougher cross-border controls. Despite encouraging signals from some ministers, Prime Minister Koirala seemed to close the door on negotiations; however, Peace and Reconstruction Minister Ramchandra Poudel wrote to armed groups on 21 March inviting talks. There were hopes they could agree to at least a ceasefire, but on 29 March the groups that had indicated a willingness to negotiate announced they would not talk, as the government had failed to meet their preconditions. They could disrupt the polls – attacks on election officials could prompt widespread fear and lead to some deserting their posts, a pattern seen with local government officials – but are unlikely to derail them entirely. Apart from the armed groups with political agendas, the numerous criminal gangs could take advantage of the election situation or be used by other forces for disruption.

Maoists. The Maoists’ public enthusiasm for the elections seems at odds with near universal expectations that they will fare poorly in them. Some suspect they may try to postpone the vote at the last minute if they are convinced they will do badly; there are signs they plan to re-evaluate their policy a few days before the polls. They could easily make elections impossible but only if they were willing to sacrifice their credibility, domestically and internationally. Few would forgive them if they were seen to be undermining the process. Although some within the party would shrug off public condemnation, the leadership would be unlikely to risk it.

Royalists. Politicians close to the palace insist that only the Maoists are likely to cause trouble. “No one else will try to disrupt the polls”, said former prime minister and RJP leader Surya Bahadur Thapa. However, most observers – including some sympathetic to the king – suspect ardent monarchists are unlikely to accept the elections with equanimity and may try to stall the process. If the polls go ahead, parties formally committed to a republic are certain to win a majority, an unsettling prospect for royalists. Maoist leaders speak of palace conspiracies and say they have reliable information some are planning violence, including assassinations. Still, chances of halting the process are slim. “What can the king do?” asked one political analyst. “He could sponsor a major destabilising incident such as a bombing or instigate or take advantage of other tensions, unrest or public disorder – but none of these is likely to halt the polls altogether”.

Other factors. Lack of will in the major parties was a major cause of past delays and could still be a problem if the NC or UML feared crushing defeat. This does not appear likely, although any rise in Maoist intimidation or serious evidence of attempts at widespread rigging could change the picture. UDMF members may worry that their prospects are poor but would find it hard to back out or cause disruption now that they have signed a deal. Technical and logistical challenges are probably likelier than that individual parties will back out, although these could be seized on as an excuse for postponement by the nervous.

III. The ELEctions

A. The Electoral System

The electoral system is a parallel one, with first-past-the-post (FPTP) and, for the first time, proportional representation (PR) contests. Voters will elect 240 members of the constituent assembly in direct, constituency-based FPTP contests and 335 through party list-based PR ones. The interim cabinet will nominate a further 26 members by consensus. The total of 601 seats is greater than was originally envisaged (and far more than the 205 seats of past elected parliaments). This resulted from demands for greater representation in the Tarai and more weighting to the PR contest. There are 9,788 polling centres, with one to three booths each, a total of 20,866 polling booths.

The FPTP contest is simple: in each constituency, the candidate with the most votes wins. There are 3,954 registered candidates from 55 parties for the 240 FPTP seats. The whole country is a single constituency for the PR contest, in which voters will vote for parties, each of which must have registered a list of at least 34 names. There are some 6,000 candidates on the lists of 54 parties. Each party will select its winning candidates from any position on its list once the Election Commission announces how many seats it has won. (The fact that the numbered lists have been presented as if they are ranked may confuse or disappoint voters if the parties select names that were low on the lists.) That number will be calculated by a system that slightly favours larger parties.

Parties must abide by certain quotas. Women must be at least half their PR list and at least half of those they select to fill PR seats they win; across both election contests, parties must field at least 33 per cent women candidates. This means that if women FPTP candidates are allotted losing seats, female delegates could make up less than 30 per cent of the CA. Other PR quotas include: Dalits, 13 per cent, “oppressed and indigenous”, 37.8 per cent, “backward region”, 4 per cent, Madhesi, 31.2 per cent and “others” (groups not mentioned elsewhere in the list) 30.2 per cent. These apply only to the PR list (for both nominated and winning candidates), and the Election Commission may accept a 10 per cent variance in any category. The requirement to nominate half women applies to each quota (eg, there must be at least 6.5 per cent female Dalits). There are no quotas for the FPTP contest, but parties are to “take into account the principle of inclusiveness while nominating candidates”. At the polling booth voters will first be given a light blue FPTP ballot paper. Once they have marked their choice with a stamp, they will be issued a light pink PR ballot paper to be cast in a separate ballot box.

The result is a system that is hard to understand and may well not produce the proportional outcome activists want. An expert said, “this is a very complex electoral system – very few people, even supposed experts, understand it. The parties are now starting to realise how complicated it is. It’s not easy for them”. Many candidates reportedly do not understand it. Only one fringe party filed a correct initial PR list; all others were returned for revision, although some parties had only made minor technical errors. This type of PR list system has only been used by Serbia and Guyana, and has been widely criticised for its lack of transparency and voter accountability as it allows party leaders to select winning candidates.

Critics also point out it is unlikely to deliver a proportional outcome. Parties winning a handful of PR seats will only be able to select a rough approximation of representative candidates; those winning an odd number of seats may well choose more men than women. The better smaller parties do, the less likely the overall balance will meet quotas. Furthermore, parties that field short lists for less than 30 per cent of PR seats (100 candidates or less) do not have to meet any quota other than that for women’s representation. Of the 54 parties standing in the PR contest, only eleven will have to abide by the other quotas.

The FPTP contest may also have deficiencies. Ballots will not have candidates’ names, just party symbols. Critics argue this undermines the nature of a contest in which there is a direct relationship between voters and individual candidates and representatives. Candidates from major parties should have little trouble getting voters to associate them with established party symbols, but smaller parties and independent candidates may struggle. An observer commented: “The system is crappy but that doesn’t necessarily mean the result will be”. Others are not so optimistic. “This system is going to produce something that doesn’t even vaguely resemble PR”, an international expert said. Nevertheless, the combined quotas have produced a far more diverse field of candidates than ever before, and the CA will be significantly more inclusive than past parliaments. The guaranteed number of women members may fall below the one third some had hoped for but even around 25-30 per cent will still put Nepal well ahead of other countries in the region – and probably around 35th globally for women’s representation.

B. The Role of the Election Commission

The Election Commission, a powerful independent constitutional body, is solely responsible for the conduct of the polls. Headed by Chief Election Commissioner Bhoj Raj Pokharel, assisted by four commissioners, it runs the entire process, from compiling the voters list and preparing ballot papers to carrying out the elections, ensuring their security and managing the count and any initial complaints. It has issued regulations for the CA election and party registration and electoral roll rules, as well as an election code of conduct. The commission has to coordinate closely with the home ministry and security forces and has deployed district election officers (DEOs) in all 75 districts. Total staff is around 240,000, and there will be between five and thirteen election officials and support staff at each of the nearly 21,000 booths. The commission has powers to second civil servants on election duties: on 14 March it sent 49 government secretaries to monitor preparations around the country.

How the commission referees the run-up to the polls, manages logistics and copes with the count and any appeals will be critical. Pokharel has won widespread respect for his professionalism and has asserted his authority in public warnings to the parties and government that he will not tolerate misbehaviour. He has also repeatedly urged the home ministry to work harder on security arrangements. However, he has so far refrained from exercising his power to fine parties or bar candidates (although one party was disqualified for failing to observe the women’s quota). The Election Commission is in an invidious position: lax enforcement may be taken as weakness, while strict enforcement could destabilise the peace process (hence its reluctant agreement to extend deadlines to accommodate fresh understandings with protestors). So far, Pokharel’s perceived closeness to the NC (he was an NC-appointed home secretary) has not damaged his credibility; in fact, it may have helped him to convey tough messages to the NC and its ministers. But it could become an issue if he has to take a stance in party battles over procedures or results.

C. The Preparations

1. Technical preparations

The electoral roll. There are 17.6 million registered voters (out of a population of approximately 27 million and compared to 13.5 million in the 1999 general election). When the Election Commission completed compilation of the new voters list in May 2007, some individuals complained they had been omitted. Their complaints were resolved, and there have been none from parties about the overall accuracy of the list.

However, many people have been left out. Only citizens who reached the age of eighteen by 15 November 2006 were eligible to register, meaning the youngest voters on 10 April will be nineteen years and four months old. Permanent residents within an electoral constituency were registered as permanent voters; others (including PLA combatants in cantonments and government employees – including soldiers, police and election officials) were registered as temporary voters, meaning they can vote only in the PR race. Internal migrants will only be able to vote if they return to their home constituencies (the Maoists had seized and burned some voters lists in February 2007 protesting the refusal to register migrants at their current addresses). Many recent citizenship certificate recipients, predominantly Madhesis, have also been left off the roll, although Madhesi parties have not raised this issue vocally.

Ballot papers. Over 40 million ballots have been printed and have to be securely delivered to almost 10,000 polling centres. The printing was achieved on schedule, despite the tight deadlines, although distribution to more remote polling stations will be a challenge. Election officials have started distributing less sensitive basic materials separately; ballot papers will require transport and police guards.

Logistics. Collating the ballots, distributing them to the correct locations in time and keeping them secure will not be easy. Distribution and security in past elections were army responsibilities. Sceptical observers doubt that the Election Commission is up to the task. Preparations for recovery of ballot boxes and their secure delivery to count centres in the district headquarters may also be affected by this lack of experience. However, the commission insists the timetable is manageable, and district election offices appear to be well organised.

Staffing. There are two critical positions at the local level: the DEO, the commission appointee in charge of overall preparations, and the returning officer, who oversees polling and counting in each constituency. In districts with multiple constituencies, there will be a chief returning officer, who acts as returning officer in one constituency but also coordinates the other returning officers. Returning officers are drawn from the judiciary (although in past local elections, chief district officers have filled the role). Each polling centre will have a polling officer and as many assistants as necessary, drawn from the civil service or state corporations.

International assistance. Many donors have offered significant bilateral aid to prepare for the polls, and the UN Mission (UNMIN) is mandated to help create a suitable environment. The Electoral Commission is not allowed to accept cash but says it has received the equivalent of Rs.533 million ($8.4 million) as foreign aid in kind. UNMIN’s mandate includes supporting the process with technical assistance. Its advisers have been working with the Election Commission in Kathmandu and five regional centres since the start of its mandate; it has now deployed advisers in all 75 districts. The UN has also set up an independent Electoral Expert Monitoring Team (EEMT), which reports directly to the Secretary-General.

2. Security arrangements

Security arrangements are based on those for past elections but with some modifications. The most critical difference is that the army, which had previously been deployed for security back-up, will be confined to barracks under the terms of the CPA. The home ministry will deploy over 100,000 security personnel: 40,000 regular police (NP), 22,000 armed police (APF) and some 48,000 temporary police and 6,000 temporary armed police. Effective policing is necessary not only to ensure a free and fair environment for campaigning but also to protect the physical integrity of ballots – from the moment they leave the press and are distributed to districts until completion of the final count. Given the likelihood of some repolling, the security exercise will extend over several weeks, perhaps even a few months. The recruitment of temporary police has been problematic: political parties have put forward their cadres, and many appear to have been enlisted. Even if partisan recruits can be weeded out, minimal training and preparation for coping with possible violence may well make the temporary forces counterproductive.

Overall responsibility for security arrangements lies with the Central Security Committee, a permanent body headed by the home minister and including the NP and APF chiefs, home and defence secretaries (and, optionally, the chief election commissioner). The Election Commission is to work closely with the home ministry, which retains operational control over security personnel, although the commission can issue directives. At the district level, security forces will answer to the chief district officer, who chairs a district security committee bringing together the local security chiefs. This committee can also include the district election officer. Each polling centre will normally be guarded by between five and sixteen police. They will be greatly outnumbered by party representatives and supporters, but election officials hope that civil society, media and other observers will also act as a deterrent against election-related crime. Five helicopters will be on standby (one per region) for emergency evacuation or security force deployment.

Extra security has been provided for sensitive districts which are more likely to see disruption by armed groups. Each of the twelve constituencies in Siraha and Saptari districts will have three APF and two NP bases, with patrols across the area. Other Tarai districts will have two police bases; hill districts will have only one APF base each. Some candidates have been given personal security on the basis of individual threat analyses. Other security measures will include sealing the border (for two to three days), banning the sale of alcohol, closing schools (for two weeks), and increasing army protection of borders and critical infrastructure (as permitted by the CPA).

There are concerns over police neutrality. The NP has been historically biased towards the NC, which also holds the home ministry and so has operational control of all security forces. There is also concern over the ability of the APF, raised and trained as a counter-insurgency force, to adapt to the sensitivities of an election. Politicians from various parties have called for the army to be deployed, despite the CPA prohibition. The army itself has kept track of the security situation and has made plans in case it is called in to cope with severe instability. It has deployed troops to 50 locations, such as airports and customs posts, to provide additional security – a move permitted by the CPA, although it did not give the requisite notification, reportedly due to lack of time.

3. Voter awareness

Many observers have long expressed fears that voters are insufficiently aware of the CA election, or of its purpose and modalities. The most recent extensive survey concluded that “only a small proportion of people have heard about the issues raised by the political parties such as a federal state, proportional electoral system, etc. Likewise, only a small proportion understand what a constituent assembly is”. The lack of understanding this implies may be overstated: the definition of “correct” understanding is narrow, and the campaign and media attention will boost awareness. This has been a priority for government and non-government agencies.

The Election Commission has taken the lead in organising basic voter education programs across the country. Its efforts have been supplemented by numerous NGO projects, mostly funded by donors. The commission’s work has included training thousands of local volunteer educators, publishing information booklets and posters and producing radio and television information slots. The scale has been impressive but the impact is hard to quantify. There has been criticism that volunteer educators were reluctant to reach beyond district headquarters; volunteers themselves reportedly found the electoral system hard to understand and even harder to explain.

NGOs have engaged in the effort in a number of ways, from running local workshops to publishing materials. Some have focused on particular issues, such as training for women journalists. However, there are concerns that generous donor funding directed to large Kathmandu-based NGOs may not have met its targets, and there is little or no way of evaluating utility, impact and impartiality. Nepal’s media has matured and expanded rapidly since the 1999 elections. The greatly increased reach of FM radio and private television (as well as a flourishing print sector) has enabled the media to play a greater role in building awareness, and donor-funded NGO projects have boosted its capacity to disseminate CA information. Still, voters look primarily to the parties to educate them about the elections, and with campaigning underway, gaps in understanding may narrow rapidly.

D. Possible Electoral Malpractice

The Electoral Commission’s Code of Conduct is strict and Chief Commissioner Pokharel has said he will enforce it rigorously. Some of the commission’s steps seem excessive, such as banning motorcycle rallies to prevent “pomposity and ostentation”. Its inability to force parties to clean up their election graffiti suggests that aiming for perfection may be overly ambitious, especially if it means overturning long-established habits. Some forms of more serious electoral malpractice are also long-established habits – perfected and practised by the mainstream parties, which will likely use them against each other and the less experienced Maoists.

Intimidation. The Maoists are justifiably seen as the primary problem, but other parties have often resorted to threats in past elections. All the major ones will use their youth and other wings for campaigning and a visible presence at polling booths which can keep an eye on other parties but may also intimidate voters or officials. The Maoists have announced they will deploy large numbers of Young Communist League (YCL) cadres at each polling station. The NC’s Tarun Dal (youth wing) and UML’s Democratic National Youth Organisation will also be out in force.

Voter impersonation, fraud. Although election identity cards were used in 1999, they are not needed for the CA polls. Voters can identify themselves with various documents, including citizenship card, passport, driving license or a government identification card with name and photo of the holder. This increases the risk of fraud. Parties will be tempted to make up for the absence overseas of many younger males by having others vote in their names. It will be hard for anyone to vote twice without official connivance, as fingers will be marked with indelible ink; however eighteen-year-olds excluded from the voters roll may well try to cast a ballot in another’s name.

Booth-capturing. This refers to various forms of unauthorised seizure of a polling station to enable a party to stuff ballot boxes. Apart from direct, violent takeover – which has been tried in the past but would certainly lead to annulment and repolling – parties can seek to infiltrate their own permitted agents, “dummy” candidates’ agents and others inside the polling station to pressure officials to allow extra votes. Other tactics are even harder for observers to monitor: for example, a party might get its voters out early, then hold up the lines to cause delay and frustration among other voters. Given the short time available to process each voter through the two complex ballot-marking exercises, deliberate delay may be an effective, near-invisible tactic.

Dummy candidates. Fielding dummy candidates (as independents) in individual constituencies can assist parties in various ways: the resources they are allowed to use for campaigning (cash and vehicles) can be diverted to the real candidate; they may divert some votes from rival parties; and, most importantly, their agents can be present at polling and at the count, pressuring voters and officials. Many suspected dummy candidates registered for certain seats, most egregiously Kathmandu-10, where the Maoist leader, Prachanda, is standing. A suspected seventeen Maoist dummies filed, but fifteen later withdrew. Other parties have been accused of the same practice.

Misuse of state resources. This will likely be a recurrent problem and cause for complaint from parties outside government. All 30 ministers are standing – twenty in FPTP seats, ten on PR lists. They will be tempted to divert resources to their parties and their own campaigns. The Election Commission has given warnings, but ministers do not seem to be listening. There have been repeated criticisms that the Maoists are abusing control of the information and communications ministry to use state media for propaganda. The NC, as leader of the government coalition and holder of key ministries, is in the strongest position to manipulate state resources.

Lack of state neutrality. With the NC in charge of the home ministry, there is a widespread perception, including within the party’s own ranks, that it has disproportionate influence over local administration and policing. Apart from most senior bureaucrats, election returning officers are serving judges – drawn from a judiciary in which the public has little faith and whose senior members (mostly male and predominantly Bahun, a high caste) may have leanings to the major parties that have been in government when they were promoted.

E. Election Observation

Monitoring will be essential for endorsing the validity of the elections and as a deterrent to malpractice. Some 148 Nepali and 29 international organisations have registered as election observers. Apart from registered monitors, party agents and officials, independent civil society members and journalists will be at many polling stations.

National observers. An estimated 90,000 national observers from 148 organisations will monitor the polls. The Election Commission has accredited over 10,000 observers at the central level; district offices will accredit the vast majority. National observers have to be adult Nepali citizens with at least tenth-grade education, non-partisan and have received observation training from their organisation. There are five major observer networks: the Nepal Election Monitoring Alliance (NEMA), Nepal Election Observation Committee Nepal (NEOC-N), General Election Observation Committee (GEOC), Democracy and Election Alliance Nepal (DEAN) and Constituent Assembly Election Observation United Forum (CAEOUF).

NEMA, funded by the Asia Foundation and led by Subodh Pyakurel, is probably the largest network, bringing together fourteen organisations and a significant membership. It has trained 17,000 volunteers and aims for 19,000, to cover all polling centres and issue an initial report by mid-morning on election day. DEAN, funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI), will have 13,000 observers from different organisations (to be trained by 556 veteran observers qualified as master trainers). CAEOUF, led by former Supreme Court Justice and IC drafter Laxman Aryal, plans to deploy 5,000 observers. The Nepal Bar Association and NGO Federation will mobilise 1,000 and 2,000 observers respectively.

The sheer numbers are impressive – almost 30 times more than in 1999 – although even the observers admit this may bring its own problems. Efforts to form a coordination committee have failed. Election observation has in the past been plagued by partisanship and there are no signs the CA polls will be different. Some major organisations and prominent individuals leading them are openly supportive of particular political parties. The Election Commission has indicated it will rescind the accreditation of observers who are found to be partisan; total numbers may end up significantly lower than the initial estimate.

International observers. 29 international organisations have been granted accreditation, some of them Kathmandu-based embassies. They will field 810 observers in total. The largest missions are those of the European Union (EU), the Asian Network For Free Elections (ANFREL) and the Carter Center. Some smaller missions are being organised by international organisations with an established Nepal presence, such as NDI and the Asia Foundation. Major international observers will compare notes, aiming not to directly contradict or undermine each other’s reports, but retain their independence. The large EU mission need not reflect member state views; its leader stresses it will reach its own judgment independent of EU missions in Kathmandu or Brussels. Nevertheless, there is likely to be much common ground in the missions’ reports; if the polls are broadly free and fair, a united message would make it harder for parties to reject the results. Perfect compliance with international standards is probably impossible: as long as there is no outrageous violence benefiting the Maoists, India is likely to issue a prompt endorsement to forestall appeals and lock in the results.

IV. The AFTERMATH

A. Repolling

Repolling will probably be necessary in some places, but it is hard to predict how many, and even election officials are unsure how it will be carried out. The returning officer of each constituency, or the polling officer at an individual station, has the authority to call off voting in a variety of circumstances. These include “any commotion as well as other extraordinary situation at the polling station or owing to non-operation of electronic devices or any riot or natural calamity or any act beyond control”. Any party that feels it is doing badly can easily cause enough disturbance to force a halt to voting. It is up to the returning officer to specify and publish a date for repolling. Polls can also be cancelled if ballot papers are lost, damaged or interfered with before the count, or if the counting station is seized. Repolling in any polling station means the count for the whole constituency must be suspended until it is complete.

Electoral law does not specify deadlines for repolling, and Election Commission officers admit they have no fixed plans. Some say it can be done almost immediately, but this is unrealistic. The ease or difficulty will depend on a number of factors. For example, if there was widespread violence it may take time to reestablish security and guarantee a free and fair environment. If most ballot papers were used before the poll was suspended, it may be necessary to print replacements, as polling stations will have only a small reserve on hand. Even supportive observers fear significant repolling may well be required. A senior Indian diplomat warned: “There may well be a few dozen places where repolling is necessary – it could be in effect an election in two phases”.

Election observers have urged that repolling regulations should be drawn up in advance to ensure that procedures are not politically influenced. As the decision to cancel polling at individual stations on the day rests with polling or returning officers, there may be charges that they have not been impartial or acted under duress.

B. The Count

Before counting starts, the ballot boxes from each booth are to be delivered under security escort to the relevant district headquarters. The returning officer must publish a notice specifying the place, date and time for the count so candidates and their agents can attend. FPTP and PR ballots are both to be counted in the district headquarters. If it cannot be done simultaneously, as preferred, the FPTP ballots take priority, and the PR count will start once that count is completed. Election officials are all likely to concentrate on completing the FPTP count first: managing two parallel counts will be practically unmanageable and there will be greater demand from voters and candidates to learn the FPTP outcome as soon as possible.FPTP results will be published by each constituency returning officer as soon as they are ready. The PR tallies are meant to be passed to the Election Commission in Kathmandu, to be totalled centrally, but election officials have also decided to release the PR tally for each constituency when complete.

The Election Commission long maintained an overly optimistic estimate that the count would take seven to ten days, and a maximum of two weeks (assuming no repolling). Many international experts had suggested some three weeks (longer if repolling is required) will be needed. The Election Commission subsequently revised its projection to the end of April. Given the serious logistical constraints, this is a more realistic timeframe, although it will still almost certainly be extended by repolling.

Individual FPTP results may start being announced shortly after election day. However, as the whole country is considered a single unit for the PR contest, those results can only be finalised when voting in every constituency is completed, and the final national tally has been confirmed. The parties will name the winners from their lists only after it has been announced how many seats they have. If their selections do not satisfy the inclusiveness quotas, they will be given three days to revise them. Although the rules allow for a 10 per cent variance, the provisions are so complex that parties may well fail – whether accidentally or deliberately – to meet the requirements.

On past experience, some experts suggest 10 per cent of ballot boxes could be lost, damaged or interfered with before reaching counting stations. A similar percentage of ballot papers could be accidentally spoiled, although this is harder to predict. Voter awareness programs and the guidance of both officials and party agents at polling stations may reduce this. Still, the parallel system with double papers could confuse many voters, as could the 55 party symbols. The lost or damaged ballots will probably not undermine the overall integrity of the vote, but since the margins separating parties could be narrow, 10 per cent disqualified ballots could prompt heated complaints and calls for repolling.

The most important question is at what stage the Electoral Commission will feel able to declare final results. This is the trigger for convening the CA, but it is not clearly defined. Some may argue that as long as by-elections or repolling are pending, the results cannot be final. Others, happy with the broad picture, may push for a faster declaration. Failure to complete polling and counting in even a single station theoretically makes the PR announcement impossible, but it is unlikely the country will wait on a handful of trouble-spots. The decision on final results, like most other aspects of the election, is likely to be political. If it is made with the consensus of the major parties, there will be little quibbling; if not, there will be another dispute.

C. The Results

The complexity of the parallel system, the vagaries of voter behaviour, the weak tradition of opinion polling and the fluidity of the post-conflict political landscape all contribute to a situation that defies confident prediction. There has been little research on voter behaviour, and it is in any event uncertain whether old loyalties will outweigh more immediate concerns. The arrival of the Maoists as an untested electoral force may lead to shifts in support among leftist voters and beyond. Similarly, the new Madhesi parties’ prospects are hard to evaluate. The behaviour of first-time voters – some 22 per cent of the electorate – may reflect concerns specific to young people who have grown up in the democratic period and come of age during the conflict.

Although it is unlikely any single party will win a majority, this does not mean the CA will be the same as a hung parliament. Assuming the broad division between the (more or less) republican left and the (more or less) conservative/royalist right continues, one of those blocs, however frail its cohesion, will have a majority. (This broad characterisation may be slightly complicated by the arrival of new parties.) The major established parties are banking on their voters turning out and hoping that loyalty and habit will trump the temptation to switch allegiance, particularly in the Tarai. The NC is hoping that the leftist vote will be split between the UML and the Maoists, potentially giving it an advantage in tight FPTP constituencies (just as the UML split before the 1999 election brought it a landslide victory). However, the UML appears confident the Maoists will not eat into its votes – one reason why it has resisted an alliance.

Royalist parties have been marginalised during the seven-party-dominated transitional period but cannot be written off, especially if they can forge an alliance. Many prominent royalists have been confident enough to stand for election from their traditional FPTP constituencies, among them RPP, RJP and RPP (N) leaders. Together they could win PR votes not only from royalists but also from others dissatisfied with the current government; they will be able to draw on resources from well-off monarchists. The fact that the Maoists have risked condemnation by frequently obstructing royalist campaigning (even by parties that have supported the peace process) suggests they view them as a serious threat, as do their repeated calls for “nationalists” to leave the palace and join their cause.

No configuration of results is without conflict risk. Any of the possible outcomes could aggravate tensions, and each would generate powerful losers. If two parties combined command more than two thirds of the CA seats, they could form an alliance powerful enough to drive through constitutional provisions. If, as is more likely, only three or more parties combined reach the two-thirds mark, there will be a greater need for consensus and therefore a greater opening for smaller parties to stall progress.

D. Reactions: Acceptance, Appeal or Rejection

Several broad scenarios could emerge as results are announced. Ideally, a more or less free and fair process will leave some individuals complaining but the main parties accepting the outcome. More likely, there will be significant complaints from larger parties which cause some disruption and perhaps lead to repolling, but do not halt the entire exercise. In the worst case, one or more major parties could reject the election altogether and press for a re-run or simply take grievances to the streets.

The critical test will be whether the election is credible enough for the results to withstand the complaints of powerful losers. There are several which could cause trouble if seriously dissatisfied with the conduct of the election or its results; any one of the main parties could obstruct progress. Meeting electoral standards is not just a matter of abstract principle: a credible process offers a much more solid basis for coping with post-poll complaints.
The slow emergence of results and the order in which they are published (with individual FPTP results announced as soon as they are counted and the PR total probably weeks later) could have political significance. For example, the Maoists are widely expected to do badly in the FPTP contest. The announcement of initial poor results could lead to frustration among their cadres (possibly increasing pressure to reject the results) or embolden their opponents to goad them with premature political obituaries. The gradual publication of local PR tallies as the count continues and the circulation of rumours may well exacerbate a tense atmosphere.

High popular aspirations raised by the polls – the prime minister has even promised they “will solve all the nation’s problems” – will not be met. Those whose hopes focus on greater inclusiveness may well be disappointed by initial FPTP results, which will be far less representative of gender, regional and ethnic diversity, and suspicious at delays in the PR results. International experts have urged that the Election Commission make greater efforts to inform voters about the time it may take to know results. While there will be many new faces in the CA, the probable victory of most senior politicians may give the impression of a return to business as usual.

Challenges and appeals are inevitable. Parties that see themselves as victims of intimidation or other unfair practices will register complaints. Individual parties and groupings could be unhappy for particular reasons:

CPN(M). The Maoists have frequently stated that as the people are on their side any result other than victory could only result from rigging. However, on other occasions their leaders have explicitly said they will recognise even unfavourable results. The movement has remained on the fringes of the state and so will feel – however much their participation in government may point to the contrary – that they can justifiably denounce the elections as managed entirely by the “old regime”, from the election officials and security forces to the NC politicians who control critical ministries. The Maoists would find it hardest to accept an NC-royalist majority in the CA.

NC and UML. The two major parties of the democratic era make the most credible-sounding commitments to abide by the results. Nevertheless, surprisingly poor showings could prompt either to complain about an unfair environment or technical irregularities. Such complaints would be unlikely to go as far as all-out rejection and might be used as leverage in the bargaining over ministerial positions.

Madhesi parties. Madhesis will certainly be better represented in the CA than in any previous parliament, but it is possible many more will be elected on NC and UML tickets than from specifically Madhesi parties, whose disunity may cost them dear. This could prompt turmoil in the moderate Madhesi parties and strengthen the hand of more radical organisations, including armed groups. Even if divisions between Madhesi parties appear to be the main cause of a weak showing, the temptation to return to street protests to avoid being outflanked by radicals might be hard to resist. The only consolation that might suit individual leaders would be cabinet berths.

Royalists. The RPP and other royalist parties have been assiduously documenting Maoist obstruction and reporting incidents to the Election Commission, the press and the international community. None expects outstanding results, but none is likely to let any perceived unfairness pass without comment.

International reaction. The most influential (and probably most prompt) reaction to the polls and their results will be India’s. Although plenty of government agencies and opinion-formers in Delhi are still wary even of moderate parliamentary leftists such as the UML, India is likely to accept any result except one which would trigger a Maoist-led government. The U.S. would also balk at such a government, although both countries’ diplomats insist their concern is with the credibility of the process, not the results. Other countries worried by a strong Maoist showing would be shielded by India’s leading role in making objections (which could easily be based on the many violations likely before and on polling day). Conversely, if India accepts the outcome, others are highly unlikely to reject it.

The Election Commission is the primary authority to handle complaints: it can annul the polls in any station or constituency. There is also a CA Court, which has the power to “hear and settle petitions relating to the election of members of the Constituent Assembly”. The court has a three-member bench, drawn from Supreme Court judges. Though in most respects it would follow summary trial procedures, any case might take a long time to process. Even once all evidence has been heard and the defence has submitted its statement (or the deadline to do so expires), it could take up to three months for the court to issue its verdict, which is final. The thoroughness of technical preparations and management will be critical for rebutting allegations of major fraud or other irregularities. Whether the Election Commission can resolve complaints or has to refer some to the court, political pressures will probably outweigh legal niceties.

V. A Challenging Transition

A. A Roadmap for the Interregnum?

The transitional period will last at least several weeks. Even if voting goes smoothly, it will take at least three weeks for the final results to be published and up to another three weeks before the CA convenes. As noted, repolling will probably seriously extend that schedule. The Interim Constitution is vague on several transitional issues and avoids some altogether. Much depends on the major political players. While all the main ones talk of maintaining seven-party unity and consensus-based governance, there is no detailed agreement on how this would work. Even if there were a general commitment to seek a broad unity government, questions of its leadership and distribution of ministries would almost certainly be reopened in the light of election results. The seven parties will probably find it hard to admit others into their club (however fraught their relations, there is a certain comfort in the arrangement) but a stable unity government would need wider representation – of Madhesi parties, more representative individuals and perhaps moderate royalists. That will require a major psychological shift.

The interim legislature will remain in place until it is automatically dissolved by convening of the CA. The Interim Constitution does not specify transitional arrangements for the executive but as long as the legislature is in place, the provisions for the continuity of the prime minister and council of ministers remain in force. This means there could only be a change in prime minister if the incumbent resigns, loses a no-confidence vote, ceases to be a member of the legislature or dies. The Interim Constitution envisions formation of a new government after the CA convenes but only specifies that it should be broadly in line with its own provisions. The critical ones that will likely still apply are that the prime minister should be selected by consensus or, failing that, elected by a two-thirds majority, and the council of ministers should be appointed by consensus. “Consensus” is defined as that of the seven parties, which appear set to retain this privileged constitutional position regardless of the election outcome.

Prime Minister Koirala has said he will retire from politics after the election, but it is not clear if this is firm and, if so, when he will step down. His name remains on the NC’s PR list. If he resigns before the CA’s first sitting, his successor would be chosen by consensus or a two-thirds vote in the legislature. The Maoists, while supporting a coalition administration, said in their manifesto they would seek CA backing for an executive presidency and a new transitional government appointed by consensus. The UML said the government “will be formed under the leadership of the largest party on the basis of proportional representation”, implying that any party with sufficient seats could expect cabinet posts. Other parties may see the start of the CA as an opportune moment to push for more structural changes.

Managing the transition will be difficult. Even with basic cross-party consensus, the government has been weak in the pre-election period and may well be dysfunctional in its aftermath – especially if results suggest the power-sharing arrangements require major changes. Tough decisions will be required during the interregnum, from managing election disputes to convening the CA and forming a new government. Perhaps more critically, the current government will have to manage security arrangements – and any post-poll instability could bring new calls for army deployment or other sensitive steps.

B. The Constituent Assembly’s First Sitting

The first sitting of the CA is to be summoned by the prime minister within 21 days after the Election Commission announces final results. Although the general understanding of “first meeting” is a single session on the first day, debate and procedural delays could extend it for several days. Its administrative tasks include electing a chair and vice-chair, forming a new government and deciding basic rules of procedure (including how to divide its constitution-drafting and legislative functions). The Interim Constitution does not specify the order in which these decisions must be taken or a time-limit. Once formed, the cabinet is to nominate the 26 remaining CA delegates by consensus, a process that could prove controversial if the assembly is closely divided.

The Interim Constitution says, “implementation of the republic shall be made by the first meeting of the constituent assembly” but does not define “implementation” or specify a mechanism. The sitting of the CA is unlikely in itself to be considered an automatic trigger for implementation, which would presumably still be subject to a vote that the seven currently governing parties would feel bound in spirit, if not in letter, to support. The Interim Constitution had initially specified that the monarchy’s fate would be decided by simple majority vote at the first sitting, but this was altered to the language cited above, which leaves the need for, or nature of, any voting unspecified. The Maoists are the only party to offer a detailed description of what it understands by implementation of the federal democratic republic, although its elements range from the immediately practical (replacing the king with an interim president) to broader policy initiatives, such as immediate implementation of the CPN(M) transitional economic policy. The NC offers no clues in its manifesto and its leaders’ comments have been ambiguous.

If the NC and royalist parties do well, it would strengthen those pushing to reopen the question of the monarchy’s future, either by voting against a republic or mounting a campaign for a referendum. The Maoists have already indicated in their manifesto that they see the CA as an opportunity to start from scratch – for example, by appointing an acting executive president. Assuming these hurdles can be crossed, the question of implementation will have to be addressed. If a republic is endorsed, the immediate future of the king and the appointment of a new head of state will need to be managed. Neither the Interim Constitution nor other written agreements address the modalities of implementing the republic, and these will certainly be contentious.

C. Possible Destabilising Factors

Two armies. Both the state and the Maoist armies are intact, as strong as ever and ready to fight if necessary. Indeed, the former has grown stronger with public rehabilitation of its reputation (helped by ineffective government and worsening public security) and recruitment to fill vacancies. It has also become bolder in its political interventions – most notably on Maoist integration and its public rejection of part of the eight-point deal on Madhesi group entry into its ranks. Chief of Army Staff Rookmangad Katwal made pointed comments in his Army Day address about respecting the orders of any government “established by constitutional law”. Unlike efforts to claim earlier remarks on Maoist integration had been misunderstood, he reinforced the message by having his official spokesperson reiterate the main points on the record the next day. On 20 March 2008, the army bluntly warned it would not tolerate any attempt to seize power by force or any elements that sought to compromise national sovereignty or territorial integrity.

Lack of progress on integrating PLA fighters, while seen by conservative opponents of the Maoists as a victory, is precisely what more militant Maoist commanders sought. Prachanda’s shift from December 2007 (when he was calling for integration before the elections) to January 2008 (when he announced it could be deferred until after them) may look like a triumph for moderation but is in fact a concession to those who want the PLA to be intact on 11 April. PLA soldiers have been involved in election campaigning (some even standing as candidates); UNMIN believes some cantonments have permitted more than the maximum 12 per cent of combatants to leave at any one time. The progressive reassertion of the military on both sides is the most dangerous shortcoming of the peace process. The essence of the November 2006 CPA was a commitment that both forces would be restrained, controlled by civilian politicians and stay out of politics to allow elections to go ahead. This has not happened: each has re-entrenched to protect its basic interests and remains combat-ready.

Royalist rearguard action. Although most royalist parties have indicated they will accept the CA’s verdict on the monarchy, the king and his staunchest supporters may not be so accommodating. Their options are narrowing and pre- or post-poll disruption is one of the few avenues left to them to stall the process. The king has become slightly more vocal (giving two interviews after a long silence) but has made no public statement directly indicating an intent to oppose the CA. Some groups within the NC are more or less openly discussing options, including a call for return to the 1990 constitution. Former NC Prime Minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai has hosted meetings of the like-minded to discuss plans. The RPP(N) is still fighting for a referendum but is unlikely to attract significant support. Some people close to the king are still talking up the “democratic coup” plan, but the army is unlikely to step in without international backing and civilian, rather than royal, political cover.

Royalists have frequently hinted at secret Indian guarantees of the monarchy’s survival, but the resolution of the Madhes movement suggested Delhi has decided not to offer the king an unconditional lifeline. Questioning the CA elections’ legitimacy, trying to use sympathetic legislators and stalling for time are the best but still weak options for the royalists. Opinion polls suggest a significant minority still supports some form of monarchy, but there are few ways to convert that abstract belief in the institution into a practical rescue plan. Still, the monarchy is unlikely to disappear without some final, possibly violent, confrontation. If the move to a republic is achieved with a less than overwhelming public mandate, royalists may still nurture hope of a return at some future date.

Weak peace process. Seven-party unity has sometimes been little more than cosmetic, and the peace process has been characterised by multiple agreements never implemented. Critical CPA elements remain unaddressed, despite explicit commitments in the 23-point agreement to move them forward. Whatever the election outcome, the Maoists will be keen to retain as much extra-parliamentary leverage as possible and are unlikely to dismantle all their parallel power structures. On 6 February they announced reestablishment of their United Revolutionary People’s Council, raising new doubts over their commitment to dissolve those structures.

Militant Maoists or royalists are far from the only threat to peace. The experience of the Madhesi and ethnic movements demonstrates that radicalism can spring from different sources and rapidly assume a violent form. In the absence of a solid peace process that transforms the basic structure of the conflict, the idea that the CA will be a panacea is an illusion. Weak governance and poor law and order have dogged the run-up to the elections and will probably be an even more severe problem in the aftermath.

VI. Constituent Assembly and Beyond

A. The Nature of the Constituent Assembly

The CA is a sovereign body and will be at liberty to define many of its own rules of conduct. In theory, it will be free to endorse or overturn any agreements entered into by the current government or its constituent parties. It will also be able to amend the Interim Constitution by a two-thirds vote. The CA’s goal is not specifically defined, although the preamble to the CPA and the Interim Constitution contain statements of intent that serve as non-binding guidelines. Broad public agreement on core governance principles has been reflected in the stated aims of the major parties, although their manifestos differ in approach.

Procedures. The Interim Constitution establishes an unusual decision-making system. Apart from the question of the monarchy, all provisions are expected to be adopted unanimously, with time-consuming procedures for fresh consultations and voting if there is even one opposing vote. Each provision will be voted on in sequence and adopted if a quorum of two thirds is in attendance and no opposing vote is cast. Failing this, it will be referred to consultation between parliamentary party leaders before a fresh vote within 21 days and, failing unanimity, a further, final two-thirds majority vote. Separately, an absolute two-thirds majority can refer to a referendum “a decision on any matters of national importance, except when this conflicts with provisions elsewhere in the constitution”. This has been taken to exclude a referendum on the monarchy; although the Interim Constitution no longer specifies requirements for a vote on the monarchy, its unambiguous provision for immediate implementation of a republic presumably counts as a provision that rules out a referendum.

The structural bias towards unanimous decisions may encourage consensus building but will also allow individuals to stall progress. The role assigned to party leaders may well encourage backroom horse-trading instead of open debate. The lack of a provision for agenda setting, drafting and ordering of votes could further empower political leaders over legislators. The CA is entitled to set up such committees as it deems necessary and could either request additional secretariat support or delegate drafting to cross-party committees. Negotiations over structures could be complex if parties see partisan advantage in specific mechanisms. However, faith in the process will be strengthened if committees or other structures function transparently and make drafts available to the public as they are submitted for debate.

The CA as legislature. The CA’s dual function saves costs and electoral complications but raises the risk of trade-offs between its constitution-making and legislative functions. It is for the CA itself to decide how it wishes to divide its roles. The Interim Constitution states that the CA acts as the legislature as long as it is in existence but that it may delegate legislative duties to a separate committee. In any case, bargaining over day-to-day legislation could lead to party deals to gain support for constitutional provisions. Restricting the CA’s legislative mandate (either by constitutional provision or party commitments to avoid enacting all but essential legislation) could prevent some of these problems. However, as even the unelected interim legislature demonstrated an appetite for legislating across the board, it is unlikely that any proposal to limit legislative scope would win party backing in the CA. Transparency of procedures and debates, coupled with public participation in constitutional discussions, are the best remaining bulwarks against the CA falling victim to disputes over relatively minor legislation.

Duration. The Interim Constitution gives the CA two years to complete its work, with a possible six-month extension in case of a “declaration of an emergency situation”. This is a reasonable timeframe, but the consistent track record of missed deadlines in the peace process suggests delays are entirely possible. The Interim Constitution specifies the need to use emergency powers to enable an extension but, as in other areas, the CA could decide that as a sovereign body, it is entitled to extend its timeframe by other means. Perhaps more worrying is the provision for early dissolution of the CA (by its own resolution), which could lead to suspension of the constitutional process mid-way without any framework for continuing executive, legislative or constitution-drafting functions.

Implementation. It may seem premature to worry about how to implement a constitution the drafting of which has not yet begun. However, constitutional experts stress that implementation is increasingly recognised as the most important part of the constitutional process. Without viable plans to put it into practice, even the best document may fail to achieve its aims.

B. The Big Issues

Although much attention has been focused on the monarch’s future, several other major issues are likely to generate serious debate:

Security sector reform. Despite its centrality to ending the conflict and building a sustainable peace, the shape of Nepal’s security sector is yet to be discussed. There are only cursory, poorly defined commitments in the CPA (to make the army more representative and subject to democratic control and to “integrate” Maoist combatants). The committee that was supposed to take discussion forward has met only once and made no progress.

Federalism. This will cause much debate. All major parties – even the RPP(N) – have formally accepted some form of federalism but there has been little discussion within them on principles or practicalities. There remains wide opposition across the political spectrum, including from prominent opinion-formers in academia, media and civil society. Little attention has been paid to the bureaucracy needed to support federal governance or a complex system of quotas and reservations. Related to federalism but not synonymous with it is the longstanding demand for more decentralisation. The 1999 Local Self-Governance Act, which devolved some budgetary authority to Village Development Committees (VDCs), the lowest level of local government, was widely seen as a success but the dissolution of local elected bodies in 2002 and the displacement of most VDC secretaries during the conflict (and latterly the Madhes unrest) halted progress.

Secularism and inclusiveness. Parliament proclaimed Nepal a secular state in May 2006. All major parties are committed to endorsing this in the constitution, but it is an emotional issue that has already generated some passionate opposition, as well as criticism from Indian Hindu groups and parties. The CA may restart debate. The question of reservations, quotas or other forms of affirmative action will be hard fought. While the quotas in the CA electoral system may be seen as a precedent, there is unlikely to be easy agreement on whether the constitution should guarantee specific measures or contain only a general provision for later legislation to implement.

Government structure and state institutions. The Maoists call for an executive presidency with a prime minister elected by parliament to oversee day-to-day administration. The UML wants a weak, ceremonial presidency with a directly elected executive prime minister. Some parties talk of making the state more representative, accessible and accountable. The Maoists, for example, seek to overhaul the judicial system and bureaucracy.

International relations. The Maoists have called for revoking the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship with India, as well as tighter controls on foreign capital. International treaties or other agreements involving major natural resource issues are already subject to certain restrictions, and some may push for even stricter constitutional provisions, especially in the light of pre-election awards of large hydropower contracts. Apart from this, the major parties’ stances on foreign relations are similarly bland. The NC and UML manifestos are indistinguishable in their commitment to base foreign policy on the UN Charter and panchsheel, the doctrine of non-interference. All parties promise to maintain good relations with India and China; the Maoist proposal that Nepal should be a “bridge” between them to take advantage of their fast-growing economies echoes King Gyanendra’s priority following his 2005 coup.

C. Public Participation

A meaningful process will require much better mechanisms for public consultation and participation than in the past. There has been no shortage of advice on how to accomplish this, ranging from a full-fledged constitutional commission (an idea unpopular with political leaders) to support structures to manage public discussions, invite and analyse individual or group suggestions and maintain transparent debate.

The major parties, however, show little interest in public consultation, despite the strong evidence that a more participatory drafting process on the Interim Constitution and firmer commitments to a similar CA exercise might have headed off some of the street agitations that forced pre-CA deals on key issues. The UML does not mention public participation in its manifesto; the Maoists make a single-sentence promise to adopt “appropriate mechanisms” to guarantee the active participation of “the general population, different interest groups and experts”. The NC gives it more space and has more concrete proposals for public hearings and consultations with a variety of groups, as well as for CA committees to consult interest groups and experts on particular issues.

VII. Conclusion

Even a successful election will only mark the opening of the next stage in the peace process. Many of the most critical tasks have been left on the back burner as attention has focused on the election. Surviving the rocky road to the polls and their probably turbulent aftermath will require maturity, cooperation and forward planning from the main parties. A managed transition to the CA is possible but the range of potentially disruptive factors is daunting. The parties’ first commitment must be to respect the election’s outcome, as long as it is broadly free and fair. Whatever the results, seven-party cohesion would smooth the way forward, but leaders will need to prepare for a broader unity government that includes other parties that do well at the polls. Tackling the sensitive remaining parts of the peace deal will then be a priority – starting with grasping the nettle of security sector reform and converting the extended military ceasefire into structural support for sustainable peace. Progress on security, justice, reconstruction and economic development would help to maintain popular support for the constitutional process.
Kathmandu/Brussels, 2 April 2008
APPENDIX A

MAP OF Nepal




APPENDIX B

Glossary of Acronyms




APF Armed Police Force
CA Constituent Assembly
CDO Chief District Officer
CEC Chief Election Commissioner
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPN(M) Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
DEA District Election Adviser
DEO District Election Officer
EC Election Commission
EEMT Electoral Expert Monitoring Team
EOM Election Observation Mission
FPTP First Past The Post
FRNF Federal Republican National Front
IC Interim Constitution
JTMM Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha (in two factions: Jwala Singh (JS) and Goit (G))
MJF Madhesi Janadhikar Forum
NA Nepal Army
NC Nepali Congress
NC(D) Nepali Congress (Democratic)
NSP(A) Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi)
NWPP Nepal Workers and Peasants Party
OHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PLA People’s Liberation Army (Maoist)
PR Proportional Representation
RJP Rashtriya Janashakti Party
RPP Rashtriya Prajatantra Party
RPP(N) Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (Nepal)
SPA Seven-Party Alliance (includes NC, UML, NSP(A), NC(D), Janamorcha Nepal, NWPP and ULF)
TMDP Tarai Madhes Democratic Party
UDMF United Democratic Madhesi Front
UML Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist)
UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal
YCL Young Communist League
APPENDIX c

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP


The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 140 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.
Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.
The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is co-chaired by the former European Commissioner for External Relations Christopher Patten and former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.
Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is based as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. The organisation currently operates eleven regional offices (in Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Nairobi, Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi) and has local field representation in sixteen additional locations (Abuja, Baku, Bangkok, Beirut, Belgrade, Colombo, Damascus, Dili, Dushanbe, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kinshasa, Port-au-Prince, Pretoria and Tehran). Crisis Group currently covers some 60 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Phillipines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Serbia and Turkey; in the Middle East, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia, the rest of the Andean region and Haiti.
Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governmental departments and agencies currently provide funding: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Agency for International Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Canadian International Development Agency, Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Foreign Office, Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, Principality of Liechtenstein Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International Development, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign affairs, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, United Kingdom Department for International Development, Economic and Social Research Council UK, U.S. Agency for International Development.
Foundation and private sector donors include Carnegie Corporation of New York, Carso Foundation, Fundación DARA Internacional, Iara Lee and George Gund III Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Hunt Alternatives Fund, Kimsey Foundation, Korea Foundation, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and Pamela Omidyar Fund, Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Ploughshares Fund, Provictimis Foundation, Radcliffe Foundation, Sigrid Rausing Trust and VIVA Trust.
April 2008
Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org
APPENDIX d

INTERNATIONAL Crisis Group REPORTS AND BRIEFINGs on Asia since 2005


CENTRAL ASIA
The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia’s Destructive Monoculture, Asia Report N°93, 28 February 2005 (also available in Russian)
Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution, Asia Report N°97, 4 May 2005 (also available in Russian)
Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising, Asia Briefing N°38, 25 May 2005 (also available in Russian)
Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State, Asia Report N°109, 16 December 2005 (also available in Russian)
Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul, Asia Briefing N°45, 16 February 2006 (also available in Russian)
Central Asia: What Role for the European Union?, Asia Report N°113, 10 April 2006
Kyrgyzstan’s Prison System Nightmare, Asia Report N°118, 16 August 2006 (also available in Russian)
Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter, Asia Briefing N°54, 6 November 2006
Kyrgyzstan on the Edge, Asia Briefing N°55, 9 November 2006 (also available in Russian)
Turkmenistan after Niyazov, Asia Briefing N°60, 12 February 2007
Central Asia’s Energy Risks, Asia Report N°133, 24 May 2007 (also available in Russian)
Uzbekistan: Stagnation and Uncertainty, Asia Briefing N°67, 22 August 2007
Political Murder in Central Asia: No Time to End Uzbekistan’s Isolation, Asia Briefing N°76, 13 February 2008
NORTH EAST ASIA
North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?, Asia Report N°96, 25 April 2005 (also available in Korean and Russian)
Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention, Asia Report Nº100, 27 June 2005 (also available in Korean)
China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente, Asia Briefing N°42, 21 September 2005
North East Asia’s Undercurrents of Conflict, Asia Report N°108, 15 December 2005 (also available in Korean and Russian)
China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?, Asia Report N°112, 1 February 2006 (also available in Korean)
After North Korea’s Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks Dead?, Asia Briefing N°52, 9 August 2006 (also available in Korean and Russian)
Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and Beyond, Asia Report N°122, 26 October 2006 (also available in Korean and Russian)
North Korea’s Nuclear Test: The Fallout, Asia Briefing N°56, 13 November 2006 (also available in Korean and Russian)
After the North Korean Nuclear Breakthrough: Compliance or Confrontation?, Asia Briefing N°62, 30 April 2007 (also available in Korean and Russian)
North Korea-Russia Relations: A Strained Friendship, Asia Briefing N°71, 4 December 2007 (also available in Russian)
South Korea’s Election: What to Expect from President Lee, Asia Briefing N°73, 21 December 2007
SOUTH ASIA
Nepal’s Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation Worse, Asia Report N°91, 9 February 2005
Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track, Asia Briefing N°35, 23 February 2005
Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, Asia Briefing N°35, 24 February 2005
Nepal: Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N°94, 24 March 2005
The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, Asia Report N°95, 18 April 2005
Political Parties in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing N°39, 2 June 2005
Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, Asia Report N°99, 15 June 2005
Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?, Asia Report N°101, 21 July 2005
Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, Asia Briefing N°41, 15 September 2005
Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan¸ Asia Report N°102, 28 September 2005
Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, Asia Report N°104, 27 October 2005 (also available in Nepali)
Pakistan’s Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule, Asia Briefing N°43, 22 November 2005
Nepal’s New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, Asia Report N°106, 28 November 2005
Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union’s Role, Asia Report N°107, 30 November 2005
Nepal: Electing Chaos, Asia Report N°111, 31 January 2006
Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, Asia Briefing N°46, 15 March 2006
Nepal’s Crisis: Mobilising International Influence, Asia Briefing N°49, 19 April 2006
Nepal: From People Power to Peace?, Asia Report N°115, 10 May 2006 (also available in Nepali)
Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work, Asia Report N°116, 15 May 2006
India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Stabilising a Cold Peace, Asia Briefing N°51, 15 June 2006
Pakistan: the Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, Asia Report N°119, 14 September 2006
Bangladesh Today, Asia Report N°121, 23 October 2006
Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, Asia Report N°123, 2 November 2006
Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process, Asia Report N°124, 28 November 2006
Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, Asia Report N°125, 11 December 2006
Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work, Asia Report Nº126, 15 December 2006
Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact, Asia Briefing Nº59, 29 January 2007
Nepal’s Constitutional Process, Asia Report N°128, 26 February 2007 (also available in Nepali)
Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism, Asia Report N°130, 29 March 2007
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007
Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?, Asia Report N°132, 18 May 2007 (also available in Nepali)
Sri Lanka’s Muslims: Caught in the Crossfire, Asia Report N°134, 29 May 2007
Sri Lanka’s Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N°135, 14 June 2007
Nepal’s Troubled Tarai Region, Asia Report N°136, 9 July 2007 (also available in Nepali)
Elections, Democracy and Stability in Pakistan, Asia Report N°137, 31 July 2007
Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, Asia Report N°138, 30 August 2007
Nepal’s Fragile Peace Process, Asia Briefing N°68, 28 September 2007 (also available in Nepali)
Pakistan: The Forgotten Conflict in Balochistan, Asia Briefing N°69, 22 October 2007
Sri Lanka: Sinhala Nationalism and the Elusive Southern Consensus, Asia Report N°141, 7 November 2007
Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan, Asia Briefing N°70, 12 November 2007
Nepal: Peace Postponed, Asia Briefing N°72, 18 December 2007 (also available in Nepali)
After Bhutto’s Murder: A Way Forward for Pakistan, Asia Briefing N°74, 2 January 2008
Afghanistan: The Need for International Resolve, Asia Report N°145, 6 February 2008
Sri Lanka’s Return to War: Limiting the Damage, Asia Report N°146, 20 February 2008
SOUTH EAST ASIA
Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, Asia Report N°92, 22 February 2005 (also available in Indonesian)
Decentralisation and Conflict in Indonesia: The Mamasa Case, Asia Briefing N°37, 3 May 2005
Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005 (also available in Thai)
Aceh: A New Chance for Peace, Asia Briefing N°40, 15 August 2005
Weakening Indonesia’s Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso, Asia Report N°103, 13 October 2005 (also available in Indonesian)
Thailand’s Emergency Decree: No Solution, Asia Report N°105, 18 November 2005 (also available in Thai)
Aceh: So Far, So Good, Asia Briefing N°44, 13 December 2005 (also available in Indonesian)
Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts, Asia Report Nº110, 19 December 2005
Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue, Asia Briefing N°47, 23 March 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, Asia Briefing N°48, 29 March 2006
Managing Tensions on the Timor-Leste/Indonesia Border, Asia Briefing N°50, 4 May 2006
Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks, Asia Report N°114, 5 May 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh, Asia Report N°117, 31 July 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, Asia Briefing N°53, 5 September 2006
Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, Asia Report N°120, 10 October 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
Aceh’s Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Asia Briefing N°57, 29 November 2006
Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid, Asia Briefing N°58, 8 December 2006
Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, Asia Report N°127, 24 January 2007
Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup, Asia Report N°129, 15 March 2007 (also available in Thai)
Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh , Asia Briefing N°61, 22 March 2007
Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status, Asia Briefing N°63, 3 May 2007
Indonesia: Decentralisation and Local Power Struggles in Maluku, Asia Briefing N°64, 22 May 2007
Timor-Leste’s Parliamentary Elections, Asia Briefing N°65, 12 June 2007
Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict, Asia Briefing N°66, 19 July 2007 (also available in Indonesian)
Aceh: Post-Conflict Complications, Asia Report N°139, 4 October 2007 (also available in Indonesian)
Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries, Asia Report N°140, 23 October 2007 (also available in Thai)
“Deradicalisation” and Indonesian Prisons, Asia Report N°142, 19 November 2007
Timor-Leste: Security Sector Reform, Asia Report N°143, 17 January 2008 (also available in Tetum)
Indonesia: Tackling Radicalism in Poso, Asia Briefing N°75, 22 January 2008
Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown, Asia Report N°144, 31 January 2008
Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Publishing Industry, Asia Report N°147, 28 February 2008
Timor-Leste’s Displacement Crisis, Asia Report N°148, 31 March 2008
OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS
For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on:
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Anglo American PLC
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Stanley Bergman & Edward Bergman
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Uta Zapf

In The News

TMDP-SP Pact Fails, No More Alliances Likely in Tarai Himalayan Times Last week, the TMDP led by Mahantha Thakur and SP led by Rajendra Mahato forged a poll alliance in 40 constituencies in the Tarai but they failed to implement that understanding as their candidates have refused to pull out of the race. ....... MJF coordinator Upendra Yadav blamed Mahantha Thakur for failing to maintain unity among the partners and ruining the chances of an alliance. ...... "He (Thakur) wanted us to support his party even in those constituencies where we are in a position to win on our own. Even if we do not contest unitedly, it would have a larger impact on us. We will win maximum seats in the Tarai," Yadav claimed, adding that the lack of alliance will only impact his party in a couple of constituencies in the western Tarai.

Blast at NC candidate's house in Birgunj NepalNews
Violence continues despite commitments
UML-Maoist cadres clash in Chitwan
Martin says Maoists, UML, NC are main code violators

How will Madhes mix affect April 10? Kantipur the political picture in Madhes looks unclear. There is no ‘political wave’ in favor of any particular party ...... As the new Madhesi parties failed to cobble together an effective poll alliance, the Madhesi political identity seems to have received a jolt in its very infancy. Madhesi people, as a result, are turning back to their roots: Caste and party loyalties. ...... Politics in southern constituencies in Kapilvastu, Nawalparasi and Rautahat is dominated by landlords, muscle and firepower.

The view from the other side Nepali Times While the awareness about Nepal’s Madhes problem is higher, it has not seeped into the popular Bihari consciousness except near the border. There is no large political constituency pushing it in Patna. ..... “So who are these Madhesis? The tv channels keep showing images of them being beaten up by the police.” ...... In the consciousness of Bihar’s opinion-formers, the Madhes is on the fringes. ..... Laloo Prasad Yadav may be a little more than a clown for Southasia’s chattering classes, but he symbolises the non-violent political assertion of the quaintly-acronymed OBCs. With his spotless record of providing security to state’s Muslim population even when north India was reeling under communal strife, and it is no surprise that Laloo was in power for 15 years. ...... Like Nepal, Bihar continues to depend on its huge migrant population.
The proletariat and the Praetorian Guard In the midwest, there is still ‘one country, two systems’ where kangaroo courts pass judgements that are enforced by YCL cadres. Maoist renegades have formed ethnic and tribal militias in the hills and Tarai. ...... The challenge of reforming the Nepal Army will probably be even more complex than rehabilitating Maoist combatants. Despite its aggressive denials, the army is composed of even more politically indoctrinated members than the Maoists. ...... Loyalists to the crown continue to dominate the army brass. ..... Koirala may want to think of appointing a defence minister who wears a dhoti, chews pan and has no hesitation in issuing instructions in his native language rather than in the king’s Nepali. Even Matrika Yadav, perhaps.

MPRF-Muslim says, anti-polls elements involved in Mosque blasts Kantipur Muslim faction of the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum Monday claimed that the anti-poll elements were involved in the Saturday night’s multiple blasts at Chhoti Mosque in Biratnagar. ..... the MPRF- Muslim faction’s General Secretary Mohammad Nasir Siddhique
टिकट विवादले कांग्रेस प्रभावित
नेपाल-प्रचण्ड भेटवार्ता एमालेले रोल्पा-२ प्रचण्ड र गोरखा-२ बाबुराम भट्टर्राईलार्इर्र्छोड्ने सम्भावना छ .... माओवादीले 'आफ्नो संवेदनशीलता बुझेर' रामबहादुर थापा बादलको क्ष्ँेत्रमा सहयोगको आग्रह गरेका छन्
इन्टरनेटबाट चुनाव प्रचार काठमाडौं क्षेत्र-५ का कांग्रेस उम्मेदवार नरहरि आचार्यले इन्टरनेटमार्फ चुनावी प्रचार थालेका छन् । नरहरि आचार्य डट कममा उनले आफ्नो उम्मेदवारीको औचित्य दर्शाएका छन् । अंग्रेजी र नेपालीमा भएको यो साइटमा क्षेत्र-५ को भौगोलिक विवरण, पार्टर्ीीे घोषणापत्र, उम्मेदवारका प्रकाशित पुस्तकका विवरण, निर्वाचन पर्चालगायत अपिलहरू छन् ।

Govt to hold talks with armed groups in Janakpur Kantipur Madhes Mukti Tigers, Terai Cobra, Janatantrik Terai Mukit Morcha led by Rajan Mukti and Joint Democratic Liberation Front. ..... The armed groups have demanded the government to release all their fellow cadres currently in police custody and to drop all charges against them as preconditions for the talks.
फोरमस“ग भएन फोरमले आफ्नो पार्टर्ीीलियो स्थितिमा रहेका तर्राईका १ सय ११ मध्ये ७५ सिट दिन प्रस्ताव गर्दा पनि तमलोपा र सद्भावनाले अस्वीकार गरेपछि तालमेल वार्ता अघि बढ्न नसकेको ...... महन्थ ठाकुरले फोरमबाट सद्भावनालाई छाडेर दर्ुइ दलबीचमात्र चुनावी तालमेल गर्न प्रस्ताव आएकाले वार्ता अघि बढ्न नसकेको ..... गुप्ताले भने आफ्नो दलले त्यस्तो प्रस्ताव नरोखेको बताए ...... फोरमले उम्मेदवारी दिएका तर्राईका १ सय ११ मध्ये ११ सिटमा तमलोपा र सद्भावनाका उम्मेदवार छैनन्
प्रधानमन्त्रीय निर्वाचन कसरी ? मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरमले प्रधानमन्त्री पदलाई 'अनावश्यक' बताएको छ । ...... जापानमा संविधान संशोधन गरी प्रधानमन्त्रीको प्रत्यक्ष चुनाव हुनर्ुपर्ने पक्षमा छलफल पनि चल्दैछ ।
फोरमका प्रस्ताव सुजाताद्वारा अस्वीकार उनले आफूसहित ठूलो समूह कांग्रेस छाडेर आएपछि फोरमको शक्ति तीन/चार गुना बढेको दाबी गर्दै कसैसित तालमेल गर्नु जरुरी नरहेको बताए ।

TMLP, SP announce electoral alliance NepalNews the SP will support TMLP candidates in Jhapa constituency no. 6 and 7, Morang 2, 3 and 6, Sunsari 4 and 5, Siraha 2 and 6, Dhanusha 1, 3 and 5, Salahi-6, Banke-3, Bardiya-1, Dang 1 and Kanchanpur 1, 2 and 3. ...... the TMLP will support SP candidates in Jhapa constituency no. 1 and 4, Morang 4, 5 and 7, Sunsari 1, 2, 3 and 6, Siraha-1, Bardiya 2 and 3 Dhanusha-6, Banke 2 and 4, Udaypur 1 and 2 and Kailali 3, 5 and 6
Govt to hold talks with armed Terai groups Friday
Prachanda not for alliance with UML, bandh called in the east

Maoist will face downfall like King if behaviour not improved: UML Chief Kantipur

MK Nepal, Prachanda discuss possible electoral alliance NepalNews
Maoists obstruct UML election rally in Dhading
Maoists, CPN (Unity Centre) 'close' to merger Maoist chairman Prachanda and Unity Centre-Masal general secretary Narayan Kaji Shrestha 'Prakash' ..... the merger was delayed with some central leaders of the Unity Centre-Masal refusing to "hand over" their properties to the party - something all the central Maoist leaders are said to have already done Willingness shown by Terai armed group for talks is positive: Home Minister Terai armed groups are currently holding internal discussions

एक्लो सेलिब्रिटी लोकप्रिय युवा नेता गगन थापा संविधानसभामा भौगोलिक क्षेत्रबाट उम्मेदवार बन्न पाएनन् । तर, नेपाली काङ्ग्रेसका चुनावी सभाहरूमा उनी एक्लो 'सेलिब्रिटी' बन्न पुगेका छन् । पचहत्तरै जिल्लाका काङ्ग्रेस उम्मेदवारहरूले उनलाई आ-आप\mनो क्षेत्रमा निम्तो दिएका छन् । तर, समय र भूगोलका कारण उनी सबै ठाउ“मा पुग्न सकिरहेका छैनन् ।

MPRF, Mahato-led NSP clash in Sunsari Kantipur Mahato-led NSP activists clashed with the activists of MPRF candidate Bijay Kumar Gachhadhar after the latter tried to replace the NSP’s flags placed at the residence of Mahato-led NSP village unit chairman Mahendra Mandal with their party’s campaign materials.
NC Dissidents Protest Against Federalism Himalayan Times 20 leaders including Taranath Ranabhat, Bipin Koirala, Shiba Bahadur Khadka, Marshal Julum Shakya, Omkar Shrestha, Dinbandhu Aryal and Harendra Bahadur Shrestha asked the people to save the nation from being divided into many federal states.
Monarchy-Maoist Unity Possible: Kamal Thapa

मधेसी पार्टीले सीट तालमेल नगरेको राम्रै हो

मधेसी पार्टीले सीट तालमेल नगरेको राम्रै हो

मधेसी अान्दोलनमा साथ रहेका तीन मधेसी पार्टीले सीट तालमेल नगरेको नराम्रो भन्न िमल्दैन। त्यो कदम चतुर कदम हो। अाफ्नो पार्टीको उम्मेदवार नै नरहेको क्षेत्रमा समानुपाितक िनर्वाचनकालािग मत माग्न गार्हो हुन्थ्यो नत्र भने। तीन पहाडी पार्टीले पिन त सीट तालमेल गरेका छैनन्।

माअोवादीले लोकतन्त्र अझ पिन िसकेन

माअोवादीको गुण्डागर्दीका समाचारहरू अाइरहेका छन्। माअोवादी नेतृत्वले एक्लै बहुमत ल्याउने सपना िकन देखेको? एक्लो बहुमत त कुनै पिन पार्टीको अाउँदैन। २०% भन्दा बढी मत कुनै पिन पार्टीले ल्याउनेवाला छैन। माअोवादीले िहंसा अझै त्यागेको छैन भनेर नै एमालेले माअोवादीसँग चुनावी सीट तालमेल नगरेको हो। अिहले माअोवादी एमालेको एक ितहाइ पिन छ िक छैन। गुण्डागर्दी गरेमा माअोवादीको मत प्ितशत ह्वात्त घटेर जान्छ, र चुनावपिछ माअोवादीलाई अरू सबै पार्टीहरू िमलेर एक्ल्याउने संभावना बढेर जान्छ।

िमलीजुली सरकार

सबैभन्दा ठुलो पार्टी कुन बन्छ? त्यो पार्टी एमाले हुन्छ िक फोरम हुन्छ, भन्न गार्हो छ। तर बहुमत को त कुरा नै छोडौं, २०% भन्दा बढी मत पिन कसैले ल्याउला जस्तो मलाई लाग्दैन। चुनावपिछ तीन मधेसी पार्टी एक ठाउँमा अाएको राम्रो। बार्गेिनङ गर्न सिजलो हुन्छ।

एमाले र तीन मधेसी पार्टी िमल्न सक्छन्। काँग्रेस र तीन मधेसी पार्टी िमल्न सक्छन्। काँग्रेस, एमाले र एक वा दुई मधेसी पार्टी िमल्न सक्छन्। माअोवादीको व्यवहारले गर्दा माअोवादी सरकारमा जाने संभावना कम भएर गएको छ।

बन्दुकधारी मधेसी समुहहरू

तीन मधेेसी पार्टी सरकारमा गएपिछ ितनले मधेसी बन्दुकधारी समुहहरूसँग अादरपुर्वक शान्ित वार्ता गर्नेछन्। िमलनिवन्दु भनेको एक मधेस एक प्रदेशको नारा हो। त्यो मधेस राज्यको स्थापना नहुँदासम्म त्यो नाराको अौिचत्य कायम नै रहन्छ। यस चुनावमा ती बन्दुकधारी समुहहरूले तीन मधेसी पार्टीलाई सघाउनुपर्छ, र चुनाव सफल पार्नुपर्छ।

अर्को प्रधानमन्त्री: उपेन्दर यादव, माधव नेपाल, शेर देउवा

तीन जना मध्ये जसको पार्टी सबैभन्दा ठुलो भएर अाउँछ उसले प्रम खाने जस्तो देिखयो। दोस्रो ठुलो पार्टीले राष्ट्रपित खाला, तेस्रो ठुलोले सभामुख। चौथो ठुलोले उपसभामुख।

पाँच बुँदा, पाँच चुनाव

In The News

Youth mobilisation during polls may cause violence: UNMIN Kantipur various evidences that find the CPN-Maoist activists guilty of incapacitating parties to freely conduct election campaign in places across the country. ..... Maoist cadres have taken over the right to assembly of activists of various parties, in different ways, in many districts including Darchula, Dhankuta, Kaski, Chitwan and Dhading
Challenegs and obstacles still exist for CA polls: UNMIN growing evidence of action by CPN-M cadres, including members of the Young Communist League (YCL), to restrict in various ways freedom of assembly of other parties in different areas of Darchula, Dhankuta, Sindhulpalchowk, Chitwan, Bardiya, Baitadi, Lalitpur, Okhaldunga, Gorkha, Kaski, Kalikot, Dhading, Salyan, among others. ....... A repeated warning from CPN-M cadres has been that other parties should not campaign in its “base areas”. Voters have been told that the CPN-M will know how they vote and will take action against those who cast their ballot for other parties. ...... The community was found to be in a state of fear and intimidated by the YCL, and OHCHR was told by multiple sources that students as young as twelve had been taken out of school and enlisted by the YCL. ...... Representatives of youth wings of major political parties have indicated that they plan to deploy large numbers of young people “to provide security” at polling stations on the day of the election. ...... a number of commanders and members of the Maoist army have been nominated and are campaigning as candidates for election without having been discharged from the Maoist army ...... retention of a specified number and type of weapons for security at the residence of the Chairman and for 25 central members of the CPN-M ....... weapons are to be used solely for self-defence and are not to be publicly displayed
‘No RPP campaign in Dhankuta due to YCl’
Maoist breaching election CoC: Election Commissioner Nepal
तात्यो सिरहा एकातिर कांग्रेस, एमाले, जनमोर्चा र माओवादीले आफूहरूबीच प्रतिस्पर्धा हुने दाबी गरिरहेका छन् भने फोरम, सद्भावना, तमलोपाले भने आफ्नो पकड रहेको बताउ“दै आएका छन् । उनीहरूको दाबी छ, 'मधेस आन्दोलनमा नेतृत्व गरेकाले हामी प्रभावशाली छौं ।' ..... यसैबीच डोम समुदायबाट पहिलो पटक उम्मेदवार बनेका छन् । क्षेत्र नं. ४ बाट दलित जनजाति पार्टर्ीी रामचन्द्र मरिक डोमलाई उम्मेदवार बनाएको विषयको जिल्लाभर सकारात्मक चर्चा भएको छ ।
मधेसमा होली
भट्टर्राईको क्षेत्रमा चुनावी चहलपहल २०२६ सालको एसएलसीमा आफ्नो गाउ“ छेउकै अमरज्योति जनता माविबाट बोर्ड फस्ट गरेका भट्टर्राईले चुनावका लागि पनि आफ्नै क्षेत्र रोजेका छन् । च्याङली गाविसको साना किसान विकास आयोजनाको भवन ध्वस्त पारेर आफ्नो जनयुद्ध सुरु भएको उद्घोष गरेका माओवादीले यस जिल्लालाई सामरिक महत्त्वको क्षेत्रसमेत मान्ने गरेको छ ।
एमाले-माओवादी झगडा नगर्ने सहमति
नुवाकोटमा त्रिपक्षीय
वाईसीएलले उम्मेदवारलाई खान-सुत्न दिएनन् माओवादी कार्यकर्ता पुष्प दाहाल लगायत ३० जनाको समूहले पकाएको भात खोसेर खाएका हुन् । उनीहरूले कांग्रेस कार्यकर्ता सुत्न स्थानीय दर्ीघमान गुरुङका घरमा लगाएको ओछ्यान अतिक्रमण गरिसुतेका थिए ।
माओवादीद्वारा आक्रमण तीव्र संविधानसभा निर्वाचन प्रचारमा संलग्न कांग्रेस र एमालेका कार्यकर्तामाथि माओवादीको आक्रमण क्रम बढेको छ । संविधानसभाको तिथि नजिकि“दै जा“दा आक्रमणका घटना अरू बढेका हुन् । ..... 'माओवादी अझै पनि बहुदलीय प्रतिस्पर्धामा भन्दा हिंसा, अराजक र तोडफोडमा विश्वास गर्दै त्रासको वातावरण बनाउन लागेको छ,' केन्द्रीय कायर्ँलयका मुख्य सचिव शोभाकर पराजुलीद्वारा जारी विज्ञप्तिमा भनिएको छ- 'यो पराजित मानसिकताको उपज हो ।' ..... एमालेले पनि आक्रमणको निन्दा गर्दै माओवादीले हतास मानसिकताबाट प्रेरित भएर आक्रमणको सिलसिला जारी राखेको दाबी गरेको छ ।

New War If Maoists Lose Polls: Dr Bhattarai Himalayan Times Senior leader of the CPN-Maoist Dr Baburam Bhattarai on Saturday warned that his party would launch a new kind of people's war if it lost in the constituent assembly polls scheduled for April 10. ...... "The new people's war will be a peaceful one, and urban-centred. No one needs to fear on any score." ..... the CPN-Maoist was the progenitor of the constituent assembly
One killed in Police Action in Dhanusha over a dozen persons were injured in clashes at different places here. One person was injured in firing at Green Hotel located at Mujelia. Clashes also took place at Janakpur chowk, Mills Area, Pindari Chowk and other places.

Nepal proposes two-phase polls NepalNews Nepal said deteriorating security situation across the country would disturb holding polls peacefully in a single phase.

EC will Take Three Weeks to Publicise Results Himalayan Times
Reporter’s notebook : Tarai folk not so sure of CA election The government is mainly focusing on bolstering security in troubled areas, but two things that can improve the security situation in these areas — political understanding between major political parties and reconciliatory approach for dealing with the armed groups of Tarai — are lacking. ..... the Prime Minister’s acknowledgement that the government will give priority to holding the CA polls rather than holding talks with the armed outfits cannot be called mature handling of the matter.

Tarai election fallout Nepali Times Ram Baran Yadav, one of the few Madhesi who hasn’t defected from the NC and Shri Krishna Yadav of TMLP ...... “Ram Baran will not even win a ward election in the district now. He is a Pahadi dalal,” asserts the young conductor, Anil. ...... Up north on the highway, Ram Baran is a hero among Pahadis. Gopal Acharya, a young student in Bardibas, says, “If there is one person of Madhesi origin who can be the country’s PM, it is Dr Yadav. He must win.” .... a section of Pahadi vote in the Tarai will go to the Maoists ..... “Mahanta is in the pockets of the Indians, Upendra is an American agent
Murkier and murkier All the three-week agitation did was channelise Madhesi discontent, and generate a wave. But in less than a week, the Madhesi parties blew it all away. ...... the three Madhesi parties are not united and their votes will split. ..... for both the first past the post and proportional representation seats combined, the TMLP, SP and MJF will be lucky to get 50 seats. ...... It is largely traditional NC voters who are shifting loyalties to the Madhesi parties, so if anyone benefits from this fragmentation it is the UML. And the UML with its non-inclusive leadership embodies the worst kind of pahadi conservatism. ....... the MJF .... has a relatively better organisation, brand name, and thus deserves a larger share of the seats, but the Forum has been the most rigid. ....... Before Upendra Yadav knows it, the MJF will be hijacked by the J P Gupta-Gachhedar-Bhandari combine. ...... it might emerge as the biggest Madhesi party ...... The Sadbhabana is a marginal actor. The splits have really destroyed the party .... The weakness of the Madhesi parties, and their possible dismal showing in the polls, may make many in Kathmandu happy.
A year after Gaur massacre Maoists struggle for vote Kantipur “People in this district see the Gaur incident as an assault on Maoists’ prolonged oppression of the common people” argues Ganesh Prasad Yadav, Rautahat district president of MPRF. ..... Mahato’s killing triggered the first wave of Madhes movement that swept MPRF to centre-stage of Madhesi politics and sidelined the Maoists - perhaps for a long, long time to come.
UNMIN: Mission impossible?
Govt invites armed groups for talks
Why UML, Maoist cadres clash everywhere

A top Nepali blogger recalls late King Mahendra NepalNews Kathmandu-based intelligentsia and expatriates say they anxiously await for Maila Baje’s postings every week.

UML strongman fires another salvo at Maoists NepalNews If they intimidate one person, they will lose 100 votes and if they intimidate 100 persons, they will lose 1000 votes
We had proposed a joint manifesto with UML: Prachanda reports of violent confrontations between the cadres of the two parties in different parts of the country. .... murder of two Maoist cadres in Rolpa and National People’s Front candidate in Banke-2

In Constituency 10 Nepali Times Less than two years ago, he was the most wanted man in Nepal with a price on his head and even sought by Interpol on terrorism charges. .... He proposed a four-lane highway from Kathmandu to Hetauda via Dakshinkali, and even promised a railway link from Tibet to Kathmandu, Pokhara, and Lumbini.
No Madhesi wave the casteism of the Yadav-Muslim-Bania combine in the tarai, the myopia of Kathmandu-centric Madhesi leaders ....... “one year of being on the streets for the Madhes movement and I still didn’t get a ticket from MJF.” ...... Less than a month after the signing of an agreement with the government, bickering within the Madhesi alliance has eroded its support base. ........ The big parties are therefore back in business, but fielding Madhesi candidates because they know the Madhes Street will not accept Pahadis. ...... In the 11 constituencies of Bara and Parsa together, the NC and UML may take as many as eight seats. ..... Singh is the Madhes sarkar pramukh of the Jwala faction of the militant JTMM and number two in the hierarchy. A former Sadbhabana activist, he was in the original team that defected from Jai Krishna Goit. ...... The JTMM is angry at the Madhesi parties for not acknowledging its role in the movement, and not being consulted before the Kathmandu agreement. ....... If elections happen, they risk getting marginalised. If they step up violence, the public may turn against them. ..... “We are not against talks. Our preconditions are release of activists, withdrawal of cases, calling off STF operations, and a unilateral ceasefire by the state.”
Cloud hangs over Badal’s campaign Kantipur Marginalized Praja and Chepangs, Tamang, Magar, Gurung and Tharus make up almost half of over 73,000 voters in this constituency.
Back to barracks, says Minister Yadav to NA security Minister Yadav informed that he will resort to security from the Maoist army if he is not provided with the necessary security during what he labeled as a ‘risky period’.
Mahato’s Sadbhawana names PM Head of State with executive rights TMDP has proposed to adopt a Prime Ministerial system provided that a “no confidence” motion cannot be put forward at least for one year to ensure political stability; while MPRF has proposed the President as the head of state with executive rights.
10 hurt in NC-MPRF men clash

Sadbhawana Party, CPN (ML) unveil election manifestoes NepalNews Prime Minister will be elected through direct voting and will be able to serve a maximum of two terms while the President will be appointed by the parliament. ..... CPN (ML) has also proposed seven states

Deuba sees himself as the next Prime Minister

One family displaced due to Maoist threat; Gautam attacked Maoists have been speeding up attack against leaders and cadres of other political parties ahead of the election of the constituent assembly.
Minister Yadav dismisses security personnel Minister Yadav is said to have been angered by the refusal of security personnel to travel to Janakpur with him.

Maoists, UML cadres clash in Chitwan NepalNews
EC makes closed-list of PR candidates public
UML says it favors 'One China policy' as violent protest erupts in Tibet the death of at least 80 people in the crackdown by Chinese military and police in Lhasa. ..... violence in Tibet has spilled over to neighboring provinces Sunday where Tibetan protesters defied a Chinese government crackdown. The Dalai Lama warned Tibet faced 'cultural genocide' and appealed to the world for help. ..... protests against Chinese rule of Tibet were reported in neighboring Sichuan and Qinghai provinces and also in western Gansu province. All are home to sizable Tibetan populations.

Armed Terai groups announce programmes to disrupt CA poll; Maoist combatants deserting camp NepalNews Madheshi Mukti Tigers, Terai Cobra, Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha and Samyukta Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha ...... would carry out explosions in the city areas and district headquarters on 19th March, carry out firings and torch rallies on 20th March ..... take physical action against the candidates and people involved in election publicity campaigns along with officials of Election Commission 25th March .... Madhesh bandh (shutdown strike) on 28th March to 30 March, burn effigies of Madhesi leaders Mahanta Thakur, Upendra Yadav and Rajendra Mahato on 3 April. ....... general strike in Madhesh from 7 to the election day, 10 April. They said people would not be allowed to even walk on foot on 9 and 10 April. ....... the statement of Prime Minister not to hold talks with any groups before the CA polls ..... there will be no need for talks after the election. The armed groups have also given three-day ultimatum to the government for holding talks with them ..... more than half of the Maoist combatants in Dashrathpur cantonment have left the cantonment site and have returned to their village ...... for publicity during the CA polls. .... The Maoists had announced that they would mobilise 200 YCL cadres in a booth on the election day.
NC candidate beaten in Okhaldhunga
MJF manifesto proposes President as chief executive a maximum of two terms ..... the Chief Minister would also be elected through adult franchise. ..... Upendra Yadav said, "The West-Minister style of governance has completely failed. This is why we have proposed President as the chief executive to be elected through direct voting." ...... conducting a census in the country before the drafting of new constitution. ..... MJF leader Bijay Gachhedar who had recently defected from NC to join the party, announced that they hope to make the MJF the 'biggest party' of Nepal.

MJF proposes President with executive power NepalNews the President be elected directly through popular vote. However, the party said the President must be accountable to the parliament. .... bicameral parliament at the center and a legislative assembly in the states. The state parliament will elect the chief minister.

SEBS marks 25th anniversary Kantipur SEBS organized the event as a part of its fund raising initiative for a Nationwide Scholarship Programme (NSP) that provides scholarships to the students of marginalized communities in 65 districts across the country. ..... SEBS President Keshab P Khatiwada and General Secretary Rajesh Adhikari. ..... the hit remix Chiyabarima and Shakira’s hip-shaking number Hips don’t lie ..... Budhanilkantha School Principal Narayan Prasad Sharma. ..... Notable former Budhanilkantha School students including Crown Prince Paras and TV personality Bhusan Dahal were also among the audience.
किन भएन तालमेल
दलित र महिलाले उम्मेदवारी पाएनन्

Why UML-Maoist poll alliance was aborted Kantipur top leaders of the two parties are starting to spit venom at each other while cadres on the ground have begun to engage in violent clashes. .... Although the Maoists had initially proposed a 50:50 percent share with the UML in all 240 constituencies across the country, they (Maoists) later scaled down to 40:60. But the UML offered them an 80:20 formula for the alliance
काठमाडौं-१० त्रिपक्षीय विश्वविद्यालयको भेटघाटमा प्रचण्डले 'नेवारको क्ष्ँेत्रमा यो बाहुन कहा“बाट आयो भन्ने प्रचार गरिएको' मा रोष प्रकट गरे ।
फोरमद्वारा सुजातालाई अवरोध फोरम प्रभावित क्षेत्रमा पुग्नासाथ उनीविरुद्ध नाराबाजी सुरु भएको थियो । फोरमका कार्यकर्ताले कालो झन्डा पनि पर््रदर्शन गरेका थिए । .... मन्त्री कोइराला गाडी लिएर लौकही पुग्दा फोरमका कार्यकर्ताले बाटो छेकेका थिए । नाराबाजी क्रममा उनलाई विदेशी नागरिक भएको आरोप लगाइएको थियो । ..... अवरोधबारे मधेसी जनअधिकार फोरमका संयोजक उपेन्द्र यादवले आफूलाई थाहा नभएको बताए । उनले भने, 'उम्मेदवारलाई चुनावीसभा गर्ने छुट छ, अवरोध गर्ने पक्षमा हामी छैनांै तर जनताले सोधेका प्रश्नको जबाफ भने दिनर्ुपर्छ ।'

NC manifesto proposes ceremonial role to President, executive power to PM NepalNews delineation of federal units will be done in consideration with a number of factors such as geography, population, economic opportunities, relation between federal units, language, ethnicity and culture ...... does not specify the number of federal units. ..... two chambers of parliament at the centre and a legislative assembly in the state. The election of the lower house of the central parliament and the state assembly will be done under mixed electoral system, with 33 guaranteed representation of women, while the upper house will have proportional representation. ...... will adopt the concept of positive discrimination for a certain period of time ..... make Nepal Army an "inclusive, democratic and professional" institution.
UML team attacked by Maoists in Ramechhap

MPRF cadres ‘black-flag’ Sujata Kantipur Sujata opined that law and order situation is still not satisfactory in some of the Terai districts. TMDP airs CA manifesto; backs Prime Ministerial system Thakur claimed that the country’s structure will be free from internal colonialism if the whole Terai is declared an autonomous state. ..... the TMDP has proposed developing road transportation, an Asian Highway and a scientific agriculture system with Bhutan, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Prachanda says prime ministerial system will save monarchy

TMLP proposes single Madhesh province NepalNews a single Terai province with several autonomous governing units within it. ..... a ceremonial President elected by two chambers of parliaments at the centre and one legislative parliament of each province. The party has proposed to give executive powers to the Prime Minister who will be elected by the central parliament. ...... the party was trying to forge electoral alliance with Rajendra Mahato's Sadbhwana Party and Upendra Yadav-led Madhesi Janadhikar Forum.

Security Situation Not Satisfactory in Tarai: EC Himalayan Times