Democracy For Nepal: Possible Framework For A Negotiated Resolution

Sunday, February 05, 2006

Possible Framework For A Negotiated Resolution

Possible Framework For A Negotiated Resolution
by Dipta Shah, Paramendra Bhagat

Current Reality: Polarization, Paralysis, Violence, Dysfunction

The unimaginable have happened in Nepal repeatedly over the past decade. After democracy was ushered in 1990, there was a feeling there is no way to go but up. The country was already as poor as can be. But then the Maoist insurgency ignited, and there was a feeling it was going to stay isolated, like Punjab or Kashmir for the larger India, but instead the insurgency swept the country. People did not expect the king to take over and start ruling directly. But he did. The next unimaginable is Nepal as a failed, bankrupt state, with a full fledged civil war, tens of hundreds of thousands migrating to India in a major exodus, direct, vicious, ceaseless military confrontations between the two armies, urban warfare in the streets of Kathmandu, like in Mogadishu, ethnic flareups caused by desperate times, like in Rwanda. These possibilities have to be concretely thought of if only to make concerted efforts to prevent them.

The country is in a major quagmire. The problems are too many. There are too many dimensions to the current conflict for any easy solution to be possible. But attempts have to be made nevertheless.

Nepal's conflictual dynamics are furthered on the premise of radicalization - the "you're with us or with them" mentality. The continued desecration of the middle ground is by far the most important agenda for the extremist actors. Neither reductionist nor revisionist approaches can yield sustainable solutions to Nepal's intrinsic problems.

The Democratic Camp Has To Take The Lead

The democratic camp has to have enough confidence in non-violence, in democracy, in peace, and in rule of law to chart out plans that make any outcome a legitimate possibility. If pursued through nonviolent means, even the role of the monarchy is not exempt from debate. In fact, no one performing in a political capacity should be exempt from criticism. Violence can not be an option. Monarchy is not a bigger problem in Nepal than apartheid was in South Africa. The emphasis on nonviolence will also force the political parties to reinvent themselves to win over the people, for mistakes were made during the 1990s.

Things Fall Apart When The Center Can Not Hold

The polarization is not helping any. The momentum shows things will only get worse.

In situations where this gradual trend towards the "middle" is absent for lengthy periods of time, the reestablishment of equilibrium, though the equilibrium may be modified, becomes paramount. With the Maoist insurgency gravitating towards the extreme left and the royal takeover designed as a counterbalance towards the right, Nepal finds itself in a state of perpetual polarization.

The realization that must be urgently had is that polar trends must be resisted and reversed at all costs. The more this idea of "us" against "them" is allowed to flourish, the more likely confrontation becomes. The more likely confrontation becomes, the more likely extremism will prevail.

It is important that as rational, informed decision makers, we take a moment to understand why trends are the way they are and, more importantly, what we can do collectively to resist aiding in the continuity of these trends. While the prospect of continued suppression of civil liberties, many attempts of which have been rejected and overcome, is unacceptable, so is the prospect of life under those who have demonstrated an affinity to kill to make their point.

Essentially, an outcome cannot be permitted where it's a question of one or the other; the outcome has to be a choice over to what extent extremes will be tolerated on the peripheries of the "center." To accept otherwise, would be akin to aiding the polarity and giving its proponents continued sustenance.

To diminish extremist designs one must modify the question of whether they're "with us" or "without us" into a strategy of how to undermine the extremists' best alternatives to negotiated solutions; the envisioned outcome being a gradual but guaranteed gravitation towards moderation and, by default, away from confrontation.

The desecration of the centrist politics - how it's happening, who it serves and why we should stop it? Why the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth must be told? Deescalation of the conflict - how can we do this? These are the question at hand.

Moving Ahead: Resurrecting The Center

It is for proponents of democracy to be the vanguard in finding a resolution to the conflict so as to usher back normal times of peace and democracy to the country. Possibilities of French revolution like conditions have been discussed in some quarters. But instead the goal has to be to imitate the end of the apartheid era in South Africa. The most radical change is possible through negotiations. Even if the country be on the verge of a revolution, that revolution has to be peaceful. That is the democratic responsibility.

There is an immediate requirement for an integrated approach to deescalating the conflict and to exploring credible, sustainable alternatives to the status quo. There is an implicit understanding that the February 1 takeover, for a variety of reasons that include but are not limited to the current government, has not been successful in producing initially stipulated outcomes, hence the need to explore mutually agreeable alternatives that can be built upon and examined via general scrutiny.

Given the parameters outlined above, the intent of this piece is to revive the notion that ideological differences can and must be navigated, provided the envisioned end goals are identical. In Nepal's case, peaceful coexistence and functional democratic practice are the envisioned, dual end goals. The simultaneous achievement of these outcomes can be realized in incremental, evolutionary terms, provided all parties to the conflict demonstrate flexibility in adapting to their "adversaries'" positions.

In essence, this piece of writing presented is the culmination of hours of dialogue between two individuals whose fundamental appreciation of the dynamics of Nepal's conflict differ. This is also a demonstration that despite ideological differences, a reconciled approach is possible, even desirable, in a situation where end goals are similar.

The distinction between moderate and extremist politics is captured aptly in the definition of these terms. Whereas moderation entails compromise and consensus, extremism implies a radical departure from generally accepted norms and conditions. Granted, no two situations are ubiquitous. Observable trends may be similar or their root causes comparable, but political developments rarely exhibit exact replication. So the argument that special circumstances call for extreme measures holds merit under certain conditions. The most important of these conditions is the realization that while extreme measures may serve short term designs, long term strategies, in order to be viable, must exhibit a discernable retraction toward moderation.

In a haste to diminish one extreme, one cannot afford to discount the consequences of aiding in the victory of another. It should not be forgotten that should one form of extremism be permitted prevail over another, the solution that materializes will be inherently unstable. Although the temptation to focus on the "bogeyman" at the helm is alluring, one must never lose sight of the potential systemic perturbation that will ensure in its absence.

There is no doubt that Nepal is and has been at a critical juncture in its history. Given the heat of the moment, it may be difficult to look beyond the hyped circumstances and polarized views.

A Dose Of Moderation Is Needed

This is not an attempt at eliciting fears to skew opinion. Rather, this is an attempt at delegating accountability by forcing a holistic view beyond the facade of a "quick-fix" to the most transparent issues. Evolutionary changes never strike the sexy dissonance that revolutionary changes hit. This is precisely why moderate positions are more challenging to uphold. Especially now, with the wheels in full motion, it's much easier to chant an extremist line and jump on the bandwagon, so to speak. Getting off the bandwagon to reconsider where and how the intended road to salvation leads, is very difficult indeed.

In today's Nepal there is a clear division between the extreme right and the extreme left. To the benefit of proponents of extremism, what little remained of an arbitrary middle has been completely decimated. This regression is not to be confused with a "shift" in the middle ground or its temporary dislocation. No, this is a situation where left-of-center is interpreted as Maoist territory and right-of-center as monarchist territory. For example, if someone criticizes the parties for their lackluster performance, the critic becomes a qualified "monarchist"; if the RNA is criticized for its human rights record, the perpetrator is a certified "anarchist" or even a "Maoist." Fallacious arguments but prevalent nonetheless.

Take for example the assassination of the mayoral candidate of Janakpur or the attempted assassination of the candidate in Lalitpur. Are these acts to be condoned by political agents? This is textbook, cold blooded, ideologically driven murder. Period. While the municipal candidates are being picked off and intimidated, our parliamentary candidates are incapable of speaking out. Why? God forbid anyone who would take a principled stand, look terror in the eye and call a murder what it is. For that would be the "monarchist" or anit-seven party thing to do. Ridiculous, but true. While Mr. Ian Martin diplomatically requests the Maoist leadership to refrain from acts of violence, our party leaders are incapable of uttering anything of substance. This is how polarized we have become.

Under ordinary circumstances nonconfrontational positions would feature prominently in vibrant debates, albeit with one qualification - the debates would be on how to fix what is wrong and would be undertaken by engaging and negotiating, not by accusing, name calling, branding and instigating.

Nothing is accomplished when debates are conducted within polarized camps - ever tried to debate the virtues of strict religious interpretation with a fundamentalist group? Why bother? But try arguing for ideological accommodation amongst the diaspora and that'll get you branded before you can say "what?" This is how polarized Nepalis have become.

When democratic credentials are measured by one's degree of radical thought, it's not progressive, it's just insane. Calibrated opposition to an indisputable wrong is one thing. Consciously abetting competitive radicalization is another.

Refusing to fall prey to a platform raised on divisions need not necessarily be construed as submission. Resisting the success of such a strategy by holding one's ground is counterintuitive opposition and yet it's also the most effective opposition. Unfortunately, when one's democratic currency is equated with confrontational positions, everyone sings to the tune of polarity.

When reality takes a back seat to ideology, polarity is exacerbated. The current ideological camps have gravitated so far to their respective extremes that we're left endlessly debating every tragedy to theoretical oblivion. The real tragedy is that owing to this tendency, genuine calamites are excused, even condoned, as long as they do not impact a specific dogmatic camp. Isn't this a tragedy?

On a different note, endorsing general shutdowns as a political vehicle is a questionable "democratic" practice. How "democratic" is something that is enforced through the threat of violence? Nepal has acquired notoriety for the number of documented rights abuses. Tactics such as "bandhs" only add to the long list of grievances. Everyone loses out, especially those for whom a day's wages are critical in financial terms. This is nothing to be proud of and yet this is not a debate that is had because of a myopic focus in partisan terms.

When innocent people become casualties of a crossfire, the ideological interpretations are as follows: for the seven party plus Maoist alliance, it's the RNA's fault for firing indiscriminately; for the King's camp, it's the Maoists' fault for ambushing the patrol. Does anyone from the leftist camp dare insinuate that being a soldier does not mean every bullet finds its intended target? Can anyone from the rightist camp break tradition and demand an inquiry into why a firefight took place amongst a civilian population?

The answers are "no" and "no." Welcome to an age where the perception of political correctness carries more weight than the act of being politically correct. We are all willing victims of orchestrated divisions - willing because we see it happening and yet do nothing to oppose it.

The irony in these observations is that as parties to the conflict move further apart, they experience artificial empowerment - "our support base is stronger than ever, we must be taking the right steps." Right? Wrong.

No one within the seven party camp dares question their Maoist partners. No one in the government dares question its leadership. This isn't about subservience or blind faith, it's about self-deluded rivalries and misguided loyalties in every direction. Talk about rhetorical "power" emanating from proponents of "democracy."

For undying supporters of democratic ideals, it's high time we accepted, in principle and practice, that democracy isn't about "me" and "them," it's about "us." That's right, it's not about widening the rift, it's about bridging the divide; and, it's certainly not about being artificially intellectual, but about being sufficiently intelligent. In practice, it's about seeing through the polar haze and resisting the temptation to elevate "me, myself and I" on imaginary democratic pedestals.

The Truth Has To Be Faced

The current divisions amongst Nepalis has resulted in very distorted perceptions of reality. The most harmful of these is the belief that one's success is based on the failure of one's opposition. As a corollary, this is the notion that "as long as my opposition is doing worse, I am relatively better off."

In the world of sport, this line of thought is necessarily true. But in the world of politics, it is false. For as long as Pareto improvements are attainable, failure-based successes are insufficient conditions for political triumph.

In translation this implies that undermining moderate elements of political parties does not qualify as a success factor for the government. Simultaneously, undermining the government's initiative to hold elections should not be a source of pride for the mainstream parties, although it might make tactical sense, momentary movement sense.

When people are killed, the consequences that society faces as a whole is the heart of the issue. The ideological inclinations of the deceased is irrelevant. While at a micro level those deceased may be Maoists or RNA soldiers, at a macro level, they are all humans. The loss of every life is a human tragedy, a national tragedy, a local tragedy and perhaps, a partisan tragedy. Not the other way around. When human losses owing to large scale firefights are portrayed exclusively as security successes or failures, the morality of the issue is lost in translation.

The Maoist attack on Tansen is an example used to refute the assertion of an improved security situation. Taken in the context of the incident itself, the argument may hold merit. But taken in the larger context of "everything else," the claim is an unethical basis upon which to exact political retribution. Judging by where Nepal is today, the critical component of "everything else" is really lacking in everything else.

The truth is, had the current government engaged moderate elements a year ago, we may not be where we are today. Then again, if February 1 was designed to force the parties to reform, then engaging them last year can be seen to have been pointless by those in power.

The same logic applies to moderate political elements. Engaging the government a year ago may have exposed these elements to the wrath of extremists from within. Unfortunately, the cost in lost credibility of proposing forwarding conciliatory overtures is exponentially higher. This renders the likelihood of dialogue more improbable but at the same time, all the more essential.

Skewing these realities to the benefit of any single group is unlikely to yield desirable outcomes. Neither a revisionist approach aimed at manipulating the wrongs of the past nor a reductionist approach aimed at discrediting a single group is sufficient.

This is not to suggest that apologies all around will solve every crisis in the country. But the exhibition of proportional accountability would be a good start.

Although fundamentally flawed, there is enough rationale to justify an armed uprising and even more to justify a hardline response. The continued propagation of one and neglect of the other is what is happening today. This approach guarantees more of the same, not less.

Given the myriad of dynamics that are in play, the siloed solutions are listed below. Depending on the political mood of the masses, it is likely that modified versions of the strict ideas below will materialize in the days ahead. The options outlined herein are not uncommon, but are made as viable alternatives, not as manifestations of political revenge.

Reviving Krishna Prasad Bhattarai

There is one person who could possibly help. An all party interim government with Krishna Prasad Bhattarai at the helm might be the best option at this late stage. Krishna Prasad Bhattarai has many qualities that make him stand out.

He has been semi retired for years, so he can be said to have been sitting on some kind of a middle ground. Unlike the likes of Girija Koirala and Madhav Nepal, Krishna Prasad Bhattarai actually is on normal, good, human being to human being kind of terms with the king. Bhattarai does not think the king is the devil, the king does not think Bhattarai is subhuman. Bhattarai's democratic credentials are second to none in Nepal. All parties will accept his leadership. Most importantly he has the political skills. He can get people to come along, he knows how to diffuse tense situations with a great sense of humor. He knows how to build coalitions. He is a year younger than Girija. And recently he announced he plans on living for 20 more years.

There need not be any attachment to any particular ideological camp - whether that be the camp of the rightists or the leftists. Tendencies towards self-preservation can be understood for all groups. For example, the King may strike a bargain. He could ask that a constitutional monarchy that does not command the army be preserved, and the guarantee rest with the Supreme Court. And that everything else can go to a constituent assembly. That would be Bhattarai's mandate. He would be given a year to hold peace talks with the Maoists, disarm them, or integrate the two armies or whatever, and then hold elections to a constituent assembly.

For a man who is not exactly famous for winning elections, this might be a good assignment, and a great way to cement his place in history. Otherwise the country will likely just continue with its political and military stalemates. Peace making is a skill. Some people are good soccer players, some people are not so good soccer players. Krishna Prasad Bhattarai is a very good soccer player. He might be the only person who could save the country. Appears to be that the solution to the triangular conflict lies outside the triangle. Bhattarai could do what the UN could not. He is as neutral as the UN for the three forces, but someone with a much more intimate knowledge of the local conditions. The seven party alliance and the Maoists get a constituent assembly, the king keeps his crown, and the country gets peace. And Bhattarai gets to chew on his paan. This is quite a formula.

Goal: Peace, Democracy

Curiously all three parties to the conflict profess the goals of peace and democracy. So it is important for them to discuss the meaning the terms have for them.

The Maoists have made an ideological shift from a communist republic to a democratic republic. That is a huge leap for them. They also have professed to honorably disarm.

The UML has openly come forth for a democratic republic. That might be a smart move to not lose too many of its cadres to the Maoists in a peaceful, multi-party democratic setup, or to possibly even gain at the Maoists' expense. But the other six parties of the seven party alliance have not been as forthcoming. Girija Koirala has not ceased talking in terms of a ceremonial monarchy. And he towers over the seven party alliance.

The king has consistently paid lip service to the twin concepts of constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy. One can ideologically disagree with the very existence of the monarchy, but it is realistic to feel the king's natural instincts to preserve the monarchy.

If the monarchy were to no longer command the army, or if the army were to be disbanded altogether, and if the crown were to have zero involvement in the country's politics, and if the monarchy were to not cost the country a dime because it generates a lot of tourism revenue for the economy, and there is a clause in the next constitution that allows the parliament to bring the monarchy to an end through a super majority of 75% or more, is that as good as a republic? Would the king be willing to negotiate for a constituent assembly that looks at every issue except that of a strictly ceremonial monarchy? Would the Maoists agree to such a constituent assembly? Will the UML?

The Ball Is In The King's Court

Proponents of democracy have with them the means to chart out a nonviolent path to a republic, if this become the agreed upon end goal. The Maoists are stronger today than ever before. They have been relentlessly attacking the urban centers including Kathmandu itself. The king should not underestimate his foes. And his extremist options might only temporarily postpone his worst fears.

Monarchs do not grow up negotiating with non monarchs as equals. So the king might have a temperamental deficiency which is understandable. But he has to be open to back channel efforts by others who do not belong squarely to any of the three political camps. Otherwise he just ends up putting the country through even more pain, and possibly helps bring the monarchy to an absolute end.

The worst case scenarios do not look at all pretty.

Put Your Cards On The Table, Start At The End

It is for all three camps to make clearer their stands in a public way before they can even attempt to negotiate and make principled compromises.

If the Maoists had stuck to their goal of a communist republic, the state might have had no option but to seek a military solution to the insurgency. A more enlightened leadership would also have looked at creative political options whereby you reinvent democracy so as to steal the Maoists' political and social thunder, eat their lunch.

Similarly if the king is bent on being an activist monarch, the democratic camp has no option but to go all the way to a republic. That is why it is for the king to come forth to an agreeable definition of a constitutional monarchy, one that the politial parties might be able to live with even when it is not at all sure the parties will settle even for that. After all, if the monarchy is to function in its role as a unifying force for the nation, then this function should be carried out with purpose, not only prose.

The question each camp has to be willing to publicly, openly answer is what is your final bottomline? Start at the end, and then talk back all the way from there to the present. That is how you would build a roadmap.

A Fourth Way

If the three political forces are pulling in three different directions, if the three are eager to seek peace and reconciliation, there necessarily will have to be sought a fourth way, a way that has not been envisioned by any of the three forces.

But first the king has to step up to the plate and commit to a negotiated solution to the conflict. Just like the Maoists and the seven parties negotiated with each other, the king now has to negotiate with them. There will be give and take. He does not have the option to reject the constituent assembly idea, but he might have the option to seek a modified version of the same. That is what negotiations are for.

Give And Take

You don't make peace with friends. You make peace with enemies, with opponents. The very idea of peace means there has to be give and take.

The Maoists gave up the idea of a communist republic. They might have to come around to the idea of disbanding their army. On the other hand they could hope to negotiate for a very progressive constitution.

The seven party alliance might have to give up on the idea of House revival and possibly settle on an outsider like Krishna Prasad Bhattarai to lead the transition. As long it is the seven party alliance that sets its agenda and not Bhattarai, it might not be that hard for them to reposit their trust in Bhattarai's political skills and seeming neutrality. Bhattarai could also end up uniting the two Congress factions on the side. Koirala might like the idea if he is concerned about his party's legacy. A unified Congress might act a bulwark to the UML and the Maoists in a multi-party framework, or you are looking at red as far as eyes can see, post-peace: both the Maoists and the UML are on a major resurgence. The country might not go Maoist, but it sure looks like it will go decidedly leftist even post-peace. A Congress that is unified before the country goes through a constituent assembly might also reassure the king to behave better during the negotiations, because the Congress will likely not go to the assembly with the slogan of a republic.

The House revival idea can not be larger and more important than the idea of peace and democracy. If need be the idea has to be sacrificed for the larger good of the people. A revived House would be nice to have, but if it is between that and permanent peace, how much sense would it make to insist on House revival?

The king has to take the first step towards negotiations. He has to conceptually agree to the very idea of it. Then he has to accept the idea of a constituent assembly. He could negotiate for a constituent assembly that is different than the one envisioned by the parties and the Maoists. He has to be open to the idea that even if the monarchy stays on, it will not get the space it had in the 1990 constitution.

The army must be open to the idea of fundamental restructuring from the top down, or possibly even getting disbanded altogether.

The Maoists need to focus on their essence of possible classlessness and social justice. They should not be too eager to bookishly imitating Mao: Mao was not exactly the smartest kid on the block. The parties should offer utmost flexibility, more so than the other two camps since it is the very nature of democrats to accomodate even those we disagree with. Democracy can have creative applications. The king should feel happy about the fact that the monarchy, just like all social institutions, can be reinvented. It does not have to imitate any other monarchy, and it sure needs to and can make a fundamental departure from its past to its own benefit and for the benefit of the country. The people in the army should be open to the possibility of participating in the larger economy.

To look for a creative solution is to respect the essense of each actor, and then to put forth a combination that breaks new ground that is satisfactory to all actors for the most part. All expectations will not be met, but many will. That is possible.

This conflict need not be a zero sum game. The sum can be larger than the whole of the parts. A creative synthesis might offer each actor more than what they might have managed on their own even if they got their way. Peace is good news, it can be great news.

All this still does not change the fact that the ball is in the king's court.

Confidence Building Measures

The warm up part would be for the king to be open to the idea of back channel communications between some people in his camp and some leaders in the democratic camp. These would be by individuals who are not members of either camp, and possibly have little direct influence in either.

The first step would be to release all political prisoners. The second would be to negotiate the outlines. All these could lead to direct, formal talks that would make the final decisions.

Disband The Two Armies Before Constituent Assembly Elections

That is one option that can be taken under UN supervision. The UN is best qualified to undertake such a responsibility, but all major powers can be involved in the undertaking. But this is not the only option.

Another option would be to integrate the two armies to be followed by an overall downsizing. Yet another would be a limited integration. The major foreign powers could contribute to a fund that would help retrain the fighters for the civilian economy jobs. Powers that have been willing to chip in tens of millions of dollars in military aid to prevent the emergence of a communist republic should be willing to put up similar amounts to send all armed folks into the general economy. Peace is worth the price.

If disbanding the two armies be less problematic than disarming the Maoists, or integrating the two armies, why not go for it?

General Amensty

If there is a peaceful resolution to the current conflict, that might still lead to a Peace And Reconciliaition Commission, but it would be one that is not vengeful. There could be general amnesty as a price to be paid for permanent and meaningful peace.

Dipta Shah

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