Let the federal commission decide on the names and boundaries of provinces and then the CA should have the final say. ..... The Supreme Court order does not encroach upon the rights of the CA but rather validates them. It says that it is the duty of the CA to take the final decision on the names and boundaries of the federal states. So it gives parties an opportunity to correct the mistakes they made in the 16-point agreement. Second, it is the duty of political parties to respect any Supreme Court decision, whether the verdict is for or against them. ...... to ask for the CA to be allowed to decide on federalism is not a criminal demand. ..... It is about allowing the CA to do its duty, which is mentioned in the Interim Constitution. ..... I believe in federalism, republicanism, inclusion and democracy. And these are the fundamental elements of the constitution too. ...... In the CA meetings, I repeatedly argued, let us leave provisions on citizenship as it in the Interim Constitution. Let us make it more liberal, if possible, but not edit it. Moreover, the draft written by the first CA had already mentioned it—citizenship through descent, marriage and naturalised citizenship. The Interim Constitution even mentions that citizenship can be obtained through either the mother or the father. ........ Many women from the bordering states of India, like Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Uttarakhand and West Bengal, marry Nepali men not just from the Madhes but also from elsewhere in the country like the hills of the Far-West. In the Madhes, it is of course widely practiced. So this law will not only affect the Madhesis but also Janajatis and hill castes. Many men go abroad to work and then marry foreign women. There are more hill castes working in India than the Madhesis. ...... in the Interim Constitution, it was mentioned that the number of electoral constituencies in the Madhes, Pahad and Himal would reflect the population of those regions. No one ever opposed this provision. Now, all of a sudden, it has been removed and the draft only says that there will be 165 constituencies based on geography and population. ....... I believe that the number of provinces in the Madhes and in the Pahad should be equal. As we have agreed on eight provinces, there should be four provinces in the Madhes and four in the hills. Even if we go by the argument of Madhesbadi parties and the fact that Madhes has a larger population, they should be demanding more provinces. Isn’t it ironical that they are demanding more constituencies in the Madhes but fewer provinces? ........... If we cannot have four provinces in both the Pahad and the Madhes, let us go for five and three each. I have heard that the disagreement regarding Kailali and Kanchanpur can be resolved. In the east, we can form a new province consisting of Jhapa, Morang, Sunsari. ....... If we are to do things my way, let us just think of the international borders of Nepal and forget all other existing administrative boundaries: Village Development Committees (VDCs), municipalities, districts, zones and development regions. Then, as we have agreed upon eight provinces and 165 constituencies, let us divide 165 by eight. Then there will be 20 constituencies in each province. The remaining five constituencies can be divided realistically. So, five provinces will have 21 constituencies while the remaining three will have 20.The argument made by leaders who say that they don’t want to break VDCs, municipalities, districts is pointless. It either means that they don’t know what federalism is or they do not want it.
the two leaders also agreed to push forward the first phase of Postal Road construction project in Nepal’s Tarai region and agreed to start the tender process as soon as possible.
The first alternative, according to leaders, is asking the SC to vacate its interim order and go ahead with the plan laid out. Another way out that the parties are considering is to amend Article 138 of the Interim Constitution that says the delineation of federal provinces, their numbers and names should be decided by the CA before its dissolution. ...... the parties are discussing the agenda of retaining the CA, through constitution amendment, until the states are named and their boundaries set. ....... “The CA could remain until the demarcation of federal provinces. We are open to constitution amendment for the purpose,” Nepal Congress Vice-president Ram Chandra Poudel ..... Madhesi Janadhikar Forum-Loktantrik leader Jitendra Dev also floated the idea in the CA on Friday.
Madhesi leaders from the NC, CPN-UML and the UCPN (Maoist) in particular are in favour of this alternative.
....... NC leaders from Tarai are pressing the leadership to finalise demarcation before constitution promulgation. Minister and NC leader Bimalendra Nidhi bats for this option arguing that it could be a win-win situation for all. Soon after the apex court’s interim order, Nidhi said it had provided an opportunity for the parties to correct their mistakes. ........ As constitution drafting gets momentum, major parties feel pressure to address the SC stay order and the demands of parties opposed to the ongoing process. President Ram Baran Yadav has also asked the parties to address legal concerns. ..... “I have already said the parties will respond to the court’s concerns. We are holding discussions on how to address the issues,” said Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal. ....... “We have no option but to plead for vacating the interim order,” said government spokesman Minedra Rijal. ...... A lawyer privy to the consultation said the petition would be filed in the apex court immediately after Chief Justice Ram Kumar Prasad Shah’s retirement. Kalyan Shrestha will replace him after Shah retires on July 8.
प्रस्तावित व्यवस्था सहज रूपमा कार्यान्वयन गर्नसक्दा आगामी नयाँ वर्षमा संघीय इकाइका रूपमा प्रदेशहरूले आकार लिनेछन् । राज्य पुनर्संरचनाको अभिन्न अंगका रूपमा नयाँ स्थानीय तह देख्न भने थप अर्को एक वर्ष कुर्नुपर्छ । ...... संघ, प्रदेश, स्थानीय तहको अधिकार क्षेत्र र साझा अधिकार सूचीमा नपरेका अवशिष्ट अधिकार केन्द्रको हुनेछ । राष्ट्रिय सुरक्षा, परराष्ट्र सम्बन्ध, मुद्रा र विकास निर्माणका ठूला परियोजना सञ्चालनबाहेक अधिकांश अधिकार प्रदेश र स्थानीय निकायमा अन्तरनिहित छन् । उनीहरूको क्षेत्राधिकार विभाजन र साझा अधिकार सूचीमा समेत पहिलो संविधानसभामा नै सहमति भएको थियो । ....... स्थानीय निकाय र कानुनअनुसार व्यवस्था हुने विशेष संरचनाको क्षेत्र निर्धारणका लागि सरकारले ६ महिनाभित्र गठन गर्ने आयोगको कार्यवधि एक वर्ष प्रस्ताव गरिएको छ । ‘गाउँपालिका, नगरपालिका र विशेष संरचनाको संख्या र क्षेत्र निर्धारण गर्नका लागि नेपाल सरकारले एक आयोग गठन गर्नेछ,’ संविधानको मस्यौदामा भनिएको छ, ‘त्यस्तो आयोगले गाउँपालिका, नगरपालिका र विशेष संरचनाको संख्या र क्षेत्र निर्धारण गर्दा नेपाल सरकारले निर्धारण गरेको मापदण्ड बमोजिम गर्नु पर्नेछ ।’ संविधान जारी भएको मितिले ६ महिनाभित्र गठन हुने आयोगको कार्यावधि एक वर्षको हुनेछ । स्थानीय तहमा जिल्ला र विशेष संरचना कस्तो बनाउने भन्नेमा विषयमा दलहरूबीच अन्तरदलीय र आन्तरिक विवाद छ । ‘प्रदेश र स्थानीय तह बलियो हुने भएपछि अहिलेको स्वरुपमा जिल्ला संरचना आवश्यक छैन,’ एमाले नेता गोकर्ण विष्ट भन्छन्, ‘सदरमुकाममा पाइने सेवा/सुविधा गाउँपालिकामा पुर्याउनुपर्छ । त्यसका लागि आवश्यक संरचना नबन्दासम्मका लागि संयोजनकारी जिल्ला तह राख्नु राम्रो हुन्छ ।’ ......... ‘विगतमा भएका सहमति आत्मसात नगरी गरिने अन्य कुनै प्रक्रियाको अर्थ छैन,’ समाजवादी फोरमका अध्यक्ष उपेन्द्र यादव भन्छन् । उनी नेतृत्वको मधेस आन्दोलनको उत्कर्षका बेला भएको स्वायत्त मधेस प्रदेशसहितको सहमति कार्यान्वयन नभए आन्दोलनमा जाने ती दलहरूको चेतावनी छ । ...... प्रदेशको नामकरण भने प्रदेशसभामा निर्वाचित सदस्यको दुई तिहाइले गर्नेछ । ... मस्यौदाको यस्तो व्यवस्थाप्रति आदिवासी–जनजाति सभासद असन्तुष्ट छन् । ‘नामाङ्कन सम्बन्धित विवादलाई जनताको घर—घरमा लैजानु हुँदैन, यो संविधानसभाबाटै टुंग्याउने विषय हो,’ जनजाति महासंघका महासचिवसमेत रहेका सभासद पेम्बा भोटे भन्छन्, ‘प्रदेशको नाम जुन विधिबाट राखे पनि जाति, भाषा, संस्कृति र पहिचान झल्कनेगरी राख्नुपर्छ ।’ ...... कांग्रेस–एमाले सहितका दलहरू भने प्रस्तावित कुनै पनि प्रदेशमा कुनै एक जातिको बाहुल्य नहुने निश्चित भएकाले साझा पहिचानको नाम नै सबैलाई मान्य हुने अडानमा छन् । प्रदेशलाई जातीय पहिचानमा आधारित नाम दिनुपर्ने अडानमा रहेको एमाओवादी र सामर्थ्यका आधारमा ६ प्रदेशको अडानमा रहेका कांग्रेस–एमाले बीचको प्रदेशसभाले नै नाम दिनेगरी आठ प्रदेश निर्माण गर्ने मध्यमार्गी सहमति जुटेको थियो । केन्द्रकै जस्तो मिश्रित समानान्तर निर्वाचन प्रणालीबाट चुनिने प्रदेशसभामा पनि कुनै एक दलको दुई तिहाइ आउने सम्भावना नभएकाले प्रदेशले राख्ने नाम पनि राजनीतिक सहमतिमै तय गर्नुपर्ने हुनसक्छ । ......... एमाओवादीले विशेष संरचनालाई पनि संवैधानिक हैसियत दिने प्रयास जारी राखेको छ । ‘पहिलो संविधानसभाले १ प्रतिशत जनसंख्या भएका जातिलाई राज्य र त्यसभन्दा कम भएका जात/जाति, समुदायलाई स्वायत्त क्षेत्र, संरक्षित क्षेत्र र विशेष क्षेत्र स्थापित गर्नेगरी प्रारम्भिक अवधारणा सहितको मस्यौदा तयार गरेको थियो,’ एमाओवादी संसदीय दलका प्रमुख सचेतक गिरिराजमणि पोखरेल भन्छन्, ‘मस्यौदाको व्यवस्था प्रमुख दलका शीर्ष नेताहरूबीच सूची उल्लेख नगरी स्वायत्त क्षेत्र, संरक्षित क्षेत्र र विशेष क्षेत्र राख्नेगरी भएको समझदारी विपरीत छ ।’ जिल्ला तह नराख्ने एमाओवादीको अडान सम्बोधन गर्न मस्यौदा तयारीको अन्तिम बेलामा यसलाई गाउँपालिका र नगरपालिको समन्वयकारी निकायका रूपमा जिल्लासभा राख्ने व्यवस्था भएको हो । जिल्ला तह राख्दा राज्यको संरचना अनावश्यक भद्दा हुने उनको भनाइ छ । .......
संविधानसभाबाटै प्रदेशको सीमा तय गर्नुपर्ने आवाज १६ बुँदे सहमतिका हस्ताक्षरकर्ता दलहरू कांग्रेस, एमाले, एमाओवादी र फोरम (लोकतान्त्रिक) भित्र पनि बलियो बन्दै गएको छ ।
....... सर्वोच्चका प्रधानन्यायाधीशको अध्यक्षतामा रहने संवैधानिक अदालतको अस्तित्व दस वर्षसम्म रहन्छ । प्रस्तावित व्यवस्थाप्रति सर्वोच्च अदालत असन्तुष्ट छ । ...... संघीय संसदको दुई तिहाइ बहुमतले संविधान संशोधन गर्न सक्नेगरी परिवर्तनशील र लचिलो व्यवस्था गरिएको छ । प्रदेशको सीमा परिवर्तन र संघ–प्रदेशको साझा अधिकार सूचीसम्बन्धी संविधानको धारा संशोधनका लागि भने बहुसंख्या प्रदेशसभाको सहमति आवश्यक पर्छ ।
स्थानीय निकायमा जिल्ला तह छैन, तर जिल्लासभा राखिएको छ । यसको आसय अहिलेको जिल्ला नजाओस् भन्ने हो । तर अहिलेका सबै जिल्ला र गाविसहरू वैज्ञानिक छैनन् । जिल्लाको खास कामको उल्लेख न्यायपालिकामा मात्रै छ । उसले केको समन्वय गर्ने ? करोडौं लगानी गरिएको जिल्ला सदरमुकामलाई सेवाकेन्द्रका रूपमा उपयोग गर्नुपर्छ । साविक गाविसहरूलाई सजिलोसँग ११/१२ सयमा ल्याउन सकिन्छ । ...... नेपालको समग्र विकासका लागि उत्तर–दक्षिण प्रदेश बन्नु राम्रो हो । त्यो वैज्ञानिक दृष्टिकोणले उचित पनि हो । यसो गर्दा एउटा भौगोलिक प्रदेश अर्कोको पूरक भइदिन सक्छ । यसलाई महेन्द्रीय धारणा भने पनि नेपालको उत्तरबाट दक्षिण बग्ने नदीको प्रवाह फेर्न सकिँदैन । मानिसका बहाव पनि उत्तरबाट दक्षिणतर्फ छ भने उत्तरका स्रोत–सम्पदाको बजार पनि दक्षिण हो । पहाडमा ठाउँ छैन । कुल भूमिको ५ प्रतिशत पनि खेतीयोग्य छैन जबकि तराईको ८० प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी भूमि अब्बल खेतीयोग्य छ । पहाडबाट तराई झर्ने आर्थिक कारण पनि यही हो । .......... नेपालमा १३० जाति छन् । १२५ वटा तोकिएका जातिमध्ये केही जातिको मात्रै आफ्नो ठूलो ऐतिहासिक क्षेत्र छ । जस्तो— राई, लिम्बु, तामाङ, नेवार, गुरुङ, मगर, खस, थारू र मधेसी समुदायको छ । यदि नेपालका २ प्रतिशतभन्दा माथि जनसंख्या भएका प्रमुख जात–जाति र क्षेत्रका आधारमा प्रदेशको निर्माण गर्ने हो भने १० वटा हुन्छ । ...... भूगोलका आधारमा नेपालमा तीनवटा तराई छ । पर्सादेखि झापासम्म पूर्वी तराई, नवलपरासीदेखि कपिलवस्तुसम्म मध्य तराई र दाङ पश्चिमको अर्को तराई । प्रदेश विभाजनमा मुख्य समस्या पूर्वी तराईमा देखिएको छ । झापा, मोरङ र सुनसरीमा पहाडी समुदायको बर्चस्व छ । पर्सादेखि झापासम्म झन्डै ८० लाख जनसंख्यामध्ये यी तीन जिल्लामा मात्रै २५ लाख छ । यी तीन जिल्ला मधेस प्रदेशमा रहँदा मधेसीले पहाडी समुदायसँग संवाद नगरी हुँदैन । यदि झापा, मोरङ र सुनसरीको छुट्टै प्रदेश बनाएमा सप्तरीदेखि पर्सासम्मको छुट्टै ‘एनक्लेभ’ बन्छ, जहाँ मधेसी जनसंख्याको एकदमै ठूलो उपस्थिति हुन्छ । त्यसले गर्दा पहाडसँग संवाद गरिरहनुपर्ने आवश्यकता एकदमै न्युन हुन्छ । ........ यसबाट अरू प्रदेश एक किसिमले र पर्सादेखि सप्तरीसम्मको प्रदेश अर्को किसिमले विकास हुने स्थिति आउन सक्छ । पर्सादेखि झापासम्म एकै प्रदेश बनाउँदा त्यस्तो अवस्था आउँदैन । यसले मधेसी–पहाडी समुदायबीच संवाद र सौहार्दको अवस्था सिर्जना गरिरहन सक्छ । मधेसको स्थिति पहाडको जस्तो छैन । पहाडमा राई र लिम्बुको एकै राज्य बनाउँदा उनीहरू बाहुल्यमा हुन्छन्, बहुमतमा हुँदैनन् । मधेसमा त्यसै पनि मधेसी बहुमतमा हुन्छन्, तीन जिल्ला छुट्याउँदा तीव्र बहुमतमा हुन्छन् । ...... कैलाली–कञ्चनपुर पूर्वी तराईको जस्तो पेचिलो मुद्दा होइन । दुई–चार राजनीतिज्ञले आफ्नो राजनीतिक स्वार्थपूर्तिका लागि र संघीयताको पातलो बुझाइका कारणमात्र त्यो समस्या देखिएको हो । संघीयता भनेको डोटीको मानिसले मेरो कञ्चनपुरमा घर छ भन्न नपाउने भन्ने होइन । त्यहाँ आवत—जावत र बन्द–व्यापार हुन्छ । जनसांखिक दृष्टिकोणले कैलाली–कञ्चनपुर पहाडी समुदायको बाहुल्य भएका जिल्ला हुन् । त्यसलाई थरुहट नाम दिए पनि त्यहाँ पहाडी जनसंख्याकै बाहुल्य रहन्छ । नेपालको विविधतालाई सम्मान गरेर हामी धनी हुन्छौं भन्ने राजनीतिज्ञले नबुझ्नु हाम्रो मुख्य समस्या हो । कैलाली–कञ्चनपुरका चुरे माथिका पहाडी बहुल क्षेत्र माथिल्लो प्रदेशमा राख्ने र थारू बहुल क्षेत्र तराईमा समाहित गर्नु सजिलो उपाय हो ।
प्रधानमन्त्री तथा नेपाली काँग्रेसका सभापति सुशील कोइराला, नेकपा (एमाले)का अध्यक्ष केपी शर्मा ओली, एकीकृत नेकपा (माओवादी)का अध्यक्ष पुष्पकमल दाहाल र मधेस जनअधिकार फोरम (लोकतान्त्रिक)का अध्यक्ष विजयकुमार गच्छदार
पूर्व-पश्चिम लोकमार्गको अत्यधिक व्यस्त नारायणघाट-ढल्केबर सडक खण्ड चार लेनको बनाउने ..... चितवनको नारायणघाटदेखि धनुषाको ढल्केबरसम्मको करिब २ सय १५ किलोमिटर सडक खण्डलाई चार लेन बनाउन लागिएको ..... पूर्व-पश्चिम लोकमार्गलाई नै चार लेनको बनाउने तयारीअन्तर्गत पहिलो चरणमा यो खण्डलाई चार लेनको बनाउन लागिएको हो । 'हाम्रो पहिलो प्राथमिकता सबभन्दा बढी व्यस्त हुने सडकलाई चार लेनको बनाउने हो,' सिटौलाले भने,'त्यसपछि दोस्रो चरणमा बुटबलसम्मको सडक खण्डलाई ४ लेन बनाउने योजना छ ।' ...... नारायणघाट-ढल्केबर सडक खण्डमा पर्ने निजगढ-पथलैया खण्डको १८ किलोमिटर भने काठमाडौं-तराई फास्टट्रयाकमा पर्ने बताए । 'त्यसलाई छाडेर अरू बाँकी सडक खण्डलाई आगामी वर्ष चार लेनको बनाउने लक्ष्य हो'
पहिले कृष्ण प्रसाद भट्टराई को कुरा गरौं। बीपी कोइराला को कुरा अलि पछि गरौं। महेन्द्र नारायण निधि को कुरा गरौं अनि त्यस पछि बीपी को कुरा गरौंला। नेपालमा लोकतंत्र मारेको गोलीले होइन, बीपी र सुगरले हो। बीपी बीपी, सुगर चाहिं गिरिजा।
कृष्ण प्रसाद भट्टराई लाई बहुदल पुनर्बहाली को पहिलो चुनाव मा हरायो गिरिजाले चमक्यो मदन भण्डारी। कति गलत निर्णय! निरक्षर हरुको देशमा गिरिजा SLC Pass नै हो कि चाहिने, लोकतंत्र भनेको त्यही हो कि?
कृष्ण प्रसाद भट्टराई मेरो आइडियोलॉजी मा गलत मान्छे हो तर सानो मान्छे होइन। मेरो आइडियोलॉजी संघीयता हो। कृष्ण प्रसाद (अर्को केपी) आजीवन संघीयता विरोधी मान्छे। बीपी को शिष्य जो ठहरियो। तर राजनीतिक कुशलता भएको मान्छे चाहिं हो। त्यो कृष्ण प्रसाद लाई फिर्ता नल्याए सम्म पार्टी फेरि माथि पुग्दैन भन्ने निर्णयमा पुगे पछि गिरिजाले विष पियेर केपी लाई फिर्ता ल्यायो, कृष्ण कन्हैया फेरि प्रधान मंत्री बने --- तर त्यस पछि के भयो त्यो कुरा बड़ो महत्वपुर्ण छ।
माओबादी को हिंसा शुरू भइसकेको अवस्था थियो। १०-१५ हजार मान्छे मरेर वार्ता गर्नु भन्दा अहिले नै वार्ता गर्नु राम्रो भन्ने निर्णय मा केपी भट्टराई पुगिसकेको। त्यसलाई भनिन्छ राजनीतिक कौशलता। त्यो थियो उसमा। देश शायद दरबार हत्या काण्ड अगाडि नै संविधान सभा मा जान्थ्यो, गृह युद्धमा होइन।
तर दरबारको इशारामा गिरिजाले कृष्ण प्रसाद लाई फेरि फाल्यो। गिरिजाले संवैधानिक राजतन्त्र नबुझेको। संवैधानिक राजतन्त्रमा राजदरबार ले त्यसरी देशको राजनीतिमा चासो लिन पाउँदैन। अंततः १५-१७ हजार मान्छे मरे। आखिर देश संविधान सभा मै गयो। त्यो गिरिजा लाई शांति दुत भन्छन काँग्रेसी हरु।
Girija did not know that he did not know.
त्यो एउटा उदाहरण हो। गृह युद्ध चर्काउने नै गिरिजा हो।
गिरिजा पहिलो पटक प्रधान मंत्री भए पछि १-२ वर्ष मै उसले पार्टी को स्पष्ट बहुमत हुँदा हुँदै संसद मा विश्वास गुमायो। त्यस पछि लोकतान्त्रिक संस्कृति मानने ले के गर्छ भने राजीनामा दिन्छ अनि उसको पार्टीको संसदीय दल ले अर्को नेता चुन्छ, त्यो नेता प्रधान मंत्री बन्छ। मार्गरेट थैचर पछि जॉन मेजर त्यसरी नै आएको।
त्यो अर्को व्यक्ति महेन्द्र नारायण निधि थियो। तर गिरिजा को मधेसी समुदाय प्रतिको racist hatred यति सार्हो तीव्र थियो कि उसले गर्न नहुने कुरा गर्यो। संसद विगठन गर्दियो। पार्टी बरु ध्वस्त होस् तर कुनै मधेसी प्रधान मंत्री नबनोस् --- उसको त्यो चरम गैर लोकतान्त्रिक व्यवहार। गैर लोकतान्त्रिक सोंच नभनौं। उसले सोंचेर गरेको कुरा होइन। It was his knee jerk reaction.
यस घटना पछि नेपाली काँग्रेस र मधेसी समुदाय बीच खड़ा भएको फाटो कहिले पुरिन्न्न।
अब कुरा गरौं बीपी को। बीपी लाई फेरि फर्किन दरबार लाई सघाएको नंबर एक सिविलियन सुर्य बहादुर थापा। बाउ महेंद्र लाई सघायो, छोरा वीरेंद्र लाई सघायो। तर त्यो सुबथा द्वारा सधैं प्रयोग हुन तैयार गिरिजा। The entire fucking time.
सुगर गिरिजा।
बहुदल आए पछि गिरिजाले जुन पटक पटक बदमाशी गर्यो त्यो नगरेको भए नेपाल नया शताब्दीमा आर्थिक क्रांतिको बाटो मा अग्रसर भइ सकेको हुने।
नेपाली काँग्रेस भित्र आज आतंरिक लोकतंत्र को पुर्ण अभाव जुन छ त्यसको नंबर एक कारण नै गिरिजा हो।
Girija Koirala spent much of his adult life struggling for democracy in Nepal. Most of that half century was spent in the political wilderness, away from the country. Almost a decade of that was spent in jail. He was in power several times after 1990, most recently leading the government that came into power after the April 2006 revolution.
Much work remains in Nepal. There is the issue of internal democracy in his party, the issue of corruption in Nepali politics at large, the issue of federalism, as yet unachieved, the issue of equality for DaMaJaMa, far from achieved. The country does not have its new constitution yet. But the basics of democracy have been laid out. And Girija Koirala made major contributions to those foundation stones. Within the framework of democracy, work on the rest of the issues can be done.
Personal Moments
I had a phone conversation with Girija Koirala when the king was in power. I blogged about it. And for the past few years this blog was the first result when you googled up his name. I don't know if that is still true since this blog is not as active as it used to be, but I relished that number one status for this blog.
I am grateful to Ashok Gurung for asking me to speak here at the New School. As you know, Ashok, it was many weeks ago that you asked me to do this, and to propose a title for my talk. Alas, I didn’t know then just how appropriate this title was going to prove by tonight. In recent days there have been calls for the revision of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, accusations and counter-accusations that it is being broken by Maoist agitation or threats of mobilization of the Army, and calling into question even of the 12-point Understanding, which was the very foundation of the peace process. It is indeed timely to ask whether the peace process is failing; if so, why; and what is required to save it.
For over three and a half years, I spoke in Nepal and on Nepal on behalf of the United Nations – first representing the High Commissioner for Human Rights, up to and during the Jana Andolan, and then representing the Secretary-General. I no longer speak for the UN on Nepal, and tonight I want to make very clear that I am speaking only for myself. Some may question my right to speak critically of events in Nepal, but I do so solely as a friend of Nepal, and as someone who deeply wants to see Nepal go forward in peace, respect for human rights, and socio-economic progress for all its diverse peoples.
In another sense, too, I want to speak tonight in a different voice. In Kathmandu, one tries to follow the details of every twist and turn of the complex politics of Nepal, and whatever is reported in the daily media - and in the positions I held, I was very often expected to comment upon it. It is easy to fail to see the wood for the trees, and hard to maintain a focus on the deeper realities of the situation. Here in New York, one looks through the other end of the telescope. And sitting as I am briefly in the UN’s Department of Political Affairs, which follows and sometimes mediates conflicts around t
he world, one has more of a comparative perspective. So this evening I want to try to address what I regard as the larger underlying issues of the peace process in Nepal, which I believe is the way to address the question of what needs to be done to get it back on track.
The fundamentals of the peace process were negotiated in the 12-point Understanding, agreed in Delhi in November 2005 between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) – which from now on I will refer to just as the Maoists – and the Seven-Party Alliance – the alliance of political parties represented in the Parliament elected in 1999 and dissolved in 2002 – whose leading negotiators were from Girija Prasad Koirala’s Nepali Congress. It was an unusual basis for a peace process, because it was not an agreement between the rebels and those in control of the state and its army, but an alliance to end control of the state by what it called “autocratic monarchy”. But as the literature expects peace processes to do, it came out of a stalemate on the battlefield: the recognition of the Maoists that they would never be able to capture the state by force of arms, and the failure of the then Royal Nepalese Army to achieve victory over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) even when fully unleashed, latterly by King Gyanendra.
The bargain that was then struck between the two sides was crucial, and needs to be remembered today. The Maoists committed themselves to the values and norms of multi-party democracy, human rights and rule of law. The parliamentary parties accepted what had been the Maoists’ agenda of election of a constituent assembly and “progressive restructuring of the state”. The combatants on both sides of the armed conflict – “the armed Maoist force and the royal army” – would be kept under UN or other international supervision in the course of the election. The 12-point Understanding became the basis on which the people of Nepal could unite – under the leadership of civil society, as much as of the political parties – to express their demand for peace and change.
Once the Jana Andolan had compelled the King to step aside, a fuller peace process began to be negotiated. The Seven-Party Alliance was now in the stronger position. The old Parliament wa
s reinstated as the basis for a Nepali Congress-led government, contrary to the Maoists’ proposal of a national political conference as the basis for an interim government. The new government had command of the Nepalese Army, and the strong backing of the Indian and US governments in insisting on not only cantonment of the Maoist army, as agreed in the 12-point Understanding, but also what came to be called “weapons separation”, before the Maoists could join an interim parliament and government. The Maoists agreed to storage of their weapons under UN surveillance, but not to surrendering ultimate control.
The fuller peace agreement which was then negotiated was enshrined in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and then in the Interim Constitution. Since then numerous agreements have for the most part repeated commitments to implement them, although they have also led to revisions in the Interim Constitution. Five aspects of the peace agreements have been unchanging and are fundamental, and it is the extent to which they have been respected or not respected which I want to examine this evening.
The first fundamental is the commitment to power-sharing and consensus. From the 12-point Understanding on, the major parliamentary parties and the Maoists committed themselves to work together in an interim legislature and government. The Interim Constitution required the Government to conduct itself “consistently with the aspirations of the united people’s movement, political consensus and culture of mutual cooperation”. This requirement was to prevail not just until the election of the constituent assembly, but until a new constitution had been adopted. Before the election was held, the parties committed themselves, whatever the result, to continue to work together in a new interim government to steer Nepal through the process of drafting the new constitution. The assumption was that it would comprise all major parties in accordance with their respective strength at the ballot box.
The second fundamental is the commitment of the Maoists to the transformation of their movement, to conform to democratic multi-party norms and to respect the rule of law. This was to include allowing those from the other political parties whom they had displaced to return home, recover land and property unjustly seized, and carry on political activities. First made in the 12-point Understanding, this commitment has been regularly reiterated, and once the Young Communist League had been established, has included a promise to end its paramilitary functioning.
The third fundamental is the commitment to transformation in the security sector: to the “integration and rehabilitation” of former Maoist combatants, and to an action plan for “democratization” of the Nepalese Army, determining its appropriate size, developing its national and inclusive character, and training it in the norms and values of democracy and human rights.
The fourth fundamental is the commitment to political, economic and social transformation. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement set out a radical and ambitious agenda, which included land reform and anti-corruption measures, as well as a general goal of economic security for backward communities. The Interim Constitution reflected in its preamble the commitment of the Seven-Party Alliance as well as the Maoists to “progressive restructuring of the state”, in order to resolve the existing problems of the country relating to class, caste, region and gender.
The fifth and last fundamental is the commitment to address the needs of victims of the conflict, and to build the rule of law by ending impunity. Repeated commitments have been made to investigate the fate of the disappeared, compensate victims of the conflict, enable displaced persons to return, establish a comprehensive truth commission, and – less frequently and more reluctantly - take action against those responsible for major human rights violations.
Such commitments are common to peace processes, and one can perhaps say that they are requirements of a successful peace process: transitional power-sharing; democratic transformation; security sector reform; addressing root causes of the conflict; and ending impunity. So what has so far been the history of the fulfillment of each of these commitments in Nepal?
The history of power-sharing has been an unhappy one from the outset. The UML as well as the Maoists were forthright in protesting the lack of collective decision-making within the Nepali Congress-led governments, and the same complaint applied to the Maoist-led government after the election. Common minimum programmes have been negotiated among coalition parties, and then seemingly forgotten. Throughout successive governments, each party has tended to treat the ministries it controlled as its own fiefdom and a source of jobs and rewards for its own supporters, rather than advancing proposals for consensus decision-making in the public interest. This has had particularly adverse consequences for the peace process in that the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction has been from its creation a partisan ministry, rather than a consensus mechanism of peace implementation. Maoist unhappiness at Nepali Congress control of the Peace Ministry led to a promise in the 23-point Agreement of December 2007 to create a multi-party High Level Peace Commission alongside the Ministry, but it was never created, and the Maoists were no more interested in creating it once they took control of the Peace Ministry than had been the Nepali Congress.
The most serious breakdown in power-sharing and consensus decision-making, of course, came in the aftermath of the Constituent Assembly election. The outcome of the election had been, and continues to be, difficult for many in the non-Maoist parties to accept. The Maoists had to concede the creation of a Presidency before the vote to implement the republic went ahead, but they resisted the claim to the post made by the Nepali Congress as second largest party. The election of outgoing Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala as President while Maoist Chairman Prachanda became Prime Minister would have kept in play the uneasy partnership that had been the main pillar of the peace process, but the Maoists feared that it would lead to the Presidency becoming a strong alternative power centre. Once Mr Koirala was denied the Presidency and the Nepali Congress was refused the Defence Ministry, the voices in the party which preferred to remain in opposition to a Maoist-led government prevailed.
In the manoeuvring over posts, the Maoists also alienated the UML, and by the time the new coalition government was formed, relationships among the parties were irrevocably soured. The Maoists’ main coalition partner, the UML, was also its main protagonist at the local level, where their youth groups clashed, sometimes with fatal consequences. Although two of the three Madhesi parties joined the government and the third initially supported it, the big three parties never brought Madhesi representatives into their main negotiations. The Seven-Party Alliance, once the Maoists had joined it, had provided a forum where at critical moments a degree of consensus around the peace process could be re-established: but after the election no such body was in operation.
Power-sharing and consensus-building have failed at two further levels. The political parties have, to this day, been unable to rise above their partisan interests and agree on a formula to re-establish multi-party local government bodies, despite the fact that these are vital to the development agenda. Plans to establish local peace committees were not a substitute, and have been only belatedly and partly implemented. The Constituent Assembly itself, although unwieldy as a decision-making body, is remarkably representative, and has seen some promising alliances of women and marginalized groups across party lines. It could have been a forum for real debate and consensus-building, instead of which all major parties have used it as a forum for confrontation, with Madeshi parties, the Nepali Congress, the UML and today the Maoists all at different times engaging in blockages and boycotts, instead of democratic debate.
Today some in Nepal argue that there is nothing uncommon in international democratic practice about a government based on a simple majority of the elected body. True enough, but before normal political competition can begin in Nepal, there is a peace process to complete, a constitution to agree upon as the framework for future competition. That is why we urged all parties to work together in government after the election. And from a peace process perspective, it is patently obvious that a peace process based on power-sharing cannot be expected to succeed if not just one major party, but one side to the peace process is not part of the power-sharing – especially if it happens to have emerged from an election as the largest single party. This is not just a matter of one political party feeling aggrieved, but about maintaining a viable peace process, which I believe is why the Secretary-General has expressed his agreement with all those in Nepal who say that a national unity government is desirable now, as it has always been.
The second fundamental aspect of the peace process is the commitment of the Maoists to the transformation of their movement, to conform to democratic multi-party norms and to respect the rule of law. Maoist leaders argue that this commitment is sincere, and ask for recognition that the transformation of a movement based on armed struggle is bound to take time. So it is, of course. But they must expect to be judged by what they do, as well as what they say, in private as well as in public. They created their Young Communist League, not solely as a movement of law-abiding youth activists based in their own communities, but as a paramilitary formation in quasi-barracks under former commanders from the People’s Liberation Army. They used it in the contest for the Constituent Assembly election to deny other parties the space in some localities for free and fair campaigning. During that campaign, their rhetoric played on fears of possible return to armed struggle to encourage voters to see the election of Maoists as the way to secure the peace. Public statements before and since the election have threatened “revolt”. What is known of internal debate has often suggested two lines, with the commitment to peaceful democratic practice uncertain in the long-term. The Shaktikor videotape revealed a highly disturbing private discourse, as do statements or interviews by Maoist leaders which talk of final insurrection to capture state power. It is time for one line, not two: the line expressed in the 12-point Understanding, of unambiguous and lasting commitment to multi-party democracy.
Some people saw the attempted replacement of the Chief of Army Staff as the last step in a creeping capture of the state. I see it in more complex terms, coming as it did after a series of highly political statements and interventions by the Chief which would have led to action in any country with democratic control of its armed forces. But democratic control does not mean partisan control. On the wider charge of state capture, the Maoists need to show a convincing commitment to independent state institutions, especially an independent judiciary. But so do other parties: some aspects of alleged Maoist state capture seem not so very different from the way in which each party in government has sought to have its supporters in the institutions of the state.
The third fundamental aspect of the peace process, the future of the armies which fought the war, is the hardest to assess, because it was not fully negotiated: the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Interim Constitution only set out processes towards solutions, not the expected outcome. But despite suggestions to the contrary, the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants to be determined by the special committee was intended and understood to mean integration of some Maoist combatants into state security forces, including the Nepalese Army. The action plan for democratization of the Nepalese Army was intended and understood to provide for a degree of downsizing and for recruitment which was more inclusive of under-represented groups, as well as to replace control by the Palace with control by the government. And the prohibition on any new recruitment by either army which began in the ceasefire code of conduct meant just that: no new recruitment, not recruitment to fill vacancies in an army swollen by wartime. The agreements did not address the future of the paramilitary Armed Police Force, or of the Maoist militia.
The Maoists were the first to break the ban on new recruitment. As the cantonments were being established in late 2006, they swelled the numbers there by bringing in young people, many of them minors, attracted by promises of salary payments and future recruitment into the security forces. Together with no planning and poor government performance, this contributed to abysmal living conditions in the cantonments. It also gave rise to long arguments over payments, as non-Maoist ministers resented being expected to fund the living costs and pay salaries for numbers of Maoist personnel they knew to be grossly inflated, and to do so by handing over lump sums which they knew would be used for wider party purposes, including sustaining the YCL.
Meanwhile, the Nepalese Army maintained that its formal acceptance of the authority of the interim governments and of the transition to a republic, distasteful as it was to many of its officers, meant that it was now democratized. In fact, accountability to the Palace having come to an end, the Army was more autonomous than ever, with no effective control by an acutely underdeveloped Ministry of Defence. Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement required the Interim Council of Ministers to prepare and implement the action plan for the Nepalese Army, the Army has argued publicly that any downsizing should only be considered by a government elected under the new constitution, and openly rejected the Government’s stated commitment to recruitment of Madhesis. It went ahead with new recruitment to fill vacancies without prior notification to the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee, which is responsible for monitoring the Agreement on Monitoring the Management of Arms and Armies, where the prohibition of new recruitment had been reiterated, and where the Nepalese parties had given final authority for reporting on compliance to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
From very early on, the United Nations, wanting to prepare the ground for UNMIN’s exit, pressed the parties to commence the processes they themselves had agreed. The special committee was established in mid-2007, headed by the Nepali Congress Peace Minister: it met once, but never met again until it was reconstituted after the election. Neither the Maoist nor the non-Maoist parties made any effort to commence serious discussion on integration and rehabilitation. The Maoists did sometimes demand action on integration, especially when they were reflecting the frustration of those in the cantonments about the uncertainty of their future. But ultimately their leaders preferred to leave it until after the election: the continued existence of their army strengthened their hand while the election was being held and beyond, while settling its future was bound to be a difficult issue inside the party and the PLA. The other parties assumed that their position would be strengthened and that of the Maoists weakened after the election, when the issue of the armies would be easier to solve on their chosen terms.
After the election, it was late October 2008 before the Government announced the re-establishment of the special committee, only for it to give rise to objections from the Nepali Congress regarding lack of consultation, composition and terms of reference. Thus it was January before the new special committee held its first meeting. During the long period in which no serious negotiation or technical analysis of options had been taking place, public statements by political and military voices had demonstrated the clash of divergent opinions. The Maoists dragged their feet on the discharge of those disqualified by UNMIN’s verification, which should have been immediate. The Nepalese Army’s active lobbying against any integration of Maoist combatants into its ranks became a major element of the crisis which led to the downfall of the Maoist-led government, and today any progress is hostage to the overall absence of political cooperation.
Three years after Maoist combatants were cantoned and restrictions were placed on the Nepalese Army, pending what was to be a June 2007 election, both armies are understandably restless. It is remarkable, in terms of any international comparison, that there have been so few serious breaches of agreements, and fortunately for the political leaders, UNMIN is available to be blamed when they do occur, rather than their own failure to address the issues that could lead beyond temporary arrangements. But it is laying up further problems for the future to increase rather than reduce the numbers of personnel for which the state has a responsibility, without any plan for the future of Nepal’s security sector: an army of wartime proportions and a paramilitary raised to fight the Maoist insurgency, whose numbers are being increased, alongside commitments to Maoist former combatants and undertakings to increase recruitment of under-represented groups.
I shall say less about the fourth fundamental aspect of the peace process, the commitment to political, economic and social transformation, but not because I think it less important. Those who talk of the Maoists “joining the mainstream” overlook the fact that while the former insurgents committed themselves to multiparty democracy, and must be held to that commitment, they did not abandon their commitment to fundamental change: indeed, the other political parties undertook to make such a commitment themselves. In so far as this referred to the end of the monarchy, it has been accomplished. In so far as it refers to restructuring the state, it is largely a matter for the new constitution, and requires a restoration of political cooperation if consensus is to be reached in the Constituent Assembly, where even a two-thirds majority requires Maoist support. But three years since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is long enough to lament the inability of politicians in Kathmandu, or for the most part locally, to cooperate so as to bring some dividends of peace and beginnings of change to the poor and marginalized majority of Nepal’s people. No effort has been made to forge a common vision for the “New Nepal” that is so often spoken about.
The fifth fundamental aspect of the peace process, the commitment to address the needs of victims of the conflict, and to build the rule of law by ending impunity, sadly can also be quickly addressed. Each side of the former conflict is concerned for its own victims, but little concerned for those it made victims, or for those who were simply caught in the middle of a ruthless war. Processes for compensation have been inadequate, and a process for addressing post-conflict issues of land and property has been non-existent. Three and a half years after the first commitment, in the Ceasefire Code of Conduct, to investigate the fate of the disappeared, a commission of investigation has yet to be established. Not a single person has been properly brought to justice for a major human rights violation committed during the armed conflict or since. The Nepalese Army protects from the courts those involved in the killing of Maina Sunawar, the Maoists protect from the courts those involved in the killing of Ram Hari Shrestha, and the Nepali Congress is uninterested in accountability for the killings of YCL cadres by the security detail of one of its election candidates. Major reports by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on mass disappearances and systematic torture by the Nepalese Army in Maharajgunj barracks and in Bardiya district make no impact on Kathmandu opinion.
This summary of the non-implementation of key commitments of the peace process might be different if there had been serious mechanisms to monitor implementation. In the Ceasefire Code of Conduct, the two sides said that they would arrange for monitoring by national and international monitoring teams: the short-lived Ceasefire Code of Conduct Monitoring Committee, which included individuals of some independence, ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and undertakings to replace it came to nothing. The agreement of 8 November 2006 which preceded the CPA required a High-Level Joint Monitoring Committee to be formed to monitor implementation, and the CPA itself provided for a National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission. The August 2007 agreement with the Madhesi People’s Rights Forum required a United Monitoring Mechanism to periodically review implementation. The 23-point Agreement of December 2007 required formation – within a month – of both a High Level Committee for Monitoring the Effective Implementation of the CPA and other Agreements, and a High Level Peace Commission. The post-election agreement of June 2008 required the formation of several commissions including a National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission – again within a month! The Common Minimum Programme of the Maoist-led government repeated this commitment, and said that the National Peace and Rehabilitation Commission would monitor the compliance and implementation of past agreements and understandings. This was again reiterated in the Common Minimum Programme of the present government, which also made a fresh commitment to a committee to monitor the implementation of agreements with the Madhesis. Yet despite these repeated commitments, there has been to this day no effective mechanism for monitoring implementation of the peace process, except for the Agreement on Monitoring the Management of Arms and Armies, under which UNMIN regularly convenes the Joint Monitoring Coordination Committee, which has now held over one hundred meetings.
Independent monitoring is an area where Nepal’s civil society might have played an important role. But despite the leading role which civil society, marginalized groups and women played in the Jana Andolan, peace process negotiations have been limited to a small group of political leaders, mostly from higher castes, and all of them men. Even if uninvited by the political parties, civil society actors might have mounted independent scrutiny of their fulfillment of their commitments; instead, much of civil society has reverted to partisan perspectives. The agreements with Madhesi and Janajati groups must be now regarded as part of the peace process, and sincerity in their implementation is also crucial for building consensus around a new constitution.
If this is the state of Nepal’s peace process, is it bound to fail? You may by now be surprised to hear me say that I believe that while it is in danger of failing, it is not yet bound to fail. My suggestions for the way forward correspond to my analysis of its fundamentals.
First, the commitment to power-sharing and consensus-building must be re-established. It should be reflected in a national unity government, including both sides to the original peace process and all major political forces, in accordance with commitments before the election and with the election outcome. Effective mechanisms should at last be established to implement and monitor implementation of peace process commitments and commitments to inclusion, and should include strong representation of women and marginalized groups, and independent civil society voices. Power-sharing and consensus-building should similarly be applied in local government. At the national level, priority should be given to building consensus around a new constitution. The Constituent Assembly should be a place of vigorous debate, and should never be impeded in its functioning either as interim legislature or as constitution-making body, or restricted in its right to discuss major national issues. The parties should cooperate together, and with civil society, in a mechanism to ensure continuous implementation of peace process commitments and resolve the most difficult issues for the new constitution.
Second, the Maoist leadership must be consistent, in public and private, in words and deeds, in its immediate and long-term commitment to democratic multi-party norms. The YCL – and other youth movements – must be instructed in these norms and in full respect for the rule of law. The sincerity of the leadership is to be judged by the action it takes when its cadres act outside these norms, and by what it says to its comrades as well as to the international community.
Third, hard discussions should take place towards an overall plan for the security sector. “Civilian supremacy” has become a Maoist slogan, but democratic control of the armed forces is a universal principle and the common interest of all political parties. Within such a plan, the size of the Nepalese Army and the role of the Armed Police Force should be decided, inclusive recruitment policies designed, and integration of former Maoist combatants into politically-neutral security forces carried out, along with rehabilitation of those who do not want or qualify for integration.
Fourth, a common minimum programme for socio-economic advancement of the poor and excluded should be agreed upon - and implemented. While restructuring the state is to be agreed upon in the new constitution, and political parties will compete in future on the basis of their respective programmes, they have agreed to embark together on real change.
Fifth, there should be equitable compensation for all categories of victims of the conflict, real efforts to investigate disappearances, and justice for the worst abuses by either side. All political parties should support impartial law enforcement, instead of protecting their own loyalists from the law.
Can this happen? At this moment I do not know, and it may seem unlikely. But I believe that this is along the lines of what the overwhelming majority of Nepal’s long-suffering people would want to see happen, and I believe that it is the interests of those concerned for stability in Nepal, including India. When I went back to the 12-point Understanding, I was struck by one of its least-often quoted commitments: that both the Maoists and the parliamentary parties would engage in “soul-searching” and not repeat their mistakes of the past. I hope that this commitment can be implemented in time to maintain the peace and pursue the change which both sides promised the people of Nepal.
The guy managed to engineer a vertical split in the MJF flouting all norms of parliamentary democracy. Madhav Nepal could not even have appointed people from his own party into the government before his party decided, but he went ahead and appointed Gachhedar against Gachhedar's party's official stand which at that point was to take part in the government in a way that both Yadav and Gachhedar get powerful ministries.
At best he now has about 25 MPs. And he is asking for five ministries including Home. A
unified MJF could have got five ministries, Home included. But by now Gachhedar has become a joke. Girija Koirala and Madhav Nepal used him and discarded him.
The party is still not officially split. There still is time. He and Upendra Yadav should meet in person and sort out their differences. But since all the plum portfolios have already been taken by the NC and the UML, the MJF has only one option left: stay outside the government, support it from the outside. Gachhedar now gets to resign because he can't be the only MJF person in the government.
Now is an opportunity to engage in party building activities. If the UML-NC government does not deliver, in a few months it might be time for a Maoist-MJF government with support from many small parties. At that point the MJF can get DPM and Foreign Affairs for Yadav and Home for Gachhedar. Right now is not a good time for the MJF to get into government.
This is what is going to happen. The NC and the UML are going to drag their feet on two mega issues:
Security Sector Reform.
Federalism.
Then the Maoists and the MJF are not going to have any option left except pull them out of power. A Maoist-MJF-TMDP-SP government is going to become possible.
Maoists 229
MJF 54
TMDP 21
SP 9
Total 313
Gachhedar overplayed his hand. Now he needs to wake up to the reality and start making sense.
Perhaps the TMDP and the SP should also support this government from the outside. It is only a matter of a few short months. They have not been consulted on portfolio division either.
Upendra Yadav must work on his leadership style. He does not consult enough. He should, as the leader of the party, be constantly consulting with all of his MPs and all members of his central committee on all issues big and small. That is on top of holding regular meetings of the parliamentary party and the central committee, and their various committees. And he should stay in daily touch with the top five or 10 leaders in the party. When in person is not possible, he should do it by phone. If he cultivates this style, it will be rare when the party president's viewpoint is different from majority opinion inside the party. He should also consult with the district leaders of his party on a monthly basis. He should invite them over to Kathmandu regularly. He should go visit them in their district offices.
In The News
UML, NC finally settle row over portfolios NepalNews agreement was reached during a meeting between Prime MinisterMadhav Kumar Nepal and NC president Girija Prasad Koirala Saturday afternoon. ....... UML will get finance, home, defence and communication portfolios while Nepali Congress will hold foreign affairs, water resources, labour, health, law and local development ministries. ...... the two parties are yet to convince other allies on the portfolio distribution. Gachchhadar predicts trouble for govt Bijay Kumar Gachchhadar, has hinted that his party might walk out of the government if it does not get the Home Ministry. ....... "If UML and Nepali Congress want us to continue in the cabinet they must be ready to give us respectable position," Gachchhadar said ....... Gachchhadar took UML and NC to task for not consulting with his party on portfolio division ....... "We will have to think whether to stay in the government if UML and NC want the Madhesi parties to settle for the ministries left by them," he said. ...... We will help the government even if we have to stay outside ....... Gachhadar also insisted that the action taken against him and other central leaders by the MJF establishment was not a legitimate one. He said MJF's
mes from UML to be inducted as ministers in the new cabinet. ..... agreed on sharing six ministries each. ..... Khanal reiterated his party’s claim for Defense, Finance, Home and Information Ministries. ...... he asked members of the Youth Force to retaliate attacks of Young Communist League (YCL) Gachchhadar demands Home ministry Republica NC, UML Reach Accord On Portfolio Sharing UML to keep finance, defense, home, communications: Khanal Army chief will complete his term: Oli to Koirala Give full shape to cabinet soon: MPRF to PM At the Forum Prashant Jha, Nepali Times The Forum saga has all the elements of a Bollywood potboiler: betrayal, anger, violence, money and revenge. ....... For all his self-righteousness and sudden discovery that this is an "anti federalism" alliance, Upendra Yadav has shown remarkable inconsistency. ...... He first sat out the entire army chief controversy by junketing around the globe. Returning a day after Prachanda's resignation, he immediately started aiming to become PM with Maoist support. When the numbers did not add up, he shifted allegiance to the UML-led coalition and signed the common minimum program. And though his heart was not in the arrangement, he wanted to lead the MJF in this set-up. When that did not happen, Yadav sacked Bijay Gachhedar & Co. ........ Gachhedar's aim throughout seemed to be to divide and weaken the party. He unilaterally decided to back the UML-NC combine and bargained a plum portfolio for himself. ....... He threw money around to get MPs on his side. And then using old friends like Khum Bahadur, Gachhedar got the NC patriarch to put pressure on the PM to swear him in without an official party decision. ......... The Forum was never a proper party. Just look at Bijay's far right antecedents and desire to turn the clock back to the 1990s, Upendra's radical left background and commitment to federalism and the inscrutable JP Gupta's shift from social democracy to ethnic separatism inspired by a jail stint and study of Sri Lankan Tamils. On the ground, activists who build the organisation for the Madhesi movement had to co-exist with late entrants who had opposed Madhesi issues through this period. ......... The party had its use when a broader Madhesi identity was sharpest before elections and Yadavs, Tharus and Muslims needed each other. ......... In the last year after his electoral success, Yadav had become intolerably arrogant and felt invincible. He had little time for his MPs and rarely visited the Madhes. Gachhedar, on the other hand, closely wooed parliamentary party members. ......... The NC wants to weaken the Madhesi groups to recover its Tarai base. ....... GPK's personal grudge against Upendra for defeating his daughter in Sunsari and opposing his dream of presidency last year. India was also irritated with Yadav for his intransigence on multiple issues and felt that he needed a lesson. ......... With Gachhedar, NC, UML, India and the army ganged up against him ........ There are now three key actors (Prachanda, Jhalanath Khanal, and Upendra Yadav) who want to see an end to this government. .......... In case a political vacuum does develop, the Maoists or a new force is more likely to benefit from it than traditional parties. ...... When Upendra Yadav was asked last year why he was getting people like Bijay Gachhedar into the MJF even though they had no commitment to Madhes, he replied, " "I need their experience of power politics." Looks like the experience has boomeranged.
Gachchhadar faces actionEarlier on Thursday morning, Nepali Congress President Girija Prasad Koirala asked Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal over the phone to appoint Gachchhadar as deputy prime minister..... Koirala made the request to Nepal after he held a meeting with Gachchhadar at Koirala residence at Maharajgunj. NC leaderKhum Bahadur Khadka accompanied Gachchhadar during the meeting.
Girija Koirala has to be beat at his own game for his recent foul play with the MJF. The need of the hour is to bring the party back from the brink of a vertical split and reunify it.
Upendra Yadav has to face the fact that him becoming Prime Minister was never an option this past month. Prachanda was never serious about the offer. The way for a MJF person to become Prime Minister is by winning big in the election next year. And you can't even win if you split the party, let alone win big.
A sane revival plan for the Nepali Congress would be to usher in a new era of internal democracy, to say good bye to the culture of nepotism. A sane revival plan would be to try and meet the aspirations of the Madhesi people who until recently were the base of that party. But instead the Nepali Congress is worse today on internal democracy and nepotism than it was last year. It stands clueless on federalism and security sector reform. Those who talk of the five development regions are not talking about federalism.
The Nepali Congress will see a bigger defeat next year than it did last year. The MJF decimated the Nepali Congress last year in the Terai. Next year the MJF has to wipe out the Nepali Congress from the Terai. For that the MJF has to stay united.
Splitting the party makes absolutely no sense.
Internal democracy means Upendra Yadav might no longer be leading the party down the line. At the next convention the party might elect someone else. That is the democratic way. If all the Madhesi parties unite, as I hope they do before the elections next year, then that unified party would hold a new convention. That convention would elect a new leader to the party. That new leader could be anybody. Could be Upendra Yadav, could be Bijay Gachhedar, could be Hridayesh Tripathy, could be Rajendra Mahto, could be Sarita Giri, could be Jay Prakash Gupta. It is for the democratic process to decide who. And once decided there has to be a post election reconciliation among all the contenders for the top job.
Critiquing Upendra Yadav's Leadership Style
His primary downside has been that he does not consult enough. Someone in his position needs to constantly be consulting with all his MPs, all members of his central committee, as many district leaders as possible. Keep alive as many bilateral channels of communication as possible. Seek out a wide range of people to ask for their opinions before making decisions small and big. Make people feel included in all decision making processes. Have robust discussions among the top leaders on a wide variety of topics on a regular basis. This is something he needs to work on.
MPRF toward vertical split after Gachchhadar faction claims official party Republica Sixteen Central Committee (CC) members of the Madhesi People´s Rights Forum (MPRF) led by senior leader Bijaya Kumar Gachchhadar filed a petition at the Election Commission claiming the party´s name, flag and symbol, thereby pushing the party ultimately toward an unavoidable split. ....... The NGO-turned party, the fourth largest in the Constituent Assembly (CA), has been facing an internal conflict over the last one month after the fall of the Maoist-led government on May 4. ....... Gachchhadar said he was compelled to move the Election Commission after the Yadav-faction turned down repeated offers over the last five days for reconciliation and unity in the party.
MJF expels Gachchhadar, six other leaders; withdraws support to govt; split looms NepalNews Upendra Yadav announced that the central committee meeting of the party held this morning decided to terminate parliamentary party leader Gachchhadar, who was appointed as the deputy prime minister on Thursday, Sarad Singh Bhandari, party spokesperson Jitendra Dev, Rameshowr Raya and Upendra Jha, among others. ...... Yadav also announced withdrawal of support to the UML-led coalition government and one-day general strike in all Terai districts on Monday. ....... He blamed Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal and Nepali Congress president Girija Prasad Koirala for plotting to divide the party. ...... supporters of party chairman Yadav and Gachchhadar clashed at the party central office. ...... Gachchhadar found the main door of the party office padlocked when he reached there to receive felicitations from his cadres. Gachchhadar ordered his cadres to break the door open, entered the party office and received felicitations. ...... Cadres supporting Yadav waved black flag to Gachchhadar as he was being garlanded. Yadav supporters also pelted stones at Gachchhadar's car when he was returning. ... Police had resorted to baton-charging to take the situation under control. MJF on the verge of split Take back withdrawal, expulsion decisions: GachchhadarRepublica parliamentary party of MPRF, of which he is the head, had decided to join the government despite Yadav´s opposition.
When Bijay Gachhedar says Upendra Yadav has been opposed to joining the Madhav Nepal government, he is lying. Upendra Yadav did explore other options duirng the recent political turmoil in the country like every other top political leader in the country, but the final decision had been that the MJF will join the government after all, but it will do so in Upendra Yadav's leadership, since he is the duly elected leader of the party.
Bijay Gachhedar went againt that party decision. The MJF would still have joined the government and Bijay Gachhedar would still have been a minister. But that was not enough for him. He had to become a pawn of Madhav Nepal and Girija Koirala who are hell bent on splitting up the MJF.
Mao discovered a long time ago that every time he expelled half the members of his central committee, his party doubled in size. That is what is about to happen to the MJF. The party's organizational base is about to grow by leaps and bounds. A party born out of a revolution can not be hurt by the smoke-filled room politics of a few Bahuns.
The Nepali Congress has no revival strategy. The MJF was one of the two victors of the election last year. It is going to emerge a bigger victor in the election next year.
The MJF has not split. A few people who should never have been brought into the party have been expelled.
Upendra Yadav should now put more trust in the leaders born out of the two Madhesi revolutions rather than hollow name politicians imported from other parties, especially the Nepali Congress and the UML.
MPRF withdraws support to govt Republica accusing Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal of conspiring against Madhes and splitting the party. ..... Bijay Kumar Gachchhadar and six other central leaders on the charge of conspiring against the party. .....Sarat Singh Bhandari, Jitendra Dev, Ramsaroop Raya, Ramjanam Chaudhari, Upendra Jha and Ratneswor Lal Goit. ..... Yadav accused Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, Tarai-Madhes Loktantrik Party and Sadbhabana Party (Mahato) of splitting MPRF. ..... Yadav also announced that his faction would not work for another coalition with the Maoists. “We will be active as a responsible opposition now” ..... his party would use the street and Constituent Assembly to contribute to the constitution- drafting process and peace process. He also announced Madhes shutdown for Monday to protest the role of Nepali Congress and CPN-UML in splitting the party...... Okil Musalman, a leader in the Gachchhadar-faction, said the decision to expel the seven leaders is unconstitutional as it was not decided by the central committee of the party. “Most of the central committee members are not in the capital today [Friday]” .... Gachchhadar is expected to organize a press conference later in the evening to make his position public. DPM greeted with black flags Gachchhadar and his supporters were forced to flee the scene, claimed BP Yadav, a leader close to party chairman Yadav.
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