Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?
Asia Report N°132 – 18 May 2007
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i
I. Introduction 1
II. The changed Maoists 2
A. Their Strategic Weaknesses 2
B. The Development of Their New Line 3
1. Bhattarai’s battle for change 4
2. A messy U-turn 5
3. Teething troubles 5
C. Their Changed Agendas 6
D. Reshaping Relations at Home and Abroad 7
III. Critical Comrades 8
A. International Allies 8
B. Ideological Differences 9
C. The Allies’ Objections 10
1. On strategy 10
2. On tactics 11
3. Conflict or compromise? 11
IV. The End of People’s War? 12
A. The Balance Sheet 12
1. Gains 12
2. But no revolution 13
B. New Roadmap(s) 14
C. A Phased Revolution 15
D. Leaders of the Radical Left? 16
V. Cooperation, Contention and Confrontation 17
A. The Maoists on the Threshold of Respectability 17
B. A United Left? 18
C. Transitional Tensions 19
D. Clashes to Come 20
E. Plan B 23
VI. Conclusion 24
APPENDICES
Map of Nepal 25
Glossary of Acronyms 26
About the International Crisis Group 27
Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Asia 28
Crisis Group Board Members 30
Asia Report N°132 18 May 2007
Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?
Executive Summary
Nepal’s Maoists have changed their strategy and tactics but not yet their goals. In 1996 they launched a “people’s war” to establish a communist republic but ten years later ended it by accepting multiparty democracy; their armed struggle targeted the parliamentary system but they are now working alongside their former enemies, the mainstream parties, in an interim legislature and coalition government. Their commitment to pluralistic politics and society is far from definitive, and their future course will depend on both internal and external factors. While they have signed up to a peaceful, multiparty transition, they continue to hone alternative plans for more revolutionary change.
Maoist strategy is shaped by a tension between purity and pragmatism. Although they stick to certain established principles, they have long been willing to shift course if they identify strategic weaknesses. Their changed approach was demanded by recognition of three critical flaws in their original plan: (i) they concluded their belief in military victory had been misplaced; (ii) they acknowledged they had misread the likelihood of determined international opposition; and (iii) they woke up to the failures that caused the collapse of twentieth-century communist regimes.
Despite having an authoritarian outlook, the Maoists maintained a culture of debate within their party; key issues have been widely discussed and hotly contested. From the end of the 1990s, they have moved gradually toward a more moderate stance. They changed positions in acknowledging the 1990 democracy movement as a success (they had earlier characterised it as a “betrayal”), in abandoning the immediate goal of a Mao-style “new democracy” and, in November 2005, by aligning themselves with the mainstream parties in favour of multiparty democracy.
The Maoists have cultivated formerly hostile forces, such as the Indian government and the staunchly anti-Maoist Communist Party of India (Marxist), to the extent of alienating their foreign allies. Supporters such as the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement and Indian Maoists had backed their insurgency but have been vocally critical of the compromises made in the peace process. They think their Nepali comrades have betrayed fundamental principles and thrown away the practical advantages they had secured through their armed struggle.
For Nepal’s Maoists, however, the balance sheet at the end of ten years of “people’s war” is more complex. They believe they have secured some lasting advantages, from their own dramatic rise to influence (with a support base and military force hardly imaginable in 1996) to their reshaping of the national political agenda (promoting formerly taboo causes such as republicanism and federalism). But the course of the war persuaded most of their leadership that they could not go it alone and would have to be more flexible if they were to build on these gains.
The peace process has forced practical and theoretical rethinking. Leaders have tried to present a more moderate image as they balance complex equations of domestic and international support and opposition. Maoist ministers have to cooperate with colleagues from other parties and work with the bureaucracy even as they plan a possible insurrection and plot to isolate “regressive” opponents. Ideologically, they define the peace process as a transitional phase in which they can destroy the “old regime” and restructure the state. They justify this by saying their acceptance of a bourgeois “democratic republic” is only a stepping stone on the way to a true “people’s republic”. Leaders argue that they can create a new form of “peaceful revolution” that is true to their communist aims but reflects the reality of Nepal’s politics.
It is tempting to brand the Maoists as either rigid radicals or unprincipled opportunists but neither characterisation explains the whole picture. Their threats to revert to mass insurrection satisfy traditionalists in their own movement and cannot be ignored. But leaders who have fought hard to forge a new approach will be loath to turn their backs on the hard-won advantages they have secured through compromise. They know they face internal opposition but believe they can hold the line as long as the peace process maintains momentum and allows them to achieve some of their headline goals.
Their likely behaviour as the process moves forward, therefore, will depend upon the role of other political actors as much as their own decisions. If the mainstream parties keep up a strong commitment to the constituent assembly process, the Maoists will find it hard to back out. If this route is blocked, the Maoists may find their effort at controlled rebellion slipping into renewed conflict beyond their leaders’ control. If this were to happen, the Maoists themselves would be big losers. But so would the democratic parties and, even more so, the people of Nepal.
Kathmandu/Brussels, 18 May 2007
Asia Report N°132 18 May 2007
Nepal’s Maoists: Purists or Pragmatists?
I. Introduction
Nepal’s Maoists are revising their methods and reconsidering their goals. Their most significant political shift has been a conditional acceptance of multiparty democracy – a fundamental ideological concession – and they have in effect abandoned central tenets of their people’s war strategy. The move towards a more pluralistic approach has taken place over several years. While the Maoists’ internal debate over ends and means has been more or less continuous, three major turning points stand out:
The decision “to defend the achievements of 1990 mass movement” (1999–2001). They had earlier labelled the 1990 compromise between the palace and major political parties a “betrayal” of the people. 2001 saw the first serious review of strategy. Their second national conference analysed the problems of the international communist movement and pinpointed the challenges for their own movement, in particular the difficulty of making progress with a purely rural focus.
The decision to abandon the immediate goal of “new democracy” (May 2003). In its place they adopted “Development of Democracy in the Twenty-first Century” (DDTC), a concept that accepted political competition within a socialist system. They laid the ground for this move away from traditional communist thinking by criticising the weaknesses of their mentors, Mao and Stalin.
The decision to ally with the parliamentary parties for “full democracy” (November 2005). In their twelve-point agreement with the mainstream Seven-Party Alliance (SPA), they accepted multi-party politics and made their immediate goal the formation of a democratic republic through an elected constituent assembly (CA). This bourgeois/ capitalist republic would be a stepping stone on the way to a true “people’s republic” embodying the classical Maoist principles of “new democracy”.
After the April 2006 mass movement, which forced the king to relinquish power, the Maoists have tried to present a moderate image. Chairman and overall leader Prachanda even assured donor agencies that they had become “rightist communists”. But the Maoists’ transition to democratic politics is far from complete and the compromise stance has failed to win backing throughout the party. They retain the end goal of a people’s republic from which most liberal parties would be excluded, and they have done little to change their militaristic approach to politics, in which the exercise of force is an integral part. The threats of violent insurrection are partly bluster but should the peace process stall, they are both theoretically and practically prepared to revert to more traditional revolutionary tactics.
This report examines the Maoists’ political culture and its development, drawing on detailed research in two main areas – Maoist internal politics and international linkages – to assess the movement’s nature as well as possible scenarios as the peace process moves forward. Some observers have consistently warned that the Maoists will never change; others think they are ready for a trouble-free conversion to parliamentary politics along the lines of the transformation of the mainstream Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML) in the early 1990s. Supporters can marshal convincing evidence but neither of these starkly opposing interpretations can accurately or adequately explain Maoist politics. The evolution of their strategy and behaviour has always been, and will continue to be, a complex process conditioned by internal debates and external conditions. It is too early to predict with confidence where this process will end. Instead, this report aims to clarify the factors and relationships that will shape it.
II. The changed Maoists
A. Their Strategic Weaknesses
The Maoists were forced to revise their strategy because of its shortcomings. Prachanda has suggested two reasons lie behind the change in line: the unfavourable “international power balance” and the “overall economic, political and social realities of the country”. In fact, he and his colleagues slowly came to realise they had made miscalculations in three critical areas: (i) their belief that an overall military victory was possible was mistaken; (ii) their reading of the international environment had to change (especially after 9/11), and the antagonistic approach towards India was counterproductive; and (iii) their faith in previous communist systems eroded as they analysed the reasons for communist regimes’ collapse.
No military victory. The major factor that forced a rethink was their realisation that military victory was impossible. During their campaign’s first five years, they quickly overran the poorly armed police force and hoped to defeat the army with similar ease. They held sway over large areas of the countryside although, in line with their strategy, they focused on controlling the population, rather than winning territory. They set up parallel governments but had no permanent, protected base areas and could not capture and hold district headquarters.
This stalemate led to their first strategic rethink of the people’s war approach. In 2001 they adopted a new line, Prachandapath, that added a Leninist twist of urban insurrection to the stagnating rural focus. However, the Maoists have never had a wide support base in Kathmandu, and the government relatively easily thwarted their efforts to build networks. Similarly, the internationally-backed Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) proved a more stubborn foe than they had expected. Thus, the twin-pronged Prachandapath plan also failed: they needed either vast popular support or clear military superiority but they discovered they had neither. Maoist attacks within the Kathmandu valley in 2005 (Sankhu) and early 2006 (Thankot and Dadhikot) had some psychological impact but never seriously threatened the capital militarily.
Hostile international environment. The Maoists thought that their growing strength would force international players to live with them even if they did not like them. They believed domestic pre-eminence would even trump New Delhi’s instinctive fears of a hard-line communist neighbour. Probably over-optimistic from the start, the prospect of international acceptance was definitively ended by the changed post-9/11 attitudes towards political violence. In 2001 the Nepali government branded the Maoists “terrorists”, followed by India and the U.S.
The Maoist response to the changed scenario was counter-intuitive and ultimately counter-productive: they chose to go on the offensive, breaking off talks and attacking the RNA directly to bring it onto the battlefield. This in turn invited international military aid to an army that could now portray itself as the last line of defence against a terrorist takeover. India, the U.S. and UK were happy to oblige; despite concerns about strategy and human rights violations, no outside power opposed the basic plan of defending the state against armed insurgents. The Maoists had long seen India as their greatest external threat, fearing that a military offensive to capture central power could prompt Indian intervention with U.S. support. They chose to test this possibility – and discovered that a hostile international environment was enough to upset their plans without any resort to direct intervention.
Shortcomings of communist models. The Maoists were initially uncompromising supporters of the five luminaries of their communist heritage: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao. However, they had always recognised that a successful revolution in Nepal would have to modify classical models. This provided cover to review the weaknesses of the international communist movement, a turning point coming when the 2001 second national conference of their Communist Party Nepal (CPN(M)) accepted that Stalin had committed serious mistakes. The May 2003 central committee meeting further analysed why the Soviet and Eastern European communist regimes had collapsed and “counter-revolution” had occurred so easily.
While still underground, Prachanda had spoken publicly about this critical reassessment of classical models: “Why did the communist movement suffer such an enormous setback? Why did the Russian revolution get overcome by counter-revolution? Why did China also go down that path? This was a debate within the central committee for many years”. The Maoists concluded that they could not simply blame a “capitalist conspiracy”; rather, the weakness lay within the communist governance system and could only be addressed by allowing a degree of political competition. This paved the way for their revised policy on multiparty pluralism.
B. The Development of Their New Line
The Maoists’ decision to enter mainstream politics was not unprecedented. They had experimented with the parliamentary system, emerging as the third largest party (albeit with only nine seats) in the 1991 general election. Throughout their armed insurgency, they maintained some relations with mainstream parties, civil society and the media, keeping an entry to open politics a viable option. But the prospect of such a radical change in strategy prompted a long intra-party debate and bitter clashes between those advocating a fresh approach and those who preferred to stick more closely to the original plan. Two senior leaders who might have played a part in these debates, Mohan Baeda (Koran) and C.P. Gujral (Aura), were out of the picture following arrest and imprisonment in India. The remaining key players were Chairman Prachanda, Baburam Bhattarai, Ram Abrader Thana (Baal), Posta Abrader Bogotá (Dowager) and Krishna Abrader Maharani. While Bhattarai urged a new line, he met with scepticism and resistance from most of his colleagues.
1. Bhattarai’s battle for change
While they had been quite quick to recognise the weaknesses of the international communist movement, the Maoists hesitated to explore alternative lines. Although the CPN(M) was theoretically committed to developing policy through an ongoing debate within the party (the “two-line struggle”), in practice proponents of new ideas faced great obstacles.
The proposal for a constituent assembly, first developed for negotiations with the government in early 2001, was intertwined with the strategy debate. When it was adopted as a negotiating platform, there was little understanding of its significance in the wider party. Most of the leadership viewed it as only a tactical ploy to isolate the monarchy and use polarisation over the issue to open up the way for the long-planned “new democratic republic”. However, Bhattarai and some other leaders had a different plan, which emerged during the 2003 negotiations alongside the shift to the DDTC concept. Bhattarai saw the constituent assembly demand as a strategic turning point that could pave the way for a “new model of revolution”. He believed that an alliance with the parliamentary forces could win Indian support and form the basis for a mass republican movement. The constituent assembly could be one point of alignment with the parties, and he also argued that the Maoists should accept competitive multiparty politics.
However, Bhattarai lost the argument. The August 2004 central committee meeting took the opposite line: instead of targeting the monarchy, it decided to enter the “strategic offensive” phase and considered reaching an understanding with “patriotic forces” (including the king) to counter “upcoming Indian intervention”. The meeting also passed a “centralisation of leadership” resolution appointing Prachanda supreme commander of the Maoist military forces as well as head of their shadow government, the United Revolutionary People’s Council (URPC) – a position held by Bhattarai. Some leaders keen to reinforce their chairman’s grip on the whole movement urged that Prachandapath should be developed into a more ambitious ideology of “Prachanda Thought”, implying he should stand alongside Mao in the pantheon of communist thinking.
Bhattarai disagreed with the centralised leadership and the tactical line of confronting India rather than the king. In November 2004 he presented his reservations in a four-point letter and then in thirteen more detailed “questions for discussion” submitted to the party headquarters. He argued that the recent decisions went against the spirit of the party’s second conference and May 2003 central committee meeting that had called for the “creative development of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism”. A January 2005 politburo meeting rejected Bhattarai’s arguments; after Prachanda presented a critique “on comrade Laldhoj’s [Bhattarai’s] letter and other activities”, his colleagues concluded that Bhattarai had breached party discipline and was proposing a “rightist deviation”. He was suspended from all party posts indefinitely. Bhattarai tried to fight back, complaining that the decision went “against the accepted rules and norms of any revolutionary communist party”. But the leadership stood firm: there would be no change in strategy and no sympathy for their comrade’s deviationist tendencies.
2. A messy U-turn
The Maoists could have coped relatively comfortably with the fall-out from the dismissal of their de facto number two leader: Bhattarai did not command a wide support base in the party or military and was not in any case seeking the leadership. But significant shifts outside their movement rapidly forced a more positive reassessment of Bhattarai’s case for change.
The February 2005 royal coup upset the plan to entice the palace into an anti-Indian alliance: it would have just been too hard to justify dealing with the king after such an autocratic step. Moreover, the coup also forced mainstream party leaders to recognise the weakness of their situation, that without allies they were at the mercy of both the king and the Maoists. This strengthened the hand of party activists (both NC and UML) who had been pressing their leaders to accept a constituent assembly and agree to limited cooperation with the Maoists to defeat royal rule. By May 2005 the major parties had accepted this and were privately urging the Maoists to be more flexible.
These pressures led to a quick Maoist U-turn. Prachanda decided to start talks with both the SPA and India. He rehabilitated Bhattarai, entrusting him with the first negotiations in Delhi. This about-turn was caused largely by the lack of other good options. The Maoists realised they could not capture power single-handedly and feared that King Gyanendra might win the argument in Delhi and persuade India to put them under unbearable pressure.
After rounds of discussions with the parties and the Indian government, the CPN(M) held a central committee meeting in Chunbang (in their mid-west stronghold Rukum) in October 2005. It approved the plan of breaking the triangular stalemate with the monarchy and parliamentary parties through an alliance with the “capitalist parliamentary forces” against the “feudal monarchy”. It also passed a new program for working towards a democratic republic through a multiparty system – the line condemned as “revisionist” only a few months before.
The upshot was that Prachanda accepted Bhattarai’s political line and Bhattarai accepted Prachanda’s primacy. The Chunbang meeting not only resolved the internal debate and restored Bhattarai to the leadership but also placed the Maoists much more firmly on a moderate path. It paved the way for the November 2005 twelve-point agreement with the SPA and the April 2006 mass movement. But the new line still had its critics.
3. Teething troubles
Most of the Maoist top leadership supported Prachanda’s case that the changed political context demanded a change in their own line. But some were deeply suspicious of accepting the multiparty system and did not back Bhattarai’s rehabilitation. Politburo member Rabindra Shrestha, who was close to Prachanda and wanted to expel Bhattarai from the party, took the dissidents’ case public. He was supported by Mani Dhwaj Thapa (Anukul), who shared similar dissatisfactions, albeit for different reasons.
Shrestha and Thapa issued a joint statement on 13 March 2006 calling on party cadres to rebel against Prachanda and Bhattarai. Prachanda wasted no time in expelling them from the party and denouncing them as “traitors”, “collaborators of the reactionaries” and “unnecessary by-product of the revolution”. But their rebellion pointed to the difficulties of selling the new line throughout the Maoist movement. They offered two principal critiques: that Prachanda and Bhattarai’s “anti-proletarian weaknesses” had led to “emerging negative trends” within the party and that the whole movement was being dragged into a “rightist deviation”. They rejected outright the proposition that multiparty competition should be viewed as a means of preventing counter-revolution.
Shrestha and Thapa set up their own “New Cultural Revolution Group” but their call for revolt had little impact within the Maoist movement. Only one moderately senior activist, former alternative central committee member Tulasi Ojha (Anawarat) of Dhankuta, joined them; he was in any case already under disciplinary action. Shrestha and Thapa’s charge that their party was following a rightist deviation echoes the main complaint of non-Nepali Maoists, but their lack of organised support meant they could not win the backing of international allies. Ultimately their revolt undermined the suggestion that the Maoists’ new line was just a cosmetic gesture: it illustrated that however weak their commitment to multiparty politics might be, the party’s leaders were engaged in a real debate over the course of their movement and were willing to face down internal opposition.
C. Their Changed Agendas
The Maoists’ original plan was that their people’s war would achieve “new democracy” (naulo janabad). This was to be a form of dictatorship of the proletariat similar to that established by the Chinese communists, which would give way to socialism and ultimately communism. In this their primary targets were the parliamentary system and the monarchy. The course of the conflict and the changing political context persuaded them to make major revisions to this initial strategy. They have adopted three significant new policies: a constituent assembly, a democratic republic and a multiparty system. The only tenet they have not abandoned is that of republicanism.
Constituent assembly. The Maoists had always demanded a new constitution but they did not initially call for a constituent assembly (CA). In February 2001, their second national conference decided “to increase the debate about the process of drawing up a people’s constitution” but implied that it would not be drafted by specially elected representatives. Still, when they entered talks soon afterwards, they demanded “interim government, CA election and institutional development of the republic”. They saw the CA proposal as a means to drive a wedge between monarchists and republicans. They dropped the republican agenda temporarily during the negotiations when it failed to gain public support but they kept the CA agenda. The fact that it was not acceptable to the palace or mainstream parties was one reason behind the failure of both the 2001 and 2003 talks.
The February 2005 royal coup changed political calculations. It appeared to prove the weakness of the 1990 dispensation and added to grassroots pressure within the mainstream parties to endorse constitutional change. For the Maoists, the CA proposal was a means for both moving from armed insurgency into mainstream politics and for restructuring the state. For both sides it became the most attractive option to end the conflict and move forward.
Democratic republic. The October 2005 Chunbang meeting decided on the immediate goal of a multiparty democratic republic. This term is also acceptable to moderate parliamentary republicans but the concept holds a particular significance within the Maoists’ longer term strategy. Baburam Bhattarai defines it as a “transitional republic”, more progressive than an Indian-style “parliamentary republic” but still a step short of a “people’s republic”. According to him, it is the supreme phase of “capitalist democracy”, in which all elements of “formal democracy” (multiparty competition, voting rights, general elections, rule of law, press freedom and the like) will be accompanied by appropriate representation and participation of oppressed classes, castes, regions and women in state structures. The Maoists would join such a multiparty competitive system in order to try to establish a people’s republic peacefully through the electoral process.
Multiparty system. The Maoists only accepted the concept of competitive multiparty politics in May 2003, when their central committee approved a proposal for “development of democracy in [the] 21st century”. While replacing the traditional concept of a one-party dictatorship of the proletariat, this only envisaged political competition among “anti-feudal” and “anti-imperialist” parties. None of the major mainstream parties would meet these criteria: Prachanda has defined the NC and NC(D) as “most reactionary parties” and the UML as a “revisionist party” with a “very dual” role. The Maoists recognise that they will not be able to restrict participation in a democratic republic but hope to implement their more narrowly defined system under a people’s republic. But they are coy when pressed on exactly how their proposed restrictions would apply to Nepal’s mainstream parties; Bhattarai only comments that “in every form of democracy there are rules on who can register as a political party – democracy does not mean freedom without limits”.
There are two main reasons for the Maoists’ acceptance of multiparty democracy. First, they realised that they could not overturn domestic and international insistence that political competition is synonymous with democracy. Secondly, their conclusion that earlier communist regimes had failed due to the lack of political competition (see above) provided a compelling argument within their own strategic framework. To avoid the danger of revolutionary change decaying into bureaucratic stagnation, they decided that “a situation must be created to ensure continuous proletarisation and revolutionisation of the communist party by organizing political competition within the constitutional limits of the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist democratic state”.
D. Reshaping Relations at Home and Abroad
Once they had realised that they could not win on their own, the Maoists turned their attention to relations with other power centres, particularly the mainstream parties and India. In this they were partly guided by the classical Maoist tactics of the “united front”: to “unite with all forces that can be united with in order to fight a common struggle against the enemy and to win in revolution and construction”. This provided rationale enough for a tactical alliance with the parties, just as it could have been stretched to justify an alliance with the palace had the plan to unite on a nationalist basis materialised.
However, the bid to reshape relations with other domestic and international players was also framed with the possibility of abandoning the underground struggle in mind. Even those pushing for greater engagement with mainstream forces knew that any process of going above ground would be difficult and dangerous. Cultivating powerful allies could ease the transition and help the Maoists reposition themselves to make the most of open politics. The key domestic constituencies were the major parties and civil society groups, although they also maintained quiet contacts with the palace and the army. Maoist leaders made increasing efforts to present a new public face to the world through more moderate press interviews and to win over elements of the international community.
The main thrust, though, revolved around the volte-face on relations with India. The August 2004 decision to confront “Indian expansionism” led to a campaign to dig trenches and bunkers across the country to prepare for a supposedly imminent “intervention”. But less than a year later they were courting New Delhi and, to their Indian allies’ even greater dismay, the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM), which supported the Congress-led government and had long been fervently anti-Maoist. India had tacitly maintained contacts with the Maoists and had its own interests in reciprocating their new attention. Apart from policymakers’ increasing frustration with King Gyanendra, some security analysts suggested that the CPN(M)’s joining mainstream politics would benefit regional stability and could provide a model for their Indian counterparts.
The Maoists’ revised approach to India brought them some immediate benefits: it enabled the alliance with the SPA (whose top leaders had accepted Delhi’s informal mediation); encouraged India’s move away from the king; went a long way to neutralising steadfast U.S. opposition; brought a degree of international legitimacy; and led to the release of more than 100 activists (including senior leaders Kiran and Gaurav) from Indian prisons. They believed, perhaps correctly, that they and India could build on at least one shared interest: that their limited cooperation would reduce the U.S. influence that had raised hackles among both Maoists and Indian policy-makers.
III. Critical Comrades
The Maoists had solid backing from international allies when they launched their campaign. Organisations such as the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM) came to see them as the global standard-bearer of old-fashioned Maoism. But as Nepal’s Maoists moved away from their initially traditional strategy, they faced criticism from international supporters who could not accept their line of peaceful transition. They have had difficulty in selling their new line but they are ambitious: they believe that their experiment in compromise can set a new precedent for the global left.
Indian Maoists are the CPN(M)’s most immediate and influential allies, although their practical support has been low-level and not critical to sustaining the insurgency. Their sceptical stance towards the peace process is relevant insofar as it shows the distance the CPN(M) leadership has travelled from its original strategy and reflects unease that is only just starting to find a voice among Nepali Maoists themselves. Indian Maoist leader Ganapathy has warned that his comrades across the border must “either get co-opted into the system or abandon the present policy of power-sharing with the ruling classes and continue armed revolution to seize power. There is no Buddhist middle way. They cannot set the rules for a game the bourgeoisie had invented”. This argument has resonance across the revolutionary left – for Nepal’s Maoists to succeed, they must not only overcome their parliamentary foes but win over the critics in their own camp.
A. International Allies
Two groups have been particularly important in providing international backing for the Maoists:
Revolutionary Internationalist Movement (RIM). RIM sees itself as the guardian of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism’s guiding principles. It was established in 1984 by groups in China wishing to protect Mao’s legacy from counter-revolution following his death. Its official contact office in London is no more than a postal address but it brings out irregularly the magazine A World to Win and fosters contacts between Maoist groups from different countries. The CPN(M) is the only RIM member whose talk of revolution has been seriously put into practice. Nepal became a shining example for other Maoists, who glorified it as a successful demonstration of contemporary revolution. Adjusting to the CPN(M)’s redefined position has been difficult.
RIM played an important role in encouraging the Maoists to go ahead with their people’s war strategy. In 1993 (the year of Mao’s centenary), it declared that it followed “Maoism” rather than “Mao Zedong thought”, a controversial line that the CPN (Unity Centre) backed in its “Mao Memorial”. One faction of the Unity Centre went on to become the CPN(M), including “Maoist” in its name to show allegiance to this position. (The CPN (Masal) led by Mohan Bikram Singh was also a member of RIM but it refused to accept the Maoist line and left the organisation in 1998.) RIM welcomed the start of the people’s war in Nepal with a communiqué entitled “From the Andes to the Himalayas, people’s war is the only way to liberation”. It then worked to generate international support for Nepal’s Maoists by building an international profile and developing links in other countries.
According to Prachanda, there was “consistent international involvement” in the final stages of planning the people’s war, “first and foremost” with the RIM Committee: “There was important ideological and political exchange. From the RIM Committee, we got the experience of the PCP (Communist Party of Peru), the two-line struggle there, and also the experience in Turkey, the experience in Iran and the experience in the Philippines. We learned from the experience in Bangladesh and from some experience in Sri Lanka”. RIM also drove the establishment of the World People’s Resistance Movement (WPRM), which aims to organise communists and non-communists against “American imperialism”. WPRM came to focus much of its attention on Nepal, running frequent propaganda and publicity programs in European cities. Since November 2005 it has sent three groups of foreign volunteers to work on a Maoist road-building project in Rolpa district. WPRM also has a South Asia branch; its current coordinator is CPN(M) leader Suresh Ale Magar.
Coordinating Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA). This committee was formed in July 2001 by nine Maoist outfits from India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, formalising a previously loose relationship. The CPN(M) was a major force behind its formation, and Nepali Maoists have played a significant role in its leadership. This regional coming together helped smooth the path for the September 2004 unification of India’s two major Naxalite organisations – the CPI-ML(PW) and the MCC-I – as the Communist Party of India (Maoist). That merger went some way towards reuniting a movement that has been divided since Naxalite leader Charu Mazumdar’s 1972 death, although the mainstream CPI-ML (Liberation) is one of a number of Naxalite groups that is resolutely opposed to the armed struggle endorsed by the CPI (Maoist).
CCOMPOSA helped the CPN(M) expand its South Asian contacts and form cooperative relationships with other like-minded groups. Nepal’s Maoists had already developed a regional perspective with their February 2001 national conference resolution on “a new Soviet federation for South Asia”. The conference concluded that India was the major obstacle to any regional popular revolution, so any successful insurgency would eventually have to fight with India. This justified building a stronger common front between otherwise disparate national groups, hence CCOMPOSA’s twin aims of “struggling for the achievement of people’s power in one’s own country” and “fighting against American imperialism and Indian expansionism”.
B. Ideological Differences
Most RIM and CCOMPOSA members have been very sceptical about the CPN(M)’s strategic review. Some have aired their criticisms publicly; others have expressed doubts privately. The debate is not hostile but it has sometimes been bad-tempered, and several rounds of meetings have yet to bridge differences. Nepal’s Maoists insist they are viewing their international friends’ objections as constructive criticism but there has been some trading of snide comments and harsh words.
The main difference between Nepal’s Maoists and their international allies is over how to put ideology into practice. The CPN(M) has concluded that revolution cannot be achieved by classical strategy and tactics; Prachanda has coined a new mantra: “the repetition of revolution is impossible, only its development is possible”. This explains their departure from the established formulas of Marxism, Leninism and Maoism and justifies their attempt to develop a new approach suited to contemporary Nepal. Most of their international allies see this as revisionism – a harsh charge among communists. Indian Maoist leaders complain that the CPN(M) makes dramatic tactical shifts without consultation and employs a confusing mix of strategy and tactics. But for Nepali Maoists, their foreign comrades are “dogmatic” and do not understand Nepal’s reality. A senior CPN(M) leader observed: “We have reached the counter-offensive phase, while our Indian friends are still struggling on the defensive phase; how can they understand the challenges that we are facing?”
Policy wrangles with RIM date from the CPN(M)’s May 2003 adoption of DDTC. Here the main clash is with the U.S. Revolutionary Communist Party, which has traditionally dominated RIM. However, differences and debates with Indian Maoists, mainly represented by the CPI (Maoist), are more significant, not least because of their geographic proximity and their decades-long bilateral relations. Indian Maoists have bridled at their Nepali counterparts’ arrogance and the development of Prachandapath and its promotion as a near-sovereign ideology. CPI (Maoist) General Secretary Ganapathy offers a typical put-down: “We found that there is a certain degree of over generalisation with regard to some of the achievements of the people’s war in Nepal, such as attributing universality to some things that are basically a feature of the revolution in an extremely backward country.”
The CPI (Maoist) is the only fraternal party to have continuously and openly criticised the CPN(M)’s new line. (The relationship between Nepali and Indian Maoists has always been rocky, featuring a number of policy disagreements.) When Nepal’s Maoists signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the government, CPI (Maoist) Spokesman “Comrade Azad” reacted: “We appeal to the CPN(M) once again to rethink about their current tactics which are actually changing the very strategic direction of the revolution in Nepal”. He warned that they ran the risk of falling into “traps laid by the ruling classes and their imperialist and expansionist masters” or falling victim to “a sudden coup and massacre of communists as witnessed in Greece, Indonesia, Chile and a number of other countries”.
C. The Allies’ Objections
The Indian Maoists’ objections fall broadly into strategic and tactical categories (although a longstanding complaint is that Nepal’s Maoists conflate strategy and tactics).
1. On strategy
The CPA. The hardest compromise for the Indian Maoists to digest has been the CPN(M)’s declaration, through the CPA, that it has ended its war. The CPI (Maoist) complains that “the agreement by the Maoists to become part of the interim government in Nepal cannot transform the reactionary character of the state machinery that serves the exploiting ruling classes and imperialists”.
The CA. The CPI (Maoist) believes the CA agenda is only suitable for tactical propaganda, not for serious implementation; it publicly objected when the CPN(M) signed the twelve-point agreement with the SPA. CPI (Maoist) leaders warn that accepting the CA and a multiparty system will lure the CPN(M) into parliamentary politics and make it little more than a second UML. They think it is wrong “to expect a possibility of a peaceful transition from the CA to the new democratic revolution”. Spokesman Azad cautioned that “one may bring some reforms from above and satisfy certain deprived sections of the people but it will never solve the basic problems of the people as you cannot smash feudalism and throw out imperialism from the soil of Nepal by utilising the old state whatever embellishments one might do to give it a refurbished image”.
Development of Democracy in Twenty-first Century (DDTC). The CPN(M)’s bold abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in favour of DDTC met with a cool reception. “What is new in the concept of 21st century democracy raised by the CPN(M) and how is it qualitatively different from the democracy of the twentieth century (communism)?”, asked Azad. Indian Maoists worry that DDTC is vague on the concept of political competition, not clarifying whether it is applicable after seizing power or during the revolutionary process. They strongly oppose a general commitment to multiparty politics. The CPI (Maoist) supports neither the new phase of democratic republic nor the idea of a people’s republic diluted by political competition.
2. On tactics
Dissolving the “people's regime”. Indian Maoists consider the “people’s governments” and “people’s courts” a major achievement and fear their dissolution will lead to “an irreversible process of losing all the revolutionary gains achieved till now”.
Cantoning the PLA. Indian Maoists called on their Nepali comrades “to withdraw from their agreement with the government of Nepal on depositing arms of PLA [the Maoist People’s Liberation Army] as this would make the people defenceless in face of attacks by the reactionaries”. They criticise the proposed merger of the PLA and Nepalese Army into a new national army as “even more dangerous”: “By merging the people’s army with the reactionary army of the ruling classes (until now the faithful servant of the king), the people will become defenceless in case of a reactionary armed offensive by the enemy”.
Inviting in the UN. Indian Maoists objected to the UN’s role in supervising the arms management process. They say it is not neutral but “essentially an instrument of imperialism and particularly American imperialism”.
Relations with the Indian establishment. The Indian Maoists are particularly affronted by their Nepali counterparts’ wooing of the Indian government and the mainstream CPM. On his first formal visit to India, in November 2006, Prachanda reassured Delhi’s political elite that “India is no more a reactionary state” and declared: “We have no working relations with the Indian Maoists, but only ideological relations”. For their Indian comrades, the Maoists’ burgeoning relations with the CPM were the hardest to swallow. The CPM, which backs the Congress-led government, has long been hostile towards Maoists, who in turn consider it a “reactionary party”.
Model for Naxalites. The CPM’s suggestion that Nepal’s Maoists are an example of peaceful transition that their Indian counterparts should emulate met with an even frostier reaction. Nepali Maoists also urged the Indian Maoists “to reconsider their revolutionary strategies and to practice multiparty democracy” and claimed “their current tactics in Nepal would be an example”. When an interviewer asked, “to what extent do you think the logic of your line on multiparty democracy applies also to the Maoist movements in India?”, Prachanda replied, “we believe it applies to them too…They have to understand this and go down this route”.
3. Conflict or compromise?
These disagreements led to strained relations between Maoists on either side of the Nepal-India border. Coming on top of their other differences, the CPI (Maoist) found Prachanda’s call for it to follow the CPN(M) route “even more surprising”, and it formally objected. The CPN(M) responded one week later, asking their comrades to understand the difference between “theoretical-political” and “diplomatic” expressions and proposing a bilateral meeting for detailed discussion. But in a further letter, the CPI (Maoist) complained that the Nepali Maoists should have offered a public self-criticism over their “negative” and “provocative” comments on their Indian comrades.
CCOMPOSA’s August 2006 fourth conference, held in Nepal, offered a chance for Indian and Nepali Maoists to talk over their differences. The Indian Maoists admitted that their spokesman Azad had spoken “too much” in public interviews without consulting his Nepali comrades. In an attempt to rein in the embarrassingly public war of words, the parties issued a joint press statement affirming that “all tactical questions … being adopted in the respective countries are the sole concern of the parties operating there.…We shall continue debates on ideological, political and strategic issues on which we differ in the true democratic traditions of the international communist movement. These debates and discussions will take place bilaterally and, occasionally, publicly.”
During the bilateral meetings, Indian Maoists frequently suggested the CPN(M) consider two “revolutionary options”. Ideally they should intensify work towards a mass uprising to capture central power. If that is not possible, they should consolidate their base areas and move towards Kathmandu gradually by capturing territory. The CPN(M) rejected both options, arguing that they should first try for peaceful change through the CA and only if that fails revert to mass movement tactics. In their rejection of the classic people’s war strategy and new focus on urban demonstrations coupled with participation in government, the Nepali Maoists have clearly broken with their comrades’ vision. Although they have reached a temporary truce, many of their cross-border colleagues would welcome the failure of the revised strategy and would probably use any setbacks to press for a return to the traditional line.
IV. The End of People’s War?
The Maoists have manoeuvred themselves into a share in government. This has caused consternation among their determined opponents, who complain that they have outwitted the SPA on every front and stand poised for power. However, from the Maoist leaders’ perspective things do not look so rosy. They have had to make major concessions, they worry that they may have wasted the leverage they hoped to gain from their military capacity (by going into cantonments before securing any of their objectives), they fear most other political forces (from the UML through to the NC, the palace and foreign states, including India) are working to stall real change and freeze them out of meaningful power, and they will have a tough job keeping their cadres happy and persuading them they have made the right decisions.
A. The Balance Sheet
1. Gains
In 1996 the Maoists were a small, fringe party with no weapons, few active members and a support base limited to a few pockets of the remote countryside. Their ten-year armed insurgency transformed them into a powerful political force capable of standing alongside, and sometimes overshadowing, Nepal’s major, established parties. Although they have joined a coalition government within the framework of the peace process, they have retained, and partially legitimised, their own armed force while expanding their openings for building urban support. In terms of their original strategy, they are still pursuing the second plan of the people’s war counter-offensive phase and targeting a democratic republic as their immediate goal.
The Maoists point to several achievements from their ten-year, people’s war campaign:
Ending the old system. The major achievement has been requiring all the political forces to accept that the 1990 dispensation was defunct, and a new constitution and system were needed. So far, this victory is largely confined to paper but most major parties have made serious commitments to significant changes. The Maoists believe their movement can take credit for making republicanism a mass demand and for boosting Nepalis’ political consciousness and attention to demands that had previously been sidelined. They see this “progressive awareness” as their greatest strength, not an historical achievement but a basis for future mass mobilisation.
Political and organisational capacity. The CPN(M) has become a broad-based, active and militant organisation. In its nationwide reach, political determination and organisational capacity (not to mention its military base), it probably outshadows all other parties. It has developed into a fairly mature, cadre-based political-military party, with experience of war and open politics. Despite its internal debates, the central committee lays down an unambiguous political line and disseminates it through a well-structured network, from the central commands and regional bureaus down to district, area and cell committees. As a party, it generally enjoys clarity, discipline and dedication, characteristics that could serve it well if it does become a committed, mainstream player.
Armed force. The war’s most visible achievement was the conversion of a rag-tag guerrilla force into the formidable PLA. Although its strength on paper (more than 30,000 troops in seven divisions and over twenty brigades) is exaggerated, its ability to confront a much larger state army has been well demonstrated. The Maoists have placed the PLA in cantonments under the terms of the CPA but organisationally it remains intact and accepting the UN-supervised process has earned it a form of legitimacy.
Parallel governance. As the war progressed, the Maoists became the de facto rulers of most of Nepal. They neither aimed for, nor achieved, unchallenged territorial control but made the most of the state’s absence. In the vacuum left by local government’s collapse or flight, they formed parallel “people’s governments” from central to region, district, village and ward level. Like their “base areas”, these existed more in theory than in practice: it was not such a great sacrifice to dissolve them under the CPA. But the local influence they represented is something the Maoists are determined not to throw away. They continue to pursue the ends of parallel governance through other means, using tools such as regional and ethnic liberation fronts, Young Communist League cadres and the leverage in open politics brought by their entry into government.
The Maoists have also benefited from their transition into mainstream politics. The alliance with the SPA saved them from a potentially sapping stalemate, and their coming above ground after the April 2006 movement helped them consolidate earlier achievements and extend their reach. Apart from their new legitimacy, they have a better chance of addressing some of their chronic shortcomings, such as weak urban penetration and a poor trade union base.
Their five cabinet ministers and six dozen lawmakers give them a foothold in the state alongside other political parties. Although they failed to win control of the most powerful ministries, they carefully selected their consolation prizes, choosing ministries which increase their influence in critical areas: Information and Communications Minister Krishna Bahadur Mahara is now the government spokesperson; having performed the same role for his party, he can make the most of the state-owned media under his control. Local Development Minister Dev Gurung directs the urban, district and village-level bodies that implement development projects and distribute budgets. Forest Minister Matrika Yadav controls a key public resource and oversees the important network of thousands of community forest users groups. Hisila Yami is in charge of housing and physical planning, while Khadga Bahadur Biswakarma oversees NGOs and INGOs – both positions which offer significant influence.
2. But no revolution
Despite these achievements, the Maoists have been forced into serious concessions. A critique from a classical communist perspective suggests they have submitted to mainstream politics without making substantial gains. They have gone back on their original boast that they would capture central power single-handedly, and they have not even secured a leading position among the political forces after the April 2006 mass movement. As the “eighth party”, they are only one partner among many in the interim legislature and in a government headed by a non-communist prime minister. Maoist leaders acknowledge they have been forced into significant compromises.
They ended their war without securing either their short-term objective of an all-party roundtable or their longer-term goal of a republic. Instead of moving quickly into government, they lost months and used up much bargaining power haggling over the terms of their entry into the interim government. The interim constitution is similarly silent on many of their major aims – although it includes promises for land reform, it does not address the higher priorities of federalism and a restructured military.
Maoist leaders could earlier boast to their followers that their “new regime” had forced the “old regime” into negotiations but however much they seek to retain independent local influence, their assimilation into the state is slowly undermining their former independence. Their “people’s governments” and “people’s courts” (which were popular with many for producing rough but quick justice) have gone; in their place the Maoists have to justify efforts to reform the “old” bureaucracy, judiciary and security forces from within.
The Maoists’ original plan, reflected in the November 2005 agreement with the mainstream parties, was that their PLA and the state’s army would be of equal status and equally subject to UN supervision. However, they have had to accept that the arms management process is primarily targeted at their forces: most of the old RNA (now known as just the NA) is not under supervision, nor has its monopoly on providing security to the state been challenged. Maoist ministers have accepted army bodyguards – a welcome sign of growing confidence but also a sign of their weakness at the negotiating table. Similarly, they did not secure the dominant role in government they had hoped for. There had been a private agreement with the SPA that they would be offered the deputy prime ministership. In the end, they were forced to be satisfied with relatively junior ministries, while NC and UML dominated the major positions. (There is some advantage in this marginal participation in government: should the interim administration become unpopular, the Maoists will find it easier to escape the blame for its failures.)
According to Prachanda, their “revolution” is at a half-way point: they have achieved almost 60 per cent of their goals; the remaining 40 per cent will be come in the near future with election of the CA. If a republican system is not established, however, it will be hard for the Maoists to prove the decade of violence was worthwhile.
B. New Roadmap(s)
For the Maoists, the current interim period is a transitional phase to destroy the “old mechanism” and to build a new state structure through the CA constitution-making process. If this succeeds, they will declare the “peaceful revolution” a victory for their new strategy. But if the process is derailed, they will try to lead a more traditional “revolution” in the form of a mass insurrection. The one option that is not on the table is a return to full-scale insurgency. While the Maoists retain the capacity to go back to war (and could easily retrieve their weapons from UN supervision if they chose), few leaders want a return to the unproductive military stalemate they have already experienced. Most would prefer to have their cake and to eat it: to keep a foothold in government and enjoy the benefits of open politics and better relations with other forces, while also using the weapon of street pressure. This balance is difficult to envisage in theory and may be even harder to achieve in practice.
The Maoists had hoped that the April 2006 movement would establish a democratic republic immediately, leaving the CA for later, but the restoration of the old parliament blocked this plan. To this extent, the push to establish a democratic republic through the CA is already a fallback option. The tension between negotiation and insurrection has been a feature of all policy debates within the CPN(M) since April 2006. One month after the mass movement, the central committee approved two alternative tactical plans: peace talks or revolt. They formulated a ten-point roadmap for peace talks but also drew up a rough plan for mass insurrection named, with a nod to Lenin, the “April thesis”. The talks roadmap was published; the thesis was a (not very well kept) secret.
Initially, the first option appeared to be working. Confident the CA would vote for a republic, the Maoists restructured their party organisation to focus on electoral constituencies. They believe they can be a strong force at the ballot box: they are a fresh face compared to the mainstream parties, have a popular agenda and an established organisational base. Prachanda has estimated they could win an outright majority. But when the peace talks lost momentum after the June 2006 eight-point agreement, another central committee meeting concluded that preparation for revolt should take priority over negotiations. The leadership managed to hold the line when the peace process again moved forward but the alternative plan for revolt is alive and well, with some of its committed supporters increasingly restive.
Whether through a peaceful constitutional process or insurrection, the Maoists are still committed to developing a new, Nepali revolutionary model and justifying their strategy in terms of their ideology. They hope to claim credit for the first successful communist revolution since the collapse of twentieth century communism and to export their “new ideology” around the world. They see a clear distinction between their commitment to respect political pluralism and the need to remodel their party on mainstream democratic lines. Despite building more cooperative relations with other parties, the Maoists have shown no interest in emulating their structure or way of working, which they still condemn as feudal and bourgeois. However much they have shifted strategy, they intend to retain ideological purity and will resist diluting their political culture.
C. A Phased Revolution
The Maoists’ first goal is a democratic republic which provides space to restructure the state and move towards a people’s republic. With the establishment of a republic, they would focus on merging the NA and PLA into a new national army and implementing federalism. (Some of these goals have influenced the interim constitution, which in effect suspended the monarchy and moved away from defining Nepal as a unitary state.) Maoist leaders are confident that a democratic republican structure would help them to consolidate a powerful position. They believe they could secure the post of head of the state for themselves or an allied party; they could play to their strengths in addressing class, caste, region and gender-based issues; they could implement a federal system in line with their longstanding proposal; and they could ensure that a reformed national army would either be loyal to them or at least neutralised as a threat.
According to the Maoists’ analysis, this would put them in a dominant position within the multiparty system. They could then try to form a people’s republic, a Nepali version of Mao’s “new democracy”, preferably by amending the constitution or using other peaceful means, although they suspect some confrontation would be likely. Under this system political competition would be much more restricted (see above); the Maoists would then aim to replace the “feudal production system” with their own type of “capitalist production system”. This would entail distributing the land of large landlords among the landless poor and nationalising industries owned by the “comprador bureaucratic capitalist classes”.
According to the DDTC plan, one section of the party leadership will go into government “to control, monitor and intervene” in the state while others will be responsible for party functioning. These groups may periodically rotate but the core leadership, including Prachanda, Baburam Bhattarai, Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal) and Mohan Baidya (Kiran), would avoid involvement in day-to-day government, instead instructing and monitoring the junior leaders whom they would deputise for the task. Nevertheless, Prachanda has not categorically ruled out the possibility of himself or other senior leaders going into government if needed.
Like other parties, the Maoists promise a “new Nepal”. In Prachanda’s words, “with good government we can become one of the richest countries in South Asia. But we need transport, hi-tech and scientific projects, infrastructures, and a lot of courage. In ten years we’ll change the whole scenario, rebuilding this country to prosperity. In twenty years we could be similar to Switzerland”. The Maoists have outlined their development priorities as: (i) improving transportation with an east-west railway line and a new east-west highway through the hill districts, with north-south links to the existing highway across the plains; (ii) boosting electricity generation with a mix of small hydro-power projects and larger schemes funded by “anti-imperialist foreign investment”; and (iii) replacing private education with a free, state education system and expanding free health care. Maoists leaders say they believe in a mixed economy and will invite foreign investment under certain conditions.
D. Leaders of the Radical Left?
Despite their quarrels, Nepal’s Maoists do not want to isolate themselves from their international allies. Rather, they want to pursue an ambitious goal of leading like-minded radical groups around the world, an objective they made clear from the beginning: “The Nepalese revolution is an integral part of the world proletarian revolution, and this will serve the world revolution. In this conext our Party takes it as a serious responsibility to contribute towards the further development of RIM…and to create a New International”. This is one goal that they have not dropped: Maoist leaders now talk about establishing a “Fourth International” from Nepal.
In their quest to assume supremacy among revolutionary parties, they are considering two options. The first is to take over RIM’s leadership. They argue that this leadership should be from the “third world”, rather than being dominated by radical Western intellectuals, who have few followers and no effective organisations but still give instructions to those who are leading genuine armed struggles. They are particularly frustrated with the American Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP), which projects its chairman, Bob Avakian, as Mao’s successor though he has no real experience of revolution. The Nepali Maoists think that RIM should be based in South Asia and that Prachanda has earned the right to lead it.
If they cannot win over RIM members with this argument, the CPN(M) may form a new organisation. With this goal in mind, it organised a five-day international seminar on “Imperialism and Proletarian Revolution in the 21st Century” in late December 2006. It was billed as part of the Nepali people’s war tenth anniversary celebrations, and it drew more than three dozen representatives from fourteen Maoist parties – perhaps the most significant gathering since the formation of RIM in 1984. Nepali and Indian Maoists presented two concept papers, and the Nepali Maoists tried to present themselves as the leaders of the international communist movement.
In December 2006, Nepali Maoists also hosted RIM’s sixth South Asian regional conference, with seven member parties participating. The other parties expressed many reservations over the CPN(M)’s “revolutionary experiment”. Still, they agreed to pursue their ideological struggle in private and to launch a “Nepal campaign” across South Asia to support Nepal’s Maoist movement. One problem was that the CPI (Maoist) is not a RIM member and was not at the meeting. Although CCOMPOSA is only a regional grouping, the fact that it includes the CPI (Maoist) makes it more important to the Nepali Maoists than the global RIM. Only if they win support from South Asian Maoists parties, including the CPI (Maoist), can they build an effective international network. None of these difficulties has dulled the Maoists’ ambition. Prachanda declares that, “even if we are a small country in South Asia, we think that our revolution can have impact all over the world”.
V. Cooperation, Contention and Confrontation
While Maoist strategy documents attempt to bring coherence to their new situation, CPN(M) leaders face a complex task of balancing competing imperatives and pursuing sometimes conflicting tactics. Their headline policy is one of cooperation: maintaining the overall unity of the eight-party interim government and crafting a stronger alliance of leftist/republican forces. They have to maintain unity and discipline within their movement while managing the reshaping of their domestic and international relations. At the same time their private – and increasingly public – assessment is that the peace process will inevitably bring further confrontations, for which they are preparing.
A. The Maoists on the Threshold of Respectability
The Maoists are slowly becoming part of the establishment in three areas:
In parliament. Maoist members of the interim legislature are showing signs of learning how to play by the rules but are not yet ready to follow all of them. They took a constructive role in various debates and have supported amending the interim constitution to introduce federalism and revise the electoral system. Maoist lawmakers have a good attendance record; some have been appointed to cross-party committees. They have quickly adopted the usual parliamentary tactics – such as forcing adjournments or resorting to more dramatic protests to stall proceedings – and have pointed out that they are receiving training on proper parliamentary behaviour. Still, taking part in the legislature is not the same as embracing democratic principles. Among the more dramatic departures from basic standards, one Maoist lawmaker claimed to have brought a gun into the house and threatened his opponents. Top leaders such as Prachanda and Bhattarai have not joined the interim legislature, leaving some to question their commitment to the parliamentary system.
In government. The Maoists joined the interim government on 1 April 2007. Their ministers are behaving much like their counterparts from other parties, fulfilling their day-to-day duties while pushing their own agenda. Their relationship with a fairly conservative bureaucracy is not straightforward; they have asked permission to transfer senior civil servants and to replace some with political appointees. Apart from appointing sympathetic journalists as advisers, Information Minister Mahara has reportedly told the state-owned media to highlight Maoist leaders’ statements. All these trends are in keeping with patterns established by successive democratic governments, and the Maoists have been similarly pragmatic when forced to accept policies they instinctively dislike. Once in power, Mahara rapidly reversed his opposition to foreign investment in the media; Hisila Yami backed public-private partnerships for water supply. While Maoist ministers have clashed with their cabinet colleagues, the top leadership has tried to patch up misunderstandings.
In dealing with the international community. The Maoists have managed to win a degree of international recognition – something that was always denied to them while underground. Maoist ministers regularly meet ambassadors and donors, most of whom have continued to support Maoist-run ministries, and have had some high-profile encounters with visiting dignitaries. Their engagement with the UN has made it easier for other countries to stop considering them as untouchables, although the U.S. still considers them terrorists and does not deal with them. A British minister who met Maoist leaders Bhattarai and Mahara was impressed by their willingness to engage with the outside world but stressed that encouragement of their role in the peace process will always be accompanied by strong messages on abandoning violence. International actors who have pressed for action on human rights are dismayed by Maoist failure to implement many of their commitments, from demobilising underage soldiers and enabling the safe return of internally displaced people to guaranteeing fundamental rights such as press freedom.
B. A United Left?
The Maoists and mainstream leftist parties share some common policies and may agree to a tactical alliance, especially if the NC reunites and also draws on the support of smaller parties to form a more powerful conservative bloc. But there is still an ideological gulf between the Maoists and the UML, and each party is determined to assert itself as the leader of a broader leftist front. The Maoists have used the structure of the peace process – in which they and NC are the decision-making core – to weaken the UML’s position. Internal politics will play a role in determining whether a working understanding can be reached: both parties have factions for and against an alliance.
The case for a working alliance appears to be strong. Leftist parties can unite around the republican agenda (though some are more fervent believers than others, and there are differences over how to achieve the republic), make a stronger stand within the legislature and government against what they see as NC heel-dragging, and maximise the left’s potential at the ballot box as and when elections go ahead. Leaders of both parties stress that outright unification is impossible but a form of united front could be built.
Private feelers have given way to more public consideration of options. On 22 April 2007 (Lenin’s birthday and the 57th anniversary of the original Communist Party of Nepal’s establishment) the Maoists hosted a cross-party leftist leaders’ gathering in Kathmandu. Most speakers wanted “to cement the absolute majority commanded by the communist forces in the parliament, the cabinet and the street”. Baburam Bhattarai said: “Let us fuse the ideologies espoused by late Pushpa Lal, late Madan Bhandari and Prachanda”. Prachanda and UML General Secretary Madhav Kumar Nepal held a follow-up meeting in which, according to Prachanda, they agreed to form a left republican alliance.
This process will probably gain momentum if an election date is announced. Both the CPN(M) and UML fear that ongoing rivalry within the left could damage their individual election prospects. The Maoists, who lack an established voter base, may see advantage in a seat-sharing arrangement to avoid competing against the UML in most of the first-past-the-post constituencies. The UML might trade this off in return for assurances of support in the proportional part of the vote.
Both Maoists and UML leaders have warned that anti-communists want to prevent the polls. In Madhav Nepal’s words, “reactionaries are trying to disrupt the forthcoming CA elections as they fear a communist majority in the CA”. In fact, the various communist parties already command a majority in both the legislature and the cabinet but have been unable to leverage this due to their own internal differences. This is unsurprising given the Maoists’ outlook: their engagement with the UML and India’s CPM is at heart contingent and instrumental. They have pressed ahead where they have seen advantage in the relationship but their priority remains to push for more radical change than mainstream communists can stomach.
C. Transitional Tensions
The Maoists remain a fairly cohesive movement and are sticking to the framework of the peace process as their preferred route forward. However, their current unity and commitment to a peaceful compromise cannot be taken for granted. If the elections do not take place and a republic is not established by other means, they will revert to insurrectionary tactics. If neither route is successful, they will face serious internal tensions. As outlined above, the Maoists arrived at their current strategy after much debate; individuals and groups opposed to the policy of “peaceful revolution” will be quick to seize upon any serious stumbles.
Since October 2005 the CPN(M) has followed Baburam Bhattarai’s political line and Prachanda’s leadership; both top figures will have tough questions to answer if they fail to deliver. The untested CA hypothesis – which had been sold to sceptics as “an experiment in revolution” – came under attack in the April 2007 central committee meeting. Netra Bikram Chand (Biplov), a younger generation leader who represents the Maoist stronghold of Rolpa and is currently in charge of the far-western command, won majority support for a new line which rejected the basis of the peace process. In his words:
We have been constantly raising three demands: the restructuring of the state, constituent assembly elections and a federal democratic republic.…But in a way we have ended up sacrificing and undermining the basic concept and achievements of our ten-year people’s war for the sake of these tactical objectives. Sadly it is now clear that following America and India’s plan, Girija Prasad and the dalal tendency are using our own weakness and sacrifices as weapons to advance their conspiracy to finish us off and scupper the restructuring of the state, constituent assembly elections and federal democratic republic.
Bhattarai opposed targeting India but accepted the party decision. While the new line was officially set by Prachanda, key elements were based on Biplov’s arguments and senior leader Mohan Vaidya’s advice. Their and Bhattarai’s perspectives are quite far apart but Prachanda is attempting a middle path between them. The CPN(M) has always contained some factions and lobbies but they were largely invisible during its underground days. Some groups are based on loyalties that predate the party’s formation, some coalesce around ideological positions; there are also occasional personality clashes and rivalry between leaders, most of whom have their own coteries.
Still, there is little likelihood of an imminent split or, despite the aggressive language of certain lobbies, a return to all-out war. The ever more public display of doubts over the peace process may make Prachanda look weak but may also strengthen his hand in negotiations with the other parties – he can credibly point to the difficulty of selling the process to cadres that are becoming restive at the loss of momentum. Commanders still have control over PLA fighters but must assuage their dissatisfaction on two fronts: they are suffering from the cantonments’ poor physical infrastructure, and some are starting to wonder if the party leadership will be able to deliver a satisfactory settlement, including a genuine merger of the PLA and NA. Discipline problems appear to be growing, from lower level cadres’ disrespect of party decisions to unauthorised extortion and intimidation; a central monitoring committee led by Mohan Vaidya recommended that the party take steps to reestablish discipline.
D. Clashes to Come
Maoist leaders believe that further political confrontation is inevitable, whether they follow the CA route or opt for revolt. In their view, the king, sections of the army and other royalist elements will try to obstruct the CA and may go so far as attempting a coup to halt the process. (The Maoists would counter this by mobilising a mass movement and making their own bid to seize power.) As always, they see deliberate polarisation as one of the best means of moving the political process forward. If their efforts to encourage a sharper polarisation between leftist and conservative political forces are successful, this may heighten the likelihood of confrontation. There are four areas where clashes are likely.
Nepali Congress. The complex relationship between the Maoist leadership and Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala (who leads the NC) lies at the heart of the peace process. On one level they have built a successful working partnership: the CPN(M) and NC have been the drivers of the peace process and the key arbiters of disputes during the negotiations, often to the exclusion of other parties. The Maoists have devoted serious attention to studying Koirala’s character and political behaviour and have exploited the fact that he relies more on personal confidants than party or government structures. Prachanda and Bhattarai have won a degree of trust with Koirala and his main gatekeepers, and this has served them well. But both sides know that their relationship is fundamentally antagonistic: they share an interest in marginalising other political players only so that there is a less crowded arena for their future showdown.
This subtle relationship plays out in a strange, but not illogical, mix of cooperation and frontal assault. Each party needs the other but it also needs to keep up a barrage of charge and counter-charge, partly to shift the blame for delays in the process and partly to manoeuvre on more substantive issues. When Koirala needled the Maoists by saying he was bringing “terrorists” to the mainstream, Prachanda retorted: “Wait and see. The coming days will show who brought whom”. Their main policy difference is over the monarchy. If the elections are delayed, the Maoists want the interim legislature to declare a republic; Koirala has generally advocated a ceremonial monarchy (while suggesting Gyanendra abdicate in favour of his grandson, Hridayendra), although if he felt the country were irrevocably heading towards republicanism, he would want to position the NC at the forefront of any change.
Other more immediate issues have already led to friction and could cause escalating tension. These include the lack of action on the Rayamajhi commission report; failure to investigate disappearances; and the lack of interest in implementing key elements of the CPA, from land reform to army restructuring. Soon after joining the interim government, the Maoists upped the ante. They accused Koirala of deliberately delaying the constitutional process, and the April 2007 central committee meeting decided to target him from all fronts – the street, parliament and government. Maoist MPs started disrupting legislature sessions and their ministers boycotted the 18 April cabinet meeting.
If there is agreement on dealing with the monarchy, the confrontation with Congress may be postponed or even avoided. For all their public griping, the Maoists have generally been happy to support Koirala as prime minister – not least because he is likely to bequeath the NC a messy succession struggle, which they hope to exploit. Still, both parties recognise that their visions of a future Nepal and its political institutions are very different. There will have to be a battle over the direction the country takes and they are determined to lead the opposing forces in it.
The monarchy. Despite their past dalliance with the palace, ending the monarchy is a core issue for the Maoists. They have always assumed that a transition towards a republic could only come about through a decisive final confrontation. The November 2005 Chunbang meeting concluded that “the party should never, and will never, fall prey to the fantasy that monarchy can be easily ended through the CA and a republic will appear just like that”. This conclusion has not changed. According to Maoist leader Badal, they have only destroyed the enemy’s outer periphery; the inner circle (i.e., the monarchy) is yet to break.
The king has been quiet but not passive. In the face of cuts to his status and privileges, he has dug in his heels with a mix of truculence and defiance. When the government brought the royal palace service under the civil service and ordered the dismissal of key officials, Gyanendra extended their tenure and promoted them. He refused to answer the Rayamajhi Commission’s queries about his role in suppressing the April 2006 movement and justified his 2005 coup in a “democracy day message” on 19 February 2007. On the anniversary of his surrender of power, he made a very public, army-escorted temple visit, received a 21-gun salute from the NA and had the old, abolished, national anthem played – none of which seemed in keeping with the letter or spirit of the interim constitution. Gyanendra still has some support from small political parties, a few international sympathisers, a section of the army and his 3,000-strong palace guard.
The Nepalese Army. There is likely to be increased friction with the NA over its unwillingness to countenance substantive reform and continuing resistance to democratic control. The army’s traditional loyalty to the palace has theoretically been severed, and some generals say they have no desire to burn their fingers by serving the king’s ambitions once again. Still, they will take “strong steps” to protect their institutional interests, which could extend to stepping in if the country faces serious instability. They will also hold out against merging Maoist fighters into a reformed force, citing reasons of professionalism and political neutrality but privately determined that as a militarily undefeated force, they should not have unpalatable reforms imposed on them.
Resolving these questions will be difficult even if a republic is smoothly established. The Maoists’ and army’s mutual distrust is understandable: each has good reason to question the other’s intentions. Maoists leaders fear a serious attempt at army restructuring could prompt an army revolt backed by foreign powers opposed to the emergence of the radical left. The army suspects that Maoist talk of merging the two forces is thin cover for a plan to take it over from within and disable the last bulwark against full Maoist control. The only peaceful way out of this deadlock is a process of security sector reform that leaves the army less likely to play politics but also prevents the security forces becoming the tools of any one political grouping. Unfortunately, no mainstream party is interested in pursuing this agenda. The timid are still too scared of the army to demand action; the confident are too tempted by the idea of trying to turn it into their own instrument.
India. Nepal’s most influential neighbour prompts deep ambivalence among the Maoists. India looked favourably on them in the early years of the insurgency, and they long saw it as a fairly safe refuge. But as Delhi adopted a tougher line, the Maoists in turn played on latent anti-Indian sentiment among their supporters. They accepted Indian facilitation of the November 2005 deal with the SPA partly out of necessity and partly on the understanding that Delhi would drop its longstanding support for constitutional monarchy. The Maoists did not imagine India would remain sympathetic indefinitely, so they planned to keep it at arms length until a republic was established and then review relations. For a year after the April 2006 movement, they behaved cautiously and diplomatically, reining in anti-Indian rhetoric and recognising the need for constructive engagement.
However, the strains are showing. The 2007 central committee meeting concluded that India had not dropped its twin-pillar policy and was trying to preserve a ceremonial monarchy. The Maoists also allege that Indian intelligence agencies are waging a covert war against them through regional armed groups such as the Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha. This has led to a slight backtracking: the Maoists have decided to give priority to “nationality” alongside republicanism, implying that they once again see Delhi as a serious threat to the nation. Their leaders say they will only restore warmer relations if India supports republicanism. They are aware that they cannot afford to anger their neighbour, that “no government can survive here without some support from New Delhi”. Nevertheless, this relationship will experience further tensions.
United Nations. The Maoists called early and consistently for UN involvement in a peace process. However, they have always been suspicious of the UN (tending to view it as subordinate to Western/imperialist interests) and sought its engagement for a clearly limited function. They realised that bringing in the UN could help them effect the transition into open politics safely and with recognition, especially for the PLA. But if the UN-led arms management process cannot deliver a deal on the longer term merging of their fighters into a new national army, there will be further criticism of the original decision. Prachanda has followed the example of other Maoist leaders in publicly criticising the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ian Martin. Although plenty of politicians from other parties have also been happy to use the UN as a convenient scapegoat, the Maoists are willing to stall a key element of the arms process – the verification of their combatants – to demand faster progress from other parties and to remind the international community that they do not feel obliged to fulfil their part of the deal if others hold back on their own commitments.
E. Plan B
The Maoists have from the outset warned that they will keep other revolutionary options open if the peace process fails. Such warnings are partly bravado and brinkmanship (for example, the “October revolution” that they threatened in 2006 was never a realistic option) but also reflect serious fallback plans. Maoist strategists are having second thoughts about the constituent assembly: they fear that delays may strengthen the palace’s hand and that even if the CA declares a republic, the king will not accept its decision without a fight.
Prachanda has long threatened revolt if the elections are not held on time; when a delay became inevitable, Maoist leaders made a show of blaming Prime Minister Koirala’s “grand conspiracy”. Prachanda announced the end of unity with the SPA and warned that agreement on declaring a republic through the interim legislature can be the only base for its renewal. The April 2007 central committee meeting also approved a plan to launch a mass movement, suggesting the start of more serious confrontation. Initially, the Maoists are collecting signatures for a republican petition but they also have plans to surround Singha Durbar, the seat of government, to take their protest to the top. The first goal is to pressure Prime Minister Koirala into concessions; failing this they will experiment with their mass movement plan.
The Maoists, like most other parties, were rarely as enthusiastic about the elections in private as they made out in public. They were neither convinced the CA could deliver revolutionary change nor as sure of their electoral prospects as they would have liked. The delay in the polls is a convenient opportunity to push for more rapid change and to placate growing unrest in their party.
The likelihood of a further confrontation was the main rationale for reorganisation of the Maoists’ militant wing, the Young Communist League (YCL). The YCL was first formed in the early 1990s, during the initial preparations for people’s war. It was then converted into the guerrilla squads which were the forerunners of the PLA and in December 2006 relaunched by the CPN(M)’s December 2006 central committee meeting. Although its members are largely unarmed youths, in keeping with its military origins it is led by PLA commanders who did not go into the cantonments. Former PLA fourth division commander Rashmi (Ganeshman Pun of Rukum) is the chairman of its 25-member central committee.
Semi-underground YCL committees have been formed from central to regional, district and village level. Groups of members are based in Kathmandu and other urban areas, while former militia members make up the bulk of its presence in villages. NC leader Sujata Koirala (the prime minister’s daughter) has alleged that the YCL is training its cadres in “booth capturing” for the CA election. YCL units have been openly carrying out extra-legal activities in Kathmandu like a parallel police force; in April 2007 the state police started to take action against them but it is not clear if this will significantly limit their capacity. Some of their actions are calculated to win sympathy (they have helped with traffic management, embarked on city clean-up campaigns and seized illegally imported goods to hand over to the police) but this only adds to the consternation of mainstream parties, who fear the combination of populism backed by intimidation.
In case of a violent confrontation, the YCL will be mobilised as the Maoists’ primary frontline force but the PLA is also standing by in reserve. Prachanda has said, “if reactionaries take action against the consensus, then a revolt will take place in Nepal and we will lead it. There will be no alternative but for the PLA to come out of the cantonments to join the revolt alongside millions of people”. Although most of their fighters and weapons are confined in the UN-supervised cantonments, Maoists leaders view this arrangement as valid only for enabling the CA elections. If the process falls apart, they will readily consider remobilising the PLA and calling it out with its weapons. Frequent demonstrations by cantoned PLA troops outside their camps are meant to remind their political rivals that they still have other options and may not be afraid to use them.
VI. Conclusion
Nepal’s Maoists have been driven by ideological purism but managed to sustain their long insurgency and enter a peace process thanks to their pragmatism. The tension between these opposing impulses lies at the heart of their evolving approach to strategy and tactics. Their commitment to the peace process is not hollow but it is conditional: progress (which, for them, would have to include some radical reforms) would strengthen the hand of more moderate leaders who have argued the case for compromise. If the process stalls, those who prefer a return to confrontation will feel emboldened – as will those who are still hoping the peace deal will fall apart.
Kathmandu/Brussels, 18 May 2007APPENDIX A
MAP OF nepal
APPENDIX B
Glossary of Acronyms
CA constituent assembly
CCOMPOSA Coordinating Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPI (Maoist) Communist Party of India (Maoist)
CPI-ML (Liberation) Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (Liberation)
CPI-ML(PW) Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist (People’s War)
CPM Communist Party of India (Marxist)
CPN(M) Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)
CPN (Unity Centre) Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre)
DDTC Development of Democracy in the Twenty-first Century
MCC-I Maoist Communist Centre of India
NA/RNA (Royal) Nepalese Army
NC Nepali Congress
NC(D) Nepali Congress (Democratic)
NSP(A) Nepal Sadbhavana Party (Anandidevi)
NWPP Nepal Workers and Peasants’ Party
PLA People’s Liberation Army (Maoist)
PWG People’s War Group, see CPI-ML(PW)
RIM Revolutionary Internationalist Movement
SPA Seven-Party Alliance
ULF United Left Front
UML Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist)
URPC United Revolutionary People’s Council
WPRM World People’s Resistance Movement
YCL Young Communist League
appendix c
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
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May 2007
Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org
APPENDIX d
INTERNATIONAL Crisis Group REPORTS AND BRIEFINGs on asia since 2004
CENTRAL ASIA
The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan: Ways Forward for the International Community, Asia Report N°76, 11 March 2004 (also available in Russian)
Tajikistan’s Politics: Confrontation or Consolidation?, Asia Briefing Nº33, 19 May 2004
Political Transition in Kyrgyzstan: Problems and Prospects, Asia Report N°81, 11 August 2004 (also available in Russian)
Repression and Regression in Turkmenistan: A New International Strategy, Asia Report N°85, 4 November 2004 (also available in Russian)
The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia’s Destructive Monoculture, Asia Report N°93, 28 February 2005 (also available in Russian)
Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution, Asia Report N°97, 4 May 2005 (also available in Russian)
Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising, Asia Briefing N°38, 25 May 2005 (also available in Russian)
Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State, Asia Report N°109, 16 December 2005 (also available in Russian)
Uzbekistan: In for the Long Haul, Asia Briefing N°45, 16 February 2006
Central Asia: What Role for the European Union?, Asia Report N°113, 10 April 2006
Kyrgyzstan’s Prison System Nightmare, Asia Report N°118, 16 August 2006 (also available in Russian)
Uzbekistan: Europe’s Sanctions Matter, Asia Briefing N°54, 6 November 2006
Kyrgyzstan on the Edge, Asia Briefing N°55, 9 November 2006
Turkmenistan after Niyazov, Asia Briefing N°60, 12 February 2007
NORTH EAST ASIA
Taiwan Strait IV: How an Ultimate Political Settlement Might Look, Asia Report N°75, 26 February 2004
North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks?, Asia Report N°87, 15 November 2004 (also available in Korean and in Russian)
Korea Backgrounder: How the South Views its Brother from Another Planet, Asia Report N°89, 14 December 2004 (also available in Korean and in Russian)
North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?, Asia Report N°96, 25 April 2005 (also available in Korean and in Russian)
Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention, Asia Report Nº100, 27 June 2005 (also available in Korean)
China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente, Asia Briefing N°42, 21 September 2005
North East Asia’s Undercurrents of Conflict, Asia Report N°108, 15 December 2005 (also available in Korean and in Russian)
China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?, Asia Report N°112, 1 February 2006 (also available in Korean)
After North Korea’s Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks Dead?, Asia Briefing N°52, 9 August 2006 (also available in Korean and in Russian)
Perilous Journeys: The Plight of North Koreans in China and Beyond, Asia Report N°122, 26 October 2006 (also available in Korean and Russian)
North Korea’s Nuclear Test: The Fallout, Asia Briefing N°56, 13 November 2006 2005 (also available in Korean and in Russian)
After the North Korean Nuclear Breakthrough: Compliance or Confrontation?, Asia Briefing N°62, 30 April 2007
SOUTH ASIA
Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle Extremism, Asia Report N°73, 16 January 2004
Nepal: Dangerous Plans for Village Militias, Asia Briefing Nº30, 17 February 2004 (also available in Nepali)
Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?, Asia Report N°77, 22 March 2004
Elections and Security in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing Nº31, 30 March 2004
India/Pakistan Relations and Kashmir: Steps toward Peace, Asia Report Nº79, 24 June 2004
Pakistan: Reforming the Education Sector, Asia Report N°84, 7 October 2004
Building Judicial Independence in Pakistan, Asia Report N°86, 10 November 2004
Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections, Asia Report N°88, 23 November 2004
Nepal’s Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation Worse, Asia Report N°91, 9 February 2005
Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track, Asia Briefing N°35, 23 February 2005
Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, Asia Briefing N°35, 24 February 2005
Nepal: Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, Asia Report N°94, 24 March 2005
The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, Asia Report N°95, 18 April 2005
Political Parties in Afghanistan, Asia Briefing N°39, 2 June 2005
Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues, Asia Report N°99, 15 June 2005
Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?, Asia Report N°101, 21 July 2005
Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, Asia Briefing N°41, 15 September 2005
Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan¸ Asia Report N°102, 28 September 2005
Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy, Asia Report N°104, 27 October 2005
Pakistan’s Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule, Asia Briefing N°43, 22 November 2005
Nepal’s New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, Asia Report 106, 28 November 2005
Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union’s Role, Asia Report N°107, 30 November 2005
Nepal: Electing Chaos, Asia Report N°111, 31 January 2006
Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, Asia Briefing N°46, 15 March 2006
Nepal’s Crisis: Mobilising International Influence, Asia Briefing N°49, 19 April 2006
Nepal: From People Power to Peace?, Asia Report N°115, 10 May 2006
Afghanistan’s New Legislature: Making Democracy Work, Asia Report N°116, 15 May 2006
India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Stabilising a Cold Peace, Asia Briefing N°51, 15 June 2006
Pakistan: the Worsening Conflict in Balochistan, Asia Report N°119, 14 September 2006
Bangladesh Today, Asia Report N°121, 23 October 2006
Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes, Asia Report N°123, 2 November 2006
Sri Lanka: The Failure of the Peace Process, Asia Report N°124, 28 November 2006
Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants, Asia Report N°125, 11 December 2006
Nepal’s Peace Agreement: Making it Work, Asia Report Nº126, 15 December 2006
Afghanistan’s Endangered Compact, Asia Briefing Nº59, 29 January 2007 (also available in French)
Nepal’s Constitutional Process, Asia Report N°128, 26 February 2007
Pakistan: Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism, Asia Report N°130, 29 March 2007
Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, Asia Report N°131, 2 April 2007
SOUTH EAST ASIA
Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi, Asia Report N°74, 3 February 2004
Myanmar: Sanctions, Engagement or Another Way Forward?, Asia Report N°78, 26 April 2004
Indonesia: Violence Erupts Again in Ambon, Asia Briefing N°32, 17 May 2004
Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process, Asia Report N°80, 13 July 2004 (also available in Indonesian)
Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas, Asia Report N°82, 9 September 2004
Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix, Asia Report N°83, 13 September 2004
Burma/Myanmar: Update on HIV/AIDS policy, Asia Briefing Nº34, 16 December 2004
Indonesia: Rethinking Internal Security Strategy, Asia Report N°90, 20 December 2004
Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing, Asia Report N°92, 22 February 2005 (also available in Indonesian)
Decentralisation and Conflict in Indonesia: The Mamasa Case, Asia Briefing N°37, 3 May 2005
Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad, Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005 (also available in Thai)
Aceh: A New Chance for Peace, Asia Briefing N°40, 15 August 2005
Weakening Indonesia’s Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso, Asia Report N°103, 13 October 2005 (also available in Indonesian)
Thailand’s Emergency Decree: No Solution, Asia Report N°105, 18 November 2005 (also available in Thai)
Aceh: So far, So Good, Asia Update Briefing N°44, 13 December 2005 (also available in Indonesian)
Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts, Asia Report Nº110, 19 December 2005
Papua: The Dangers of Shutting Down Dialogue, Asia Briefing N°47, 23 March 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
Aceh: Now for the Hard Part, Asia Briefing N°48, 29 March 2006
Managing Tensions on the Timor-Leste/Indonesia Border, Asia Briefing N°50, 4 May 2006
Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks, Asia Report N°114, 5 May 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
Islamic Law and Criminal Justice in Aceh, Asia Report N°117, 31 July 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
Papua: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, Asia Briefing N°53, 5 September 2006
Resolving Timor-Leste’s Crisis, Asia Report N°120, 10 October 2006 (also available in Indonesian)
Aceh’s Local Elections: The Role of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), Asia Briefing N°57, 29 November 2006
Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid, Asia Briefing N°58, 8 December 2006
Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge, Asia Report N°127, 24 January 2007
Southern Thailand: The Impact of the Coup, Asia Report N°129, 15 March 2007
Indonesia: How GAM Won in Aceh , Asia Briefing N°61, 21 March 2007
Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah’s Current Status, Asia Briefing N°63, 3 May 2007
OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS
For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on:
Africa
Europe
Latin America and Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
Thematic Issues
CrisisWatch
please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org
APPENDIX e
INTERNATIONAL Crisis Group BOARD of trustees
Co-Chairs
Christopher Patten
Former European Commissioner for External Relations, Governor of Hong Kong and UK Cabinet Minister; Chancellor of Oxford University
Thomas Pickering
Former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Russia, India, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador and Nigeria
President & CEO
Gareth Evans
Former Foreign Minister of Australia
Executive Committee
Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High Commissioner to the UK and Secretary General of the ANC
Maria Livanos Cattaui*
Member of the Board of Directors, Petroplus Holding AG, Switzerland; former Secretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce
Yoichi Funabashi
Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist, The Asahi Shimbun, Japan
Frank Giustra
Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada
Stephen Solarz
Former U.S. Congressman
George Soros
Chairman, Open Society Institute
Pär Stenbäck
Former Foreign Minister of Finland
*Vice-Chair
Morton Abramowitz
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey
Adnan Abu-Odeh
Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King Hussein and Jordan Permanent Representative to the UN
Kenneth Adelman
Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Ersin Arioglu
Member of Parliament, Turkey; Chairman Emeritus, Yapi Merkezi Group
Shlomo Ben-Ami
Former Foreign Minister of Israel
Lakhdar Brahimi
Former Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General and Algerian Foreign Minister
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President
Kim Campbell
Former Prime Minister of Canada; Secretary General, Club of Madrid
Naresh Chandra
Former Indian Cabinet Secretary and Ambassador of India to the U.S.
Joaquim Alberto Chissano
Former President of Mozambique
Victor Chu
Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong
Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Pat Cox
Former President of European Parliament
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Former Foreign Minister of Denmark
Mark Eyskens
Former Prime Minister of Belgium
Joschka Fischer
Former Foreign Minister of Germany
Leslie H. Gelb
President Emeritus of Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Carla Hills
Former Secretary of Housing and U.S. Trade Representative
Lena Hjelm-Wallén
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, Sweden
Swanee Hunt
Chair, The Initiative for Inclusive Security; President, Hunt Alternatives Fund; former Ambassador U.S. to Austria
Anwar Ibrahim
Former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia
Asma Jahangir
UN Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Religion or Belief; Chairperson, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
Nancy Kassebaum Baker
Former U.S. Senator
James V. Kimsey
Founder and Chairman Emeritus of America Online, Inc. (AOL)
Wim Kok
Former Prime Minister of Netherlands
Ricardo Lagos
Former President of Chile
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Novelist and journalist, U.S.
Mark Malloch Brown
Former UN Deputy Secretary-General and Administrator of the UN Development Programme
Ayo Obe
Chair of Steering Committee of World Movement for Democracy, Nigeria
Christine Ockrent
Journalist and author, France
Victor Pinchuk
Founder of Interpipe Scientific and Industrial Production Group
Samantha Power
Author and Professor, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Fidel V. Ramos
Former President of Philippines
Ghassan Salamé
Former Minister, Lebanon; Professor of International Relations, Paris
Douglas Schoen
Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, U.S.
Thorvald Stoltenberg
Former Foreign Minister of Norway
Ernesto Zedillo
Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization
INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY Council
Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises major individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis.
Rita E. Hauser (Chair)
Elliott F. Kulick (Co-Chair)
Marc Abramowitz
Anglo American PLC
APCO Worldwide Inc.
Ed Bachrach
Patrick E. Benzie
Stanley M. Bergman and Edward J. Bergman
BHP Billiton
Harry Bookey and Pamela Bass-Bookey
John Chapman Chester
Chevron
Citigroup
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce
Richard H. Cooper
Credit Suisse
John EharaEquinox Partners
Frontier Strategy Group
Konrad Fischer
Alan Griffiths
Charlotte and Fred Hubbell
Iara Lee & George Gund III Foundation
Sheikh Khaled Juffali
George Kellner
Amed Khan
Shiv Vikram Khemka
Scott J. Lawlor
George Loening
McKinsey & Company
Najib A. Mikati
Donald PelsPT Newmont Pacific Nusantara (Mr. Robert Humberson)
Michael L. Riordan
Tilleke & Gibbins
Baron Guy Ullens de Schooten
VIVATrust
Stanley Weiss
Westfield Group
Don Xia
Yasuyo Yamazaki
Yapi Merkezi Construction and Industry Inc.
Shinji Yazaki
Sunny Yoon
SENIOR ADVISERS
Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding national government executive office) who maintain an association with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time.
Martti Ahtisaari
(Chairman Emeritus)
Diego Arria
Paddy Ashdown
Zainab Bangura
Christoph Bertram
Jorge Castañeda
Alain Destexhe
Marika FahlenStanley Fischer
Malcolm Fraser
Bronislaw Geremek
I.K. Gujral
Max Jakobson
Todung Mulya Lubis
Allan J. MacEachen
Barbara McDougallMatthew McHugh
George J. Mitchell
(Chairman Emeritus)
Surin Pitsuwan
Cyril Ramaphosa
George Robertson
Michel Rocard
Volker Ruehe
Mohamed SahnounSalim A. Salim
William Taylor
Leo Tindemans
Ed van Thijn
Shirley Williams
Grigory Yavlinski
Uta Zapf
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